

ORIGIN ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**AIRGRAM**

POL 2 IRAQ

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A-299  
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 15 SEP 29 AM 7 22

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: September 23, 1965

SUBJECT : Courtesy Call on New Minister of Agriculture: Political Content

REF :

Enclosed is a memorandum of the political content of a discussion on September 21 with Dr. Akram al-Jaf, a Kurd, Minister of Agriculture in the September 6 government.\* (Economic aspects of this discussion are reported separately.)

This aspect of the discussion was significant for:

1. Dr. Jaf's guarded optimism with respect to increasing civilian participation in the Iraqi cabinet which presumably related to the new cabinet, which he said would be announced "today or tomorrow," as well as to the previous cabinet.
2. Dr. Jaf's indication that, though reluctant to become a Minister, he had accepted the agriculture portfolio both in the hope of helping improve the country's agriculture and, "as a Kurd," to contribute in some way to a peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem.

*J. Wesley Adams*  
J. Wesley Adams  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure:

Memcon, Sept. 21, 1965.

\*Dr. Jaf was continued as Minister of Agriculture in the new government announced in the late evening of September 21.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals,  
declassified after 12 years.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: Chargé: JWAdams:mjb:9/21/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Enclosure 1, Page 1  
A-299 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 21, 1965

Participants: HE Akram al-Jaf, Iraqi Minister of Agriculture  
J. Wesley Adams, American Chargé d'Affaires a.i.  
Bryan Baas, Second Secretary of Embassy

Subject: Courtesy Call: Political Content

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In a 45-minute courtesy call on the new Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Akram al-Jaf, prominent independent Kurd, the following political subjects were discussed (the economic aspects are separately reported):

1. The Current Political Situation. The Minister volunteered that events of the past week (the attempted coup against President Aref by Prime Minister Arif Abd al-Razzaq) "were a shock to us all." He thought that a new cabinet would be announced today or tomorrow. While giving no indication whether he expected to be included, his exposition earlier in the conversation of his plans for the Ministry suggested that he expected to continue in office.

Dr. Jaf remarked that he was encouraged by the increasing civilian participation in the cabinet. His mention of this fact suggested that he expected this would be true of the cabinet about to be announced as well as of the cabinet which assumed office on September 6.

Jaf said he himself was not a politician, that he was happy with his job as head of the Tobacco Monopoly where there were many things to be done, and he had not wanted to be a Minister. However, "as a Kurd," he could not avoid the opportunity, when urged to join the cabinet, of trying to exercise some influence toward settlement of the Kurdish question.

2. The Kurdish Question. This issue, Dr. Jaf said, must be solved by discussion and not by fighting. The Kurds and Arabs, he said, must live together and the Arabs must be assured that the Kurds do not intend ultimately to seek independence. If the Kurds can provide this assurance, then it would be up to the Arabs to grant Kurdish national rights (unspecified).

Responding to a question, Dr. Jaf acknowledged that Ambassador Strong had previously outlined to him American policy on the Kurdish question. I repeated that, as he knew, Kurdish sources on the one hand had sought US military assistance which we had declined, believing that the problem was a domestic issue

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
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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Enclosure 1, Page 2  
A-299 from Baghdad

which must be solved through negotiation. On the other hand, the Government of Iraq and many Arabs seemed convinced the US in fact was supplying military assistance. The US was thus caught in the middle. We intended to stay out of the dispute but would continue to urge all parties to seek a peaceful accommodation. The Minister expressed his understanding of the US view.

In departing we expressed our hope to Dr. Jaf that he would be in the new cabinet and, in that event, wished him well both in his job as Minister and in his efforts to promote a Kurdish settlement.

  
J. Wesley Adams

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Authority NRD 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/08

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-278

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1965 SEP 24 AM 10 27

INFO : BASRA

RM/AN  
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION  
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: September 16, 1965

SUBJECT: Kurdish Developments Affecting IPC

REF :

Mr. Rudi Jackli, who is Acting Manager of IPC in Iraq during Mr. William Stewart's absence on leave, called at his request on September 8. He discussed prospects for an oil settlement under the new Government (reported separately) and Kurdish events as they affect IPC, as follows:

Security Situation at Kirkuk Installations. Mr. Jackli showed me a copy of a letter dated September 4, 1965 from the Ministry of Oil stating that members of the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) were known to be engaged in planning sabotage and asking the IPC to exercise special precautions in the protection of the oil installations.

The letter, Jackli said, was actually addressed to the Mosul Petroleum Company and Basrah Petroleum Company in addition to IPC. The intent, Ministry officials had explained, was that security precautions be exercised even in the Basra area, far from the scene of Kurdish hostilities. Jackli did not know what the Government feared in that area but supposed they had in mind such extreme things as the sinking of tankers, or sabotage of pipelines. Personally, he thought there was no Kurdish sabotage danger whatsoever in the Basra region.

Jackli said that his company was now preparing a draft reply which would state that they would take ordinary precautions but would emphasize that responsibility for security rested with the usual security authorities. The most effective of these authorities, Jackli commented, was Divisional Headquarters of the Army and he intended addressing a separate letter to them asking what they would suggest the company do beyond what it is already doing.

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Downgraded at 3-year intervals.

Declassified after 12 years.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

Chargé: JWA: jmb: 9/15/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

POL: ESDuncan

1965 SEP 24 PM 4 52

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
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, A-278 from Baghdad

Jackli said that the installations in and around Kirkuk had been subject to no more harassment than in normal times. Occasionally, some of their equipment was hit by stray bullets but they regarded this as normal, the activity of peasants exercising their rifles.

Blockade Measures Against the Kurds. Jackli commented that unusual measures were being taken in the Kirkuk area, in an effort to prevent supplies from reaching the Kurdish insurgents. Gasoline, he said, is being dispersed four gallons at a time and cars leaving Kirkuk are actually being stopped at the outskirts of town and excess gasoline siphoned out of the tanks. Similarly, cars are searched for spare parts, such as fan belts. The Government, he went on, has made no special demands on IPC to control its supplies of automobile spare parts, knowing that much greater quantities exist outside of IPC warehouses. The Government, however, has asked them to account for all spare parts for their radio equipment, since the IPC installations are the only ones outside Government hands. The company, he said, has refused this demand, asserting that it would be extremely difficult to account for parts used and available at its various stations. According to Jackli, the Government is clamping down on radio spares in the hope of keeping these from the recently-opened clandestine Kurdish radio.

  
J. Wesley Adams  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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AGR	COM	FRB	FROM : American Embassy Baghdad			DATE: September 4, 1965		
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT : UAR Embassy Counselor's Comments on Kurds, the Iraqi Government, and "Wars of National Liberation".					
TR	XMB	AIR	REF :					
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	<p>Enclosed is a memorandum of conversation of August 27 between Mahmoud Fawzi Kamel, Counselor UAR Embassy in Baghdad, and the Chief of the American Embassy Political Section.</p> <p>The UAR Counselor reaffirmed a UAR policy line of refusing material assistance to the Kurds while counseling the Iraqi government to seek a peaceful solution. The UAR has urged settlement, especially in the interest of stability, but he thought the regime considers itself too weak to accept an accommodation with the realities of Kurdish culture. The GOI had decided that a military solution was the only feasible one and had misjudged its ability to accomplish this. He asserted that the GOI had established conclusively that goods and personnel were being supplied across the Iranian border to the Kurds. He was not sanguine on the immediate prospects for negotiations although he agreed these should be encouraged.</p> <p>Mahmoud saw the void between the regime and the people as the main obstacle to a stable regime in Iraq. This had indeed been the problem of succeeding regimes from the time of Nuri. He thought the solution lay in adequate development of the Socialist Union institution. He observed that the system had not yet worked well in Egypt despite the greater confidence of the government there and its relative acceptance by the people, but he was confident the Arab Socialist Union as an institution would ultimately be successful in Egypt. The problem in Iraq was more difficult.</p> <p>GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.</p>					
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FORM 52 DS-323			CONFIDENTIAL			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
Drafted by: POL:ESDuncan:egaplj:9/4/65			Classified and Classification Approved by: Enoch S. Duncan, Counselor for Political Aff.			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
Clearances: J. Wesley Adams, Charge' d'Affaires ad interim								

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Airgram No. 237, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

In response to comment, he acknowledged there were fallacies and dangers in the concept of "wars of national liberation" as advocated all around the world by the communists. He thought the merits of individual cases of uprisings should be examined, however, and differentiated from externally based subversion. On Vietnam, the American Embassy officer stressed the continuing United States initiatives to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table, yet without result. Mahmoud referred to Indian and Yugoslav approaches to the UAR to ask it to explore possibilities of negotiations. In the discussion of Vietnam, Mahmoud appeared especially impressed by a reference to the campaign of systematic assassination of village and provincial leaders by the Viet Cong in the period leading up to the present high pitch of insurgency. He expressed interest in learning more about this phase of the Vietnam insurgency.

For the Charge' d'Affaires ad interim:



Enoch S. Duncan  
Counselor for Political Affairs

Enclosure:  
As stated

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Enclosure  
Airgram No. 237  
Baghdad, Iraq

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 27, 1965

Participants: Mahmoud Fawzi Kamel, Counselor, UAR Embassy  
              Enoch S. Duncan, Counselor, American Embassy

Subject: Kurds; Iraqi Government Situation; and "Wars of National Liberation"

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The following points were developed in an uninterrupted conversation of more than one hour with Mahmoud Fawzi Kamel, UAR Embassy, at a buffet dinner on August 27:

1. Kurdish Problem

We went into this topic - the Kurdish Problem - from a discussion, described below, of "wars of national liberation" and the fallacies and dangers of this concept as supported and encouraged by the communist world. I abhorred the waste and dissipation of the Iraqi government's resources on this conflict and recalled the United States policy line that the Kurdish problem is an internal Iraqi matter which we would encourage both sides to resolve in a peaceful humanitarian way.

Mahmoud said the UAR policy on this matter had been consistent from the days of Qasim to the present. Kurdish representatives had repeatedly asked them for material assistance which they had declined to give. At the same time, they had counseled the present regime that a solution was essential to stability and that the feasible route was negotiation and accommodation. The problem, Mahmoud said, was that the present Iraqi government felt itself basically too weak to reach a negotiated settlement. Individuals who would assume responsibility for any feasible accommodation of the realities of Kurdish culture would be vulnerable to attacks from other personalities, and so it went.

I recalled the comment of a Kurd (whom I described not quite accurately as an independent moderate Kurd) to the effect that whatever regime reached a reasonable solution with the Kurds would be the durable regime in Iraq. I said that despite all the explanations I had heard, I was unable to comprehend the reason why the government resumed fighting last spring. Mahmoud responded that during the negotiations both sides had reiterated mutually unreasonable demands and the Iraqi regime had decided that the only feasible solution was a military one. They had mistakenly thought that they could achieve such a solution in about two months time.

With respect to Iranian aid to the Kurds, Mahmoud said the government had, by border surveillance and reconnaissance, established conclusively that goods and personnel were moving across the border. I asked what his information was as to volume and consequent effect on the campaign. I also observed for the record that the border area was wild and occupied by Kurds on both sides. Mahmoud said the Iraqi government had satisfied itself that Iran was supplying heavy modern weapons and training groups of Kurds in Iran. Pressed on the number being trained, he

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Enclosure, page two  
Airgram No. 237  
Baghdad, Iraq

referred to several groups of twenty. I remarked that this seemed hardly enough to have a major influence on Kurdish strength. It was not, for example, in the same category and effect as the massive intervention of the North Vietnamese military units and cadres. Mahmoud responded that the Iranian objective seemed merely to give enough aid to keep the harassment of the Iraqi regime going.

Mahmoud said the situation seemed to have evolved - and deteriorated - to the point that it would be some time before an effective negotiation might be undertaken by the government. We agreed it was desirable to encourage the government in this direction.

2. Iraqi Government Problems

Mahmoud commented that the present Iraqi regime, as was the case with preceding regimes, found itself set apart, with no rapport with the people of the country. Similarly the entire population in all walks had no identification with the government. In addition, the regime lacked confidence in itself. He saw the solution for a stable regime as the bridging of the gap between the regime and the people by the means of the Socialist Union. The UAR faced the same problem; the difference being that the regime had confidence and had inspired a reasonable amount of confidence on the part of the general population. He said the Arab Socialist Union in the UAR did not work very well, but that the Egyptian regime had been practical in recognizing its mistakes, and he believed the Socialist Union would eventually work as a bridge between the government and the people. I suggested that in Iraq's case perhaps the first bridge might be practical and wise steps toward solving major outstanding issues such as the Kurdish problem and the lack of economic development and normal business.

3. "Wars of Liberation"

This was the first topic taken up in our conversation. Our discussion began by my noting the widespread favorable reaction to the Nasser-Feysal agreement for cooperation in a solution of the Yemen problem. I subsequently commented that it was very distressing to see the fabric of civilization being threatened in so many places by all manner of irresponsible challenges of legitimate governments. Closely related was the recourse to violence in regional disputes by the very countries which presume to counsel peace and even retreat from aggression in other areas. Entangled with all of this was the dangerous concept of the "wars of national liberation" which the communist world endorsed as a vehicle justifying its intervention and trouble making. I lumped together the Congo, the Southern Sudan and the Iraqi-Kurdish problem as illustration of some of the situations that endorsement of "wars of national liberation" would tend to legitimize. It appeared that any dissident minority group was being accorded a right to attack its legitimate government despite reasonably established national boundaries. One could see, I suggested, even the Egyptian Coptic population opting for "national liberation". Mahmoud thought it necessary to look at each case on its

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Authority <u>NNO 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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Enclosure, page three  
Airgram No. 237  
Baghdad, Iraq

merits. He acknowledged, however, that there were many dangerous, and also, ridiculous aspects to the concept of "national liberation" as being so blithely endorsed and supported around the world. He acknowledged the dangers and the improprieties of such communist interventions as Cuba's efforts to infiltrate arms and men into Latin American countries and the North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam.

We discussed briefly the Vietnamese situation, with Mahmoud referring to the Indian and Yugoslav request that the UAR seek to explore means of persuading Hanoi and Peking to negotiate. I recalled the latest efforts by the United States to persuade Hanoi to come to the negotiating table, referring specifically to the United States willingness to consider suspension of bombing of North Vietnam if the North Vietnamese would make an appropriate gesture, and our further indication of willingness for Viet Cong representatives to join the North Vietnamese at the conference table. I said our recent military steps should do much to convince the North Vietnamese and Peking that we simply would not let them win a military decision in South Vietnam. We hoped this would bring them to the conference table although as yet there was no sign.

Mahmoud appeared especially impressed by my reference to the campaign of systematic assassination of village and provincial leaders by the Viet Cong in the period leading up to the major military effort by the Viet Cong. I pointed out that this type of wholesale terrorism and campaign to destroy the government's authority throughout the country seemed hardly typical behavior in an indigenous civilian uprising. He expressed interest in learning more about and understanding this early phase of the communist-inspired insurgency.

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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L	FBO	AID	FROM : AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD		DATE: AUGUST 29, 1965	
AGR	COM	FRB	SUBJECT: Local Political Situation		REF	
INT	LAB	TAR	1		7	
TR	XMB	AIR	Enclosed is a memorandum of conversation with Indian Ambassador Sadath Ali Khan on August 22, 1965. The main points of interest are the following:			
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	1. Ambassador Khan concluded from a recent talk with the UAR Ambassador that the latter desires to reduce local tensions and help stabilize the regime; and, to this end, the UAR Ambassador is counseling the so-called Nasserists to refrain from agitating against the regime. Ambassador Khan does not see constitutional union as a UAR objective. Rather UAR objectives are preservation of a sympathetic regime in Iraq and some economic benefits from the relationship.			
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OSD	USIA	NSA	2. Ambassador Khan relayed the former Russian Ambassador's report of Foreign Office Undersecretary Khadim Khalaf lecturing him on support of the Kurdish "bandits". The Russian's reply was to note the Iraqi government's willingness a few months ago to negotiate with these same "bandits".			
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		NSC	3. According to the Indian Ambassador, Tahir Yahya was responsible, over Aref's initial opposition, for Iraq's high level representation at the UAR's Revolution Anniversary celebrations.			
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			GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified			
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Drafted by: POL:ESDuncan:plj:8/29/65			Contents and Classification Approved by: Enoch S. Duncan			
Clearances: Charge: JWAdams						

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Enclosure  
Airgram No. 227  
Baghdad, Iraq

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

August 22, 1965

Participants: Sadath Ali Khan, Indian Ambassador  
J. Wesley Adams, American Charge' d'Affaires ad interim  
Enoch S. Duncan, Counselor for Political Affairs

Subject: Local Political Situation

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The Indian Ambassador called at his initiative. In the conversation he developed his views on the local political scene around three main points as follows:

1. UAR Attitudes - A great deal of the Indian Ambassador's presentation was built around a conversation the previous week with UAR Ambassador Hewedy who had this time sought him out. Ambassador Khan commented that his impression was that when the UAR Ambassador felt himself in command of the local situation and UAR fortunes were riding high, he was relatively less accessible. This was true even for Ambassador Khan even though they were personal friends and relations between India and the UAR were warm.

According to Ambassador Khan, Ambassador Hewedy asked what he had heard on Ba'th activity. He had responded by pointing out that the Ba'th had no power base and had alienated itself by its past performance. In what was apparently a tour d'horizon Ambassador Hewedy had generally deplored the performance of former Guidance Minister Farhan and the rest of the group of Subhi 'Abd al-Hamid that had resigned in support of Farhan. He indicated he was encouraging the government to improve relations with this group, perhaps bringing into the cabinet at least associates of Subhi and Farhan. His general indication was of working for reducing the local tensions and helping stabilize the regime.

Ambassador Hewedy had described in some detail Farhan's arrival and behavior in Cairo in July. He had been in a great rage. When he finally calmed down enough to explain his problem to Hewedy and the Iraqi Ambassador he had violently denounced Aref. Hewedy had responded by stressing the legitimacy of the Presidential authority and the necessity of respect for it.

Ambassador Khan concluded from his talk with Hewedy that the UAR was counseling the extremist "Nasserist" group to be quiet and avoid disturbing the stability of the regime. Ambassador Khan subscribed to a suggestion that the Subhi-Farhan "Nasserist" group were as much an embarrassment as an asset to the UAR objectives vis a vis Iraq. Ambassador Khan excluded constitutional union as a UAR objective. He thought UAR objectives toward Iraq were some economic

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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosure, page two  
Airgram No. 227  
Baghdad, Iraq

and trade benefits (the UAR like India was always hard up), perhaps some direct financial aid, and a sympathetic regime prepared generally to cooperate with the UAR on major area issues. He agreed that a major consideration was avoiding an Iraqi regime cooperating closely with a Syrian regime hostile to the UAR, or with the West.

2. Russian Position - Ambassador Khan recounted some anecdotes of the recently departed Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yakovlev's difficulty in getting to see the UAR Ambassador. He recalled one instance in which he had telephoned from the Indian Embassy seeking an appointment and Hewedy had been evasive.

The Russian Ambassador reported to the Indians that Khadim Khalaf had lectured him for Russia's support of the Kurdish "bandits and thieves". The Russian reported his reply as recalling that a few months before the Iraqi president had been calling Mulla Mustafa Barzani "brother" and negotiating with him. He purportedly ended the conversation by asking if the government of Iraq negotiated with "bandits".

3. Government Personality Conflicts - Ambassador Khan's information, based at least in part on his talk with the UAR Ambassador, was that Aref had resisted sending a delegation to the UAR for the July 23 celebrations, but Tahir Yahya had insisted. The latter had gone so far as to state that he would go at his own expense and on his own if Aref refused official sanction. Tahir Yahya argued that if a strong delegation did not go, there was the possibility of a UAR reaction which might include an unfavorable or even highly damaging statement in one of Nasser's speeches. Aref had finally relented. The result of course was an excellent public reception for Tahir Yahya and the Iraqi delegation and the tribute for Aref in Nasser's speech.

Ambassador Khan told a story about a certain hold over Naji Talib possessed by Tahir Yahya. Naji Talib reportedly wrote a letter to Qasim pledging his loyalty and pleading for restoration of his military pay or retirement rights. The letter had come into Tahir Yahya's possession from certain files, and faced with any conflict with Naji Talib, he brought out the letter.

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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

55 AIRGRAM

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A-188  
NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

Amman, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, Taiz, Tel Aviv

FROM : American Embassy Baghdad

DATE: August 17, 1965

SUBJECT: President Aref Announces Dissolution NCRC and Various Policy Positions in Newspaper Interview.

REF :

The Baghdad daily, al-Manar (The Lighthouse), published an exclusive interview with Iraqi President 'Abd al-Salam Muhammad Aref August 14. In replying to seventeen questions, President Aref announced significant recent developments and policy views which are summarized as follows:

He flatly affirmed that the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) established by Law No. 61 of 1964 had dissolved itself and distributed its powers and responsibilities to the presidency, the cabinet and the National Defense Council.

He carefully reaffirmed a role for private ownership and a private sector within the framework of socialism and a public sector.

He expressed a continued hope for the constructive development of the Arab Socialist Union and acknowledged there were difficulties in creating a practical and effective institution of this kind.

Other points included the following: (a) he would attend the upcoming United Nations General Assembly upon receipt of an invitation from the UN Secretary; (b) he denied rumors of obstacles to unity, attributing those rumors to "imperialism and its satellites"; (c) successful completion of the census proposed for October 14, 1965 would permit the arrangement and conduct of elections for a national assembly; (d) Iraqi embassies abroad have been instructed to consult with UAR embassies to coordinate efforts in the political field; (e) questioned as to reports of exceptional strength and capabilities of the British intelligence service in Iraq, he replied that the British service should accordingly have known in advance

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:ESDuncan:ega:8/16/65

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ESDuncan

Clearances:

J. Wesley Adams, Charge d'Affaires a.i.

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
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By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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Airgram No. 188, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

of the July 14 revolution: (f) he expressed appreciation for the willingness of the Kurdish brothers in the North to condemn the "armed gangs" and to help in crushing them: (g) he also found high morale among Iraqi soldiers and officers in the North.

For the Charge' d'Affaires a.i.

  
Enoch S. Duncan

Counselor for Political Affairs

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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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E	P	IO	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			1965 AUG 11 AM 8 04		
L	FBO	AIO	INFO: AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, BONN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DHAHRAN, JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA			BRANCH		
5/5	5/9	6	FROM : AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD			DATE: AUGUST 4, 1965		
27			SUBJECT: Current Iraqi Political Scene			file		
AGR	COM	FRB	REF :			JD		
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	XMB	AIR						
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RSP file  
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Having surmounted a major government crisis earlier in the month and publicly reaffirmed dedication to Arab unity throughout ceremonies marking both Iraqi and UAR revolutions, the Iraqi regime turned to the Kurdish problem with a vengeance. Press August 2 and 3 reported taking objective in both Penjwin and Mount Safin operations. President Aref visited troops in the North August 1-3 congratulating them on victories. His reported remarks belie earlier GOI claims that only military exercises are going on in the North. As a result of GOI victories, it may feel more confident it can prevent Kurdish problem from reaching international forum.

Meanwhile, Aref announced some days ago his intention to visit Najaf, a Shi'a power center, but the trip has not materialized, perhaps because of difficulty in arranging a meeting with Muhsin al-Hakim, paramount Shi'a divine.

The press is filled with considerable show of government activity on all fronts such as development plans, public works dedication, ceremonies and large budgets for reconstruction of the North.

Rumors of plots seem to be temporarily losing vitality and credibility as the regime gets on with normal business. Cabinet dissention is rumored over further socialization moves being urged by Khair al-Din Hasib, Acting Head Economic Establishment. The Ministers of Economy and

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Drafted by: POL:ESDuncan:plj:8/4/65  
Clearances: DCM:JWAdams AMB:RCStrong

Contents and Classification Approved by: Enoch S. Duncan

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05



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
Airgram No. 137, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

Industry reportedly offered their resignations but are at their desks.

The Iraqi-Syrian radio exchanges of vituperation continue.

Comment: The victories in the North do not appear decisive. These victories may in fact deceive the regime as to its capacity to achieve a military solution. On the surface the regime seems reasonably durable although few Baghdadis would give it more than a few months. The regime has not sought any gesture of United States support and is making every effort to demonstrate that really nothing has changed.


For the Ambassador:

  
Enoch S. Duncan  
Counselor for Political Affairs

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL IRAQ-US XR POL 17-4 265-IRA	
NEA-10			AIRGRAM		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	A-147	CONFIDENTIAL	XR-POL 2 IRAQ	
ARA	EUR	FE	NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR	
NEA	CU	INR	TO : SECSTATE		150 AUG 11 AM 5 04	
E	P	ID	INFO : ADANA, ALEPPO, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, LONDON, TABRIZ, TEHRAN		ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH	
L	FBO	AID	FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD		DATE: August 4, 1965	
SK 27	S/P 1	1	SUBJECT : President Aref's Lack of Interest in Call by Ambassador		REF : A-67, July 17, 1965	
AGR	CDM	FRB	POL 2 IRAQ ML		A-67 reported my offer to Foreign Minister Talib to meet with President Aref if Aref wished to see me before I departed August 5 on home leave. This airgram completes the record.	
INT	LAB	TAR	There has been no direct response from President Aref. Some three days after my offer, al-Manar, considered to be Aref's mouthpiece, pub- lished an editorial highly critical of President Johnson and followed with another a few days later. Something over a week ago Aref received the Soviet Ambassador on the occasion of his transfer to Moscow.		It seems reasonable to interpret the foregoing as reflecting con- tinuation of Aref's personal dislike and distrust for President Johnson and US policy in the Near East, and to indicate that despite the weakness of his regime Aref intends not to seek any type of gesture of support from the US. As a result of my offer to call, Aref had ready at hand the means to "balance" the Soviet Ambassador's call on him, but he chose not to "balance."	
TR	XMB	AIR	This experience would tend to confirm my belief, reported earlier, that basic improvement in the US position in Iraq is unlikely in the near term and that there could be a continuation of the previous slow deterioration.		 Robert C. Strong	
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.		FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out	
3	10	3	FORM 4-62 DS-323		CONFIDENTIAL	
OSD	USIA	NSA	Drafted by: AMB:RCStrong:mjb:8/4/65		Contents and Classification Approved by:	
45	3	3	Clearances:			

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Authority **NND 938522**

By **SC-NARA** Date **11/18/05**

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 2 IRAQ		
NEA-10			<b>AIRGRAM</b>			XR E 2 IRAQ		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-95			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
1	1		NO.			7 53		
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	INR	FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD			DATE: July 24, 1965		
E	P	IO	SUBJECT : Baghdad Chamber of Commerce Officials Discuss Current Economic/Political Situation			REF : CERP, Section D		
4			Mr. Hussein Ali ABD AL-HADI, Acting President of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Yousif AL-UZRI, Director General of the Chamber, and Mr. Sabih SHABIBI, Baghdad Merchant and Secretary of the Chamber, discussed with the reporting officer the effect on business of the recent Cabinet changes, the current plight of the Iraqi businessman, the nature of the public sector and the confusion between it and the private sector, and recent newspaper attacks on the Chamber for having criticized the Government Purchasing Board. A memorandum of conversation is enclosed.			For the Ambassador: Rupert Prohme Rupert Prohme First Secretary of Embassy		
L	FBO	AID	Enclosure:			Memcon dated July 22, 1965		
		S/P	Decontrolled following January 1, 1968			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
AGR	COM	FRB	FORM 102 DS-323			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
INT	LAB	TAR	Drafted by: ECON:CHS			Contents and Classification Approved by:		
TR	XMB	AIR	Clearances: AMB:RCStrong			7/24/65		
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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Enclosure 1, Page 1  
A-95, from Baghdad

July 22, 1965

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Hussein Ali Abd al-Hadi, Acting President, Baghdad Chamber of Commerce  
Mr. Yousif al-Uzri, Director General, Baghdad Chamber of Commerce  
Mr. Sabih Shabibi, Merchant and Secretary, Baghdad Chamber  
Cameron Sanders, Second Secretary


SUBJECT : Effect on Business of Recent Cabinet Changes; Newspaper Attacks on Chamber

I called on Mr. Abd al-Hadi following his invitation to have coffee with him in his office sometime (his favorite nephew, Ziad Abd al-Hadi, former service manager for Phillips appliances at African Iraqi, and I are good friends). Mr. Shabibi and Mr. Uzri joined us.

I asked Mr. Abd al-Hadi what he thought the outlook was for business in the light of the recent Cabinet changes. He said: "I think things will be much better, much better." Mr. Uzri interjected that the new Minister of Economy, Kadhim Abd al-Hamid, is their old colleague in the Chamber - he was Mr. Uzri's predecessor as DG of the Chamber for "fifteen or sixteen years; he has only been out for about a year; he is always here." I said that cabinet changes were not necessarily policy changes and asked what would be necessary to encourage businessmen to increase their financial commitments. Mr. Uzri said that the market would continue to be inhibited as long as the import license situation remained tight. He said that public opinion was a basic factor, that "what people believed" was important, and that merchants would continue to lack confidence in the intentions of the government toward them, as long as Iraq had the kind of government it presently has. Mr. Shibibi spoke up to say that he felt only two Ministers could be trusted or depended upon. All three men agreed that their friend, the new Minister of Economy, was one such individual, but Mr. Abd al-Hadi and Mr. Uzri inquired who the second might be. Mr. Shibibi said, "Dr. Abd al-Hassan (Zalzala, the Minister of Planning) ..." The others seemed to accept this. Mr. Shibibi gave an earnest discourse on the need in Iraq to get the Army out of politics and to restore constitutional and representative government. Mr. Uzri said that only in this way would the people have a means of securing their own interests, free from the whims of ignorant or reckless Army officers and "doctrinaire people" who are forever setting up some "huge apparatus to run everything" before they have worked out the objectives of such schemes or found the personnel to man them. He said that the confusion between the public and the private sectors in Iraq was a clear demonstration of this, that businessmen accepted the idea of a powerful public sector, now, but felt that it had encroached heedlessly and destructively on the private sector, with no thought of the consequences. Businessmen did not know where they stood.

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Enclosure 1, Page 2  
A-95, from Baghdad

Mr. Abd al-Hadi said: "It is like a man with two wives - he cannot satisfy them both; he must have order in his house and a clearly assigned role for each" (translation by Mr. Uzri).

I asked about recent newspaper attacks on the Chamber for having criticized government tea purchasing. Mr. Uzri said that the Chamber had addressed two successive letters to the former Minister of Economics, complaining about the government's excessive profit margin in tea and sugar, after its having justified the nationalization of the trade in both commodities on a basis of the high profits being made by the private merchants. The letters also questioned certain other alleged irregularities at the Government Purchasing Board. (Mr. Uzri commented to me that the government could have achieved its ends by having the Government Purchasing Board regulate the commodity trade, that this would have been appropriate and useful, but that government takeover and concentration of everything in the Purchasing Board's hands was ineffective and had not worked out in the public interest.) He said that the Chamber had received no direct acknowledgment of either letter from the government, but that an announcement had subsequently and abruptly been made that prices of tea and sugar would both be reduced by about 12½%, effective August 1. At almost the same time, however, newspaper attacks on the Chamber had been commenced in al-Thawra al-Arabiya, the official organ of the Arab Socialist Union.

All three men seemed gratified by the stand the Chamber had taken in this matter and felt that it had thus really fulfilled its obligation as group spokesman for the private Iraqi businessman, who could not risk speaking up on his own.

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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 2 Iraq		
NEA-10			<b>AIRGRAM</b>			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-83			CONFIDENTIAL		
1			NO.			HANDLING INDICATOR		
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 2		
NEA	CU	INR	INFO : AMMAN, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT,			See underlined portions		
E	P	IO	TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV					
L	FBO	AID	FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD			DATE: July 21, 1965		
	SP		SUBJECT: Conversation with UAR Ambassador: Situation in Iraq					
AGR	COM	FRB	REF :					
INT	LAB	TAR						
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Attached is memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Strong and UAR Ambassador Hewedy, summarizing Hewedy's remarks in response to comments and questions. Particular attention is invited to the comment section of the memorandum, which includes analysis of the over-all meaning of the recent GOI cabinet changes. One big question in everyone's mind following the denouement of the more than two weeks crisis was, of course, UAR reaction. Beirut's L'Orient (July 13, 1965) headlined the question of a "divorce" between Cairo and Baghdad. Hewedy's sometimes cautious but generally revealing statements provide a more sober perspective. In any event, US interests do not appear to be affected particularly, one way or the other, by the political change in Iraq.

Briefly, Hewedy attributed the cabinet crisis and changes to clash of personalities rather than principles. He saw no fundamental dispute over such things as Arab unity, nationalization, socialism, and the Arab Socialist Union.

He saw the GOI as weakened by the split and anticipates Aref at some later date wanting to bring some of the so-called Nasserite group back into the cabinet--minus, however, Farhan who had gone too far.

He expected GOI policy to remain the same on Arab unity and on Arab and international affairs.

He had no clear idea of GOI intentions re the Kurds but implied negotiations are a possibility, noting that the GOI and Kurds have never lost communication.

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Contents and Classification Approved by: Enoch S. Duncan

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
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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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A-83 from Baghdad, Page 2

US-UAR relations were also discussed briefly at Hewedy's initiative. He said the UAR desired improved relations and believes such feasible with some contribution by both sides.

For the Ambassador:

  
Enoch S. Duncan  
Counselor for Political Affairs

Enclosure:

Memcon, July 19, 1965.

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Airgram No. 83  
Enclosure I, page one  
Baghdad, Iraq

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Amin Hamid Hewedy, UAR Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, US Ambassador to Iraq

SUBJECT : Situation in Iraq

DATE : July 19, 1965

A. Iraq. The following summarizes remarks by Hewedy in response to my comments and questions:

1. Cause of Recent Crisis. Hewedy was caustic about Farhan's loss of temper, letter of resignation and departure for Cairo. His criticism had two grounds: a) the President of the Republic must be respected and his dignity upheld and b) Farhan's action was based on personal differences rather than on basic differences over principle. He was also caustic about the resignation of others, following Farhan to show solidarity with him. The greatest weakness of Iraq was the play of personal factors, the failure to base actions on agreed principles and policies and the unwillingness to compromise. Farhan, he thought, was finished in Iraqi politics, but he thought that in time the others, who had not burned their bridges, might find a way to make their peace and return to high positions. There were no basic differences between Aref, Tahir Yahya and the Subhi-Farhan group over such things as unity, nationalization, socialism, the Arab Socialist Union. It was not disputes over these things that brought the crisis but disputes over what persons were to hold what jobs and over personal comments made by one leader about another.

2. Current Situation. Hewedy thinks the GOI has been weakened by the split and thinks it likely that at some uncertain time Aref will want to bring Subhi's group back, minus Farhan who went too far. He expects GOI policy to remain the same on unity, Arab and international affairs and he commented that the Iraqis finally had all come, even Subhi's group, to understand and accept the UAR position on unity, that internal unity must first be achieved in Iraq. He noted the current stress by Aref and others on national unity, but said he had no idea what the GOI intended to do beyond saying the words. He had no idea whether the GOI intended to leave the leading officers of Subhi's group in their key positions or to transfer them. National unity meant satisfying the Kurds and Shi'as. Putting eight Shi'as in the cabinet as ministers was not the answer. The religious question was a serious one, for the Sunni shaykhs had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and the Shi'a religious leaders would be satisfied with nothing less than full control.

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Airgram No. 83  
Enclosure I, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

3. Kurds. Again, Hewedy had no clear idea what the GOI intended. He shared my understanding that things had been rather quiet and he had heard rumors of negotiation. His only comment was that the GOI and Kurds had never lost communication with each other, and both sides realized that major hostilities would rule out the possibility of a peaceful settlement. His implication was that negotiations were a possibility.

4. UAR Position. We got on to this by my comment that the UAR seemed to be reacting with great restraint to the political events in Iraq and my observation that Naji Talib had stopped/Cairo and must have had advice from Nasser to continue in the government and use his position of respect to try to stabilize things. Hewedy responded that the GOI did not intend to change its unity, Arab and foreign policies thus implying UAR acceptance of the recent change in personalities, and indirectly denied that Nasser had influenced Talib. Naji, he said, was his own man; he decided for himself what was right and what was wrong and acted on that basis only. Hence the respect in which he was held in all quarters, even without any political organization behind him. In the recent circumstances, Naji had decided it would be wrong to leave the GOI; he should continue in it and work for the things he believed in.

Comment: Hewedy's record in talks with me has been good. When he had been willing to discuss something he has not misled me though his remarks sometimes have required interpretation (as in two places above). When he has been unwilling to deal relatively frankly with a subject, he has simply evaded it.

His remarks summarized above lead me to believe that the UAR is really disgusted with the Nasserites here for acting like Iraqis rather than accepting UAR guidance. The UAR is likely to continue to work with Aref and to support him as President. The motives of Nasser in doing so may be mixed: a) he may have decided not to try to play too heavy a role in Iraqi internal affairs if only because Iraqis are not readily manageable; b) the new GOI's Arab and external policy will probably be satisfactory; c) the UAR probably can continue to obtain benefits from friendly collaboration with Iraq, particularly since in its weakness the GOI will want to lean over backward to keep an even keel; d) Nasser is not interested at present, after the fall of Ben Bella, to encourage people to think that he, Nasser, could go, too, so it is in his interest to facilitate an ultimate reconciliation between the GOI leadership and the Iraqi Nasserites and a return by the latter to participation in the GOI.

The UAR has found its ability to wield influence in Iraq on internal Iraqi affairs to be severely limited. This does not mean an end to UAR efforts at influence; it merely means more caution by the UAR in its efforts and a recognition of its limitations. The UAR will continue to exploit its possibilities within the limitations.

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Airgram No. 83  
Enclosure I, page three  
Baghdad, Iraq

It seems fair to conclude that for sometime, at least, UAR dealings with the Nasserites in Iraq will be in the direction of moderation, against efforts by them to work up a military coup against the GOI. However, only time will tell whether the Nasserites heed the advice. If they do not heed it and if the GOI refuses ultimately to take the Nasserites back in and otherwise ignores UAR interests and positions, the UAR attitude might change.

In our discussion Hewedy made no mention of Aref's health. By omitting reference to it, he may well have indicated that it is not a factor in the situation, i.e., there is no reason to believe that Aref is due to be incapacitated or die shortly. Aref's health has been the subject of many rumors and much speculation. He has lost a great deal of weight in six months and has become skinny; before he was well-padded. His eyes are not clear, being a muddy yellow. A few weeks ago he allegedly told his Chief of Protocol, a career diplomat, that he had a bad case of diabetes, had to lose a lot of weight and had to be careful with his diet. He has shown no sign of leaving Iraq for medical attention. He has maintained an active schedule. He shows no sign of physical decline, walking with a springy step as before and holding himself with a soldierly erectness.

A big test which must be faced before long is ratification of the IPC agreement and joint venture with INOC. Oil Ministry officials are reliably reported to exude confidence that the promised Ministerial Committee will soon be established to consider the agreement and that ratification is a foregone conclusion. Presumably the new ministers are pledged to sign the agreement. Will the UAR oppose it? Hewedy's attitude would seem to indicate that at least there will be no strong, overt opposition. The GOI may wait until the Algerian-French agreement is completed, for if the UAR in its desire to improve things with Boumedienne fails to oppose the Algerian-French agreement, ratification of the IPC agreement might be made easier for the GOI, particularly since the terms of the two agreements are not readily comparable.

US interests would not appear to be affected particularly one way or the other by the political change here. It seems unlikely that the GOI will be any more friendly and cooperative. On the other hand, in the absence of pressure from the UAR, the GOI will not have to prove its patriotism by being more antagonistic to the US. Thus we expect to go along roughly "as is" for a further period, the situation being neither good nor bad. Only time will tell whether the situation will deteriorate. We do not think it can improve much in any case.

B. US-UAR Relations. This was discussed very briefly with Hewedy at his initiative. The only comments made by Hewedy were:

1. The UAR desired to improve relations with the US; while it was clear that the UAR must make a real contribution to the improvement, the US must

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Airgram No. 83  
Enclosure I, page four  
Baghdad, Iraq

contribute as well. The UAR sometimes did things the US did not like, and the US sometimes did things the UAR did not like. It was necessary to sort things out and understand where each other's policy was fixed and where there was flexibility.

2. Apart from its desire to improve relations, the UAR believed it was feasible because: a) differences between the US and UAR were over matters entirely <sup>external</sup> to the UAR and thus more readily adjustable (implying considerable "give" by the UAR, potentially), and b) the UAR could see that the USG wished the improvement, too.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

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By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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# AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 22 AM 8 12

ADANA, ALEPPO, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, LONDON, TABRIZ, TEHRAN  
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FROM : AMERICAN EMBASSY BAGHDAD

DATE: JULY 17, 1965

SUBJECT: Foreign Minister's Views: on (a) Ambassador's possible meeting with President Aref (b) new government's policy and (c) Iranian aid to Kurds.

REF

## SUMMARY

After signing the book at the Presidential Palace July 14, Ambassador Strong paused to talk with Foreign Minister Najib Talib. The following points were developed in a conversation relatively long for such an occasion:

- (a) A meeting for the Ambassador with the Foreign Minister and possibly a meeting with President Aref prior to departure on home leave;
- (b) cabinet changes as signifying a more practical pursuit of essentially the same policies; and
- (c) the Foreign Minister's urging US influence to stop Iranian aid to the Kurds.

In the last connection, the Foreign Minister had used President Aref's speech - which expressed a desire for best relations with neighbors - on the previous evening as a basis to tell the Iranian Ambassador that Iran could now stop helping the Kurds.

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### Possible Meeting with President Aref

The Ambassador noted his scheduled departure on home leave, during which he would be consulting with senior officials in the US

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Drafted by: POL:ESDuncan:ega:7/17/65

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Clearances: Ambassador Robert C. Strong

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Authority NND 932522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Airgram No. 67, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

government, and obtained the Foreign Minister's agreement that a general discussion with the Foreign Minister would be useful prior to departure. The Ambassador added that while he had no reason himself to request a meeting with President Aref, it occurred to him that the President might wish to see him before his departure on leave to express any views the President might wish conveyed to US officials.

The Foreign Minister's immediate reaction was that a meeting with Aref would be useful. He would pass on the Ambassador's suggestion. He also expressed the hope that he would be present at such an interview.

Continuing Iraqi Policy

Ambassador Strong expressed pleasure at the Foreign Minister's continuing in his post and sought the Foreign Minister's views on the cabinet changes. Talib's reply sought to play down the importance of the changes and emphasized the intention of the GOI to pursue the same fundamental policies as before the changes. While stressing the continuity of policy, using the word "fundamental", he said that the government now, however, can pursue a more "practical policy". The government would still aspire toward the recognized ideal of unity but would also realize its limitations and do what was possible and practical. He apparently had not heard the definition of politics as the art of the possible and was quite taken with it.

With reference to other possible changes, the Ambassador asked whether such unionists as the commandant of the military college, Col. 'Urfan Abd al-Qadir Wajdi - of pro-Nasser inclinations - would continue in their posts. The Minister's reaction was "most certainly" and "really, why not?"; he added that the differences in views of various elements regarding unity were very small and the services of all were needed.

Iranian Aid to the Kurds

The Foreign Minister raised the question of Iranian aid to the Kurds, recalling previous discussion of the subject with the Ambassador. He said the evidence of Iranian help was clear and that there was no doubt of Iranian government involvement. In response to the Ambassador's question of whether this view was based on the same alleged incidents mentioned in the previous conversation - a picnic meeting of Kurds and Iranian military leaders and some jeep loads of arms sent across the border, the Foreign Minister said the Kurds were now using mortars, mines and bazookas obviously sent in from Iran. Again replying to a question, he was not certain whether some of these weapons had actually been captured from the Kurds. He, however, dismissed any relationship between these weapons and weapons captured from the Iraqi army. He said he could not accuse the Iranian government of directly supplying the weapons, but it was clear the weapons could not come in over the one available road without the knowledge and consent of the Iranian government. He reaffirmed his earnest hope that the US would intervene to halt this Iranian activity.

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Airgram No. 67 , page three  
Baghdad, Iraq

The Ambassador reaffirmed the US policy and position on the Kurdish problem in some detail. Without seeking to debate the accuracy of the Foreign Minister's information, he emphasized US policy on the Kurds was "hands off" (Talib concurred) but that the US could not take responsibility for policy of its allies on matters outside the province of the alliance. The US was not helping the Kurds and favored a peaceful solution within the framework of the Iraqi nation and sovereignty. He noted the handling of Ismet Vanli in the US and affirmed his understanding that Vanli had accomplished nothing in the United States (again Talib concurred). The Ambassador also referred to recent reports of Iraqi government military successes and reestablishment of authority in parts which should facilitate control of possible Iranian supply routes.

The Foreign Minister was reluctant to comment on possible military developments in the Kurdish operations. He said he accepted the US policy and position but still felt there must be a great deal the US could do, if it tried, to influence Iran in this matter. He sincerely hoped it would do so.

In connection with the Prime Minister's concern for Iranian help to the Kurds, Iranian Ambassador Pirasteh told Ambassador Strong the night of July 13, that immediately after President Aref's speech and the presentation of the diplomatic corps to him earlier that evening Naji Talib took him aside, asked him whether he had understood the speech and upon receiving an affirmative reply, said that now Iran could stop supplying arms and other things to the Kurds. Pirasteh denied that Iran was supplying any. Aref's speech, generally moderate in tone, stated inter alia that Iraq wanted good relations with its neighbors and that internal Iraqi unity must precede Arab unity.

In the course of Ambassador Strong's talk with the Foreign Minister at the Palace, the questions of coincidence, parallelism, and coordination of policies of the USSR, the US, the UAR and others vis-a-vis the Kurds were discussed. The Ambassador noted the USSR, the US and the UAR all favored a peaceful solution but for different reasons. The USSR, for example, favored autonomy for the Kurds as a possible first step toward an independent Kurdistan which might eventually succumb to communism. The US favored a peaceful resolution within the concept of the Iraqi nation. He did not speculate on what the UAR's view was.

In this last connection, the Foreign Minister developed at some length the theme that achievement by the Kurds of all of their objectives would lead eventually to a communist takeover of that area. He also developed the theme that the prolonged wasting of the country's resources and energies on the Kurdish problem - necessitated by Kurdish resistance and outside help - weakened the government's position especially in the south and created greater instability which could well lead to further revolutions and communist takeover at some stage. He volunteered, too, that once a communist regime takes power, it never lets go.

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By	SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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Airgram No. 67 , page four  
Baghdad, Iraq


COMMENT

In the past Aref has, clearly as a matter of policy, avoided meeting with the Ambassador. The suggestion of a possible meeting was carefully phrased to avoid any rebuff while testing the current presidential attitude since departure on home leave made such a suggestion entirely logical and polite.

The Foreign Minister's reference to a "practical policy" closely parallels ex-Minister of Education Zaki's comment to the Ambassador on July 12 that policy would now be "more realistic". The coincidence suggests a well worked-out rationale on the part of the government. The Foreign Minister's attitude suggests continuing effort to make as little disturbance of GOI-UAR relations as possible with the shift. We still have no real indication of how ready the UAR may be to let it go at that, or what other actions the GOI may have in mind, such as transfers of Nasserite officers, which might create more stresses.

Obviously and understandably the Kurdish problem and outside assistance is a major preoccupation of the Iraqi government. The Foreign Minister's persistence on the subject may reflect an inability of higher officials such as the President and Prime Minister to conceive of Iranian support of the Kurds without US contrivance. Or, it may be simply an effort to keep the problem before the US in the hope that an effort will be made to influence the Iranians. In any event, it is a question about which the Foreign Minister and others in the government continue to feel strongly. Ambassador Pirasteh earlier had planned to return to Tehran on consultation July 15. Now he seems to be staying here longer, presumably to assess the nature of changes. The Ambassador has suggested to Pirasteh that he look behind the words used regarding unity and consider the reality. If this is done, Iran might well find it possible to relax a bit in its concern over UAR influence in Iraq.

For the Ambassador:



Enoch S. Duncan  
Counselor for Political Affairs

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NR 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ACTION/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2 IRAP	
NEA-5			<b>AIRGRAM</b>		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	NO. A-1074		CONFIDENTIAL	
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE		1965 JUN 18 PM 2 42	
NEA	CU	INR	INFO : AMMAN, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, TAIZ, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN, ANKARA, DHAHRAN		RIV/AM ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH	
E	P	IO	FROM : AMERICAN EMBASSY BAGHDAD		DATE: JUNE 12, 1965	
L	FBO	AID	SUBJECT : Abdullah Mubarak; Situation in Iraq; Kuwaiti Border		REF :	
5/5	4	SP	ARMY		3	
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**SUMMARY**

On June 7, Ambassador Strong called on Mohammad al-Hamid, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iraq, to discuss the recent visit of Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak to Baghdad; the situation in Iraq; and the problem of the demarcation of the Kuwait-Iraq border.

Hamad stated that, although the GOI had not been very enthusiastic about having Mubarak here, the GOI could not ignore the latter's sizeable cash gifts to various charitable institutions and thus was obliged to give him some small official attention. Hamad was satisfied that the GOI had acted quite appropriately towards Mubarak. He went on to add that Mubarak was interested in buying river-front property but had not been able to obtain any at any price.

Hamad expressed the view that if the present regime does not hold together, there could be chaos in which the extreme leftists would come to power eventually. He indicated that if the rumor of Aref's illness is true, Tahir Yahya is the likely man to succeed him even though no one knows what Yahya really believes in. In any event, Hamad said he thought the Egyptians understand the situation here and they will not try to push for real unity. Hamad expressed the opinion that the Iraqi Air Force is the balance wheel of the present power structure in Iraq and this precludes the Iraqi nationalists from trying to seize power alone.

GROUP 4  
Downgraded at 3-year intervals;  
declassified after twelve years

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: AMB:RCstrong:POL/TJS/ces:ega:6/12/65  
Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador Robert C. Strong

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05




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Airgram No. 1074, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

Although the GOI is still dragging its feet over the demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border, Hamad thought that this will eventually be done. Until that time, Kuwait's investments - for which the GOI is eager - are not likely.

Comment: Ambassador Hamad's observations about the internal situation in Iraq as well as those recently made by the Saudi Ambassador (see A-1065) confirm to a large extent what the Embassy has also been hearing over the last six months.



ROBERT C. STRONG

*all m/m*  
Enclosure: Memcon dated June 7, 1965  
Participants: Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador to Iraq  
Mohammad al-Hamad, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iraq

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Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

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Airgram No. 1074  
Enclosure I, page one  
Baghdad, Iraq

Memorandum of Conversation

Participants: Mohammad al-Hamad, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador to Iraq

Subjects : Abdullah Mubarak; Situation in Iraq, Kuwaiti Border

-----  
I called on Hamad to discuss the above subjects.

1. Abdullah Mubarak. Hamad said Mubarak had spent only ten days in Kuwait at the suggestion of the GOK and had left there before the return of the Amir from India in order to avoid creating a problem of precedence at the airfield. The Iraqis had not been very enthusiastic about having him here, so, as was his wont in order to make favorable publicity for himself, Mubarak announced certain sizable cash gifts. This the GOI could not ignore, so he was given some small official attention, and President Aref invited him to call and to have lunch. However, to limit his time with Aref he was invited at 1:15 and lunch was promptly served at 2:00 p.m. after which he had to leave. Hamad was satisfied that the GOI had acted quite appropriately toward Mubarak.

He added that Mubarak wanted to buy river-front property somewhere between the residence of the UAR Ambassador and the American Embassy, but he had been unable to obtain any at any price. The piece he particularly wanted was that of the Shahbandar family immediately north of the American Embassy residence, of about 9,000 square meters. Current value is ID 9 - 10, but several years ago it would have been as high as ID 20. Several of the Shahbandars did not wish to sell.

2. Situation in Iraq. Hamad expressed the view that if the present GOI does not hold together, there could be chaos in which a very leftist regime could come to power eventually. Since neither the Nasserists nor the Iraqi nationalists have the power to rule separately, they must find means to avoid a blowup. He believed that if President Aref must leave Iraq for medical treatment there will be a political truce until the outcome is seen. If a successor to Aref is eventually needed, Tahir Yahya is the likely man, even though no one knows what he really believes in. He had been informed by Brigadier Farhan earlier this morning that the NCRC was holding an emergency meeting today, and he said he had reason to believe the meeting was to discuss President Aref and what was involved. He noted that the postponement of the

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Airgram No. 1074  
Enclosure I, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

Baghdad University graduation ceremonies was generally thought to be due to Aref's health, but he did not know whether Aref planned to go to Algiers for the Asian-African Conference, to be followed by a state visit to Algeria, to be followed by a meeting of the Joint Political Leadership in Cairo, in turn to be followed by the July 14 celebrations here lasting until July 20.

Hamad said he thought the Egyptians understood the situation here. They would try to shore up this GOI and would not try to push real unity. In fact very recently Nasser had again told the Iraqis that unity with the UAR was out of the question until Iraq itself was unified within.

In Hamad's opinion the Iraqi Air Force is the balance wheel of the power structure in Iraq and Aref Abd al-Razzaq as the commander holds a strong position which precludes the Iraqi nationalists from trying to seize power alone.

3. Kuwaiti Border. Hamad stated that the GOI was still dragging its feet over demarcation, but he kept talking with them about it. Eventually, he thought, he would be successful. Whereas the GOI was eager for Kuwaiti investment and for Kuwait to implement the plan to pipe large amounts of fresh water from Iraq to Kuwait, nothing was likely to be done until the border was demarcated. While the GOI thought it had created attractive terms for Kuwaiti private financing and construction of a new hotel in Basra, in fact private Kuwaitis were prepared to wait a couple of years, or longer.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

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Authority <i>NNO 932522</i>
By <i>SE</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2 IRAQ

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A-1065

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: JIDDA, CAIRO

FROM : AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

DATE: JUNE 5, 1965

SUBJECT: Ambassador Strong Calls on Saudi Ambassador

REF : Memorandum of Conversation, December 3, 1964, "Situation in Iraq"  
Ambassador Strong, Ambassador Kuhaime, and Thomas J. Scotese

On June 2, 1965 Ambassador Strong paid a call on 'Abd al-Aziz al-Kuhaime, Saudi Arabian Ambassador, during which Iraq's internal situation was discussed at some length. Ambassador Kuhaime indicated that Iraq is passing through a very unstable period and no one can predict what will finally emerge. The present regime is split into two factions - a Nasserite faction led by Interior Minister 'Abd al-Hamid, Guidance Minister Farhan and Air Force Commander 'Abd al-Razzaq and an anti-Nasser faction led by Prime Minister Tahir Yahya. At the present time the latter group is much the stronger; but because of its fear of Nasser and its need of UAR support against its many internal enemies, the anti-Nasser faction is not yet prepared to rule alone. However, given the Kurdish problem, the economic dislocations brought on by nationalization and the opposition of the Shi'a, this regime cannot last long.

Discussing the threat of communism in Iraq, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador said that the danger is not great at the present time, but that in the long run communism might become more threatening as the younger generation is subjected to the Marxist ideas now being openly propagated in Baghdad. Kuhaime confirmed that he has reports indicating the Baathi party and the Communists in their mutual interest of overthrowing the government, have agreed to stop working against each other.

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

POL: TJScotese:plj:6/5/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Ambassador Robert C. Strong

Clearances:

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05


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Airgram No. 10/65, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

Finally Ambassador Kuhaimi stated that Nasser's influence in the country as well as in the Arab world as a whole has decreased considerably in the last couple of years. The people are basically opposed to socialism which is against the tenets of Islam and are tired of all the radio attacks on Arab leaders coming from "Voice of the Arabs." He concluded by saying that the present Saudi government is confident of its strength and considered itself to be the principal opponent to communism in the Arab world. In this regard he was very grateful for American support of King Faisal and reaffirmed the identity of Saudi and American goals and interests in the Middle East.

Comment: Little of what Ambassador Kuhaimi stated is new, but his comments are valuable because they do confirm much of what the Embassy has been picking up over the last six months or so.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

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OPTIONAL ACTION

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# AIRGRAM

POL 2 IRAQ  
POL IRAQ-UAR  
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-793

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1965 MAR 8 AM 9 05

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, LONDON, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: 3 March 1965

SUBJECT : Views of an Officer of the UAR Embassy in Baghdad on the Current Situation in Iraq, and on UAR Influence on Iraq.

REF :

In a conversation on February 25, 1965, 'Adil Ma'mun Sharaf al-Din, Third Secretary of the UAR Embassy in Baghdad, who has demonstrated himself as both perceptive and frank in previous conversations, stated that it appears that the UAR Embassy in Iraq is not to be subjected to the reductions in force decreed for the service as a whole. He believes that the current Iraqi regime has achieved a "relative stability" despite its past and present vicissitudes. He is convinced that the GOI intends shortly to resume hostilities against the Kurds, and holds that this is an act close to madness. His Embassy, he avers, has advised the GOI of its conviction that such a resumption of hostilities is highly inadvisable, but to no avail; the UAR Embassy in general, he states, is ineffective in influencing the course of Iraqi actions, partially because of the self-restraint the Egyptians impose upon themselves here due to their sensitivity on the subject of actual or potential charges of "Egyptian imperialism". Sharaf al-Din was highly critical of Iraqi fumbblings on the Consultative Assembly issue, and believes the project will be ultimately abandoned. He has seen no evidence that President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser actually intends to visit Iraq.

A memorandum of conversation is enclosed.

For the Ambassador:

*James E. Akins*

James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

POL:ERM Kane:mlh:03/02/65

Contents and Classification Approved by:

AMB:RC Strong

Clearances:

DCM:JW Adams

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Enclosure 1, Page 1  
Airgram No. 793  
Baghdad, Iraq.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Iraq, and United Arab Republic Influence Thereon.

PLACE AND DATE: Alwiyah Club, February 25, 1965.

PARTICIPANTS: 'Adil Ma'mun Sharaf al-Din, Third Secretary (Political Section),  
UAR Embassy in Baghdad  
Edward R.M. Kane, Second Secretary, American Embassy

-----  
The reporting officer has known 'Adil Ma'mun SHARAF AL-DIN, Third Secretary in the Political Section of the United Arab Republic Embassy in Baghdad, for something over a year. Although a junior officer of the UAR Foreign Service, Sharaf al-Din has during this period demonstrated himself as being a perceptive observer, and has discussed national and international issues with a frankness not often found among Egyptian officials. Statements of interest made by Sharaf al-Din during a luncheon alone with him on February 25, 1965, were as follows:

Reduction in Staff of UAR Embassies Abroad: Sharaf al-Din confirmed information previously available to this Embassy that due to foreign exchange stringencies UAR Embassies abroad have received instructions to cut back on their staffs by as much as one-third. He stated that UAR Ambassador to Iraq Amin HUWAYDI had returned to Cairo to dispute any such cut-back for Iraq, where Huwaydi feels the size of the staff is already disproportionately small to the work-load carried by the Embassy. Although Huwaydi has not yet returned to Baghdad to inform his staff of the fruits of his argumentation, he apparently has been successful, since he informed the Embassy by telephone from Cairo that Sharaf al-Din and one other officer who were slated to leave this spring need do no packing.

Stability of the Iraqi Regime: Sharaf al-Din concedes that the current regime in Iraq has been riddled with internal strife, but also believes that popular rumor has considerably exaggerated the degree thereof. In his estimate the current regime has now achieved a state of "relative stability", and probably will continue to exist in its current form for the immediate future.

The Kurdish Situation: Sharaf al-Din believes, as do most other observers of the Iraqi scene, that the GOI is definitely planning to recommence hostilities with the Kurds in the near future. Sharaf al-Din holds that this is an act of fantastic stupidity on the part of the Iraqis, both because of the "imminence of trouble with the Israelis" (which trouble Sharaf al-Din appears convinced will soon break out) and because of the "situation in Baghdad" (the implication here being that although the GOI has achieved a relative stability, such stability might well not withstand another military campaign in the North). Sharaf al-Din opined that if the Iraqis would only give the question "five minutes thought" they would perceive the total inadvisability of a resumption of hostilities with the Kurds. Asked whether his

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Enclosure 1, Page 2  
Airgram No. 793  
Baghdad, Iraq

Embassy had made the GOI privy to such an assessment of the situation, Sharaf al-Din stated that of course it had, but utterly without avail. Sharaf al-Din continued to give a picture of relative UAR impotence in influencing internal Iraqi developments. He states that his Ambassador and the Embassy as a whole are most sensitive to actual or potential charges of "Egyptian imperialism" or Egyptian meddling in the internal Iraqi scene and therefore avoid direct demarches, attempting rather to make their points to GOI authorities only in the most gentle, subtle and indirect fashion. (Parenthetically, Sharaf al-Din said that the difficulties of the Iraqi assignment have driven his Ambassador to the verge of a nervous breakdown. Sharaf al-Din, who served under Ambassador Huwaydi in Rabat, said that there Huwaydi had been invariably cheerful, light-hearted, and a non-smoker; he is now, according to Sharaf al-Din, smoking three packs of cigarettes a day and is literally a bundle of nerves.)

The Consultative Assembly: Sharaf al-Din criticized as "ridiculous" the stumblings of the GOI on the question of nominating members of the Consultative Assembly. Although adducing no proof for his stand, he cited his belief that the regime will in the last resort cancel the entire project and find one method or another to announce that no Consultative Assembly will be necessary.

Prospect of a Visit by Nasir: Sharaf al-Din said that although the Iraqi press continues to talk of an imminent visit to Iraq by UAR President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, he "honestly" has seen no evidence that such a visit will take place. The Embassy would get at least ten days notice of such a visit, Sharaf al-Din avers, and no such notice has yet been received. (See NQB-4805 on this subject).

Relative Isolation of Egyptian Diplomats in Iraq: Throughout the discussion Sharaf al-Din gave a picture of the relative isolation of Egyptian diplomats in Iraq from Iraqis -- relative, that is, in terms of what one might imagine to be the case in this day of Arab unity and Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world. Sharaf al-Din states that he himself (he is unmarried) knows no Iraqi families well enough to be invited to their homes (although he has been here two years), and finds little in common with the unmarried young Iraqi men he knows. (He finds them "blood heavy", with their constant insistence on political discussion.) Sharaf al-Din states that he and his colleagues in the Embassy spend the bulk of their time with each other rather than out making Iraqi contacts. (NOTE: Observation of the patterns of Egyptian diplomats at the Alwiyah Club tends to confirm this.)

The Egyptian Military Presence in Iraq: Sharaf al-Din declined to comment on the numbers of Egyptian military personnel now in Iraq, stating that he had no information on military affairs.

Non-Iraqi Subjects: Sharaf al-Din's comments on non-Iraqi subjects were much more predictable and less perceptive than his other statements. He was scathingly anti-German and proud of 'Abd al-Nasir's cleverness in dealing with Bonn. He lectured the reporting officer again on the wilted subject of the United States and Israel. He had -- at least until strenuous attempts were

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Enclosure 1, Page 3  
Airgram No. 793  
Baghdad, Iraq

made to dissuade him -- a picture of the Malcolm X assassination and the burning of the Elijah Muhammad "mosque" as being the result of a wave of anti-Muslim sentiment sweeping the United States.

*Edward R. M. Kane*  
Edward R. M. Kane

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE									
NEA-5			AIRGRAM				POL 17 TUR. IRAQ XR POL 2 IRAQ		
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			NO.				HANDLING INDICATOR		
			TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE				1965 FEB 8 AM 10 44		
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			FROM : AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD				DATE: FEBRUARY 4, 1965		
			SUBJECT: Baha Vefa Karatay, Turkish Ambassador, Views Situation in Iraq				REF :		
			On January 26, Ambassador Strong returned Turkish Ambassador Baha Vefa Karatay's initial courtesy call. The Turkish Ambassador said that he finds Iraq a highly interesting place to work, regarding it as strategically important to Turkey. Despite the current Iraqi move toward the Soviets and signs of resurgent local Communist activity which he views with dislike and distrust, he considers Turko-Iraqi relations as being good; Turkish policy continues to be that of friendship for Iraq. He thinks that Iraq wants good relations, despite the difficulties between Turkey and the UAR. He does not believe, as Turks did earlier, that UAR-Iraqi unity will take place soon.				Karatay does not believe that a fight can be avoided this spring between the Iraqi government and the Kurds. He agrees that the Iraqi army can not settle the problem by war and that a political settlement is needed which would sufficiently recognize Kurdish rights without risking the political separation of the area from the rest of Iraq. He thinks that the regime should go farther than it has in meeting the demands of the Kurds.		
			Comment:				Karatay was friendly and frank throughout. His analysis of the situation in Iraq - particularly in the North - generally accords with that of the Embassy, although we cannot be sure that Iraqi army		
			GROUP 3				Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.		
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
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 Authority NND 938522  
 By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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Airgram no. 699, page two  
Baghdad, Iraq

preparations in fact reflect an intention to attack come good fighting conditions. The army must be prepared for the contingency of a Kurdish attack and the GOI may wish to bring maximum pressure to bear on the Kurds in the hope of causing a reduction in their demands. However, renewed war is indeed possible.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NNO 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

# INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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PAGE TWO RUQVWG 1252 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
OR RELEASED TO GENERAL KURDISH PUBLIC. MULLA FEARS OLD KDP  
MILITANTS WOULD CHARACTERIZE PROPOSAL AS BETRAYAL AND MAJORITY  
OF KURDS WOULD BE INCLINED AGREE. MULLA IS COUNTING ON GOI  
REJECTION WHICH WILL BE SUFFICIENT PROOF FOR ALL KURDS OF  
GOVERNMENT'S ILL-WILL. ALTHOUGH GOI HAS INFORMED KURDS THAT  
COUNTER PROPOSALS WILL BE MADE AFTER FEBRUARY 8, MINISTER  
OF INTERIOR HAS ALREADY INDICATED THAT GOI WILL REFUSE (1) FORM  
KURDISH LIWA FROM PREDOMINATELY KURDISH AREAS OF MOSUL LIWA,  
(2) RECOGNIZE KURDISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE, (3) AMEND CONSTITUTION  
TO "RECOGNIZE KURDISH NATIONAL RIGHTS", (4) ACCEPT KURDISH ARMED  
FORCE UNDER MULLA MUSTAFA. KURDS STILL COUNTING ON RESUMPTION  
HOSTILITIES LATE MARCH - EARLY APRIL.

GOI APPARENTLY INTENSELY ANNOYED WITH USG AND BRITISH FOR  
GRANTING VISA TO ISMET SHARIF VANLI (WHO, ACCORDING AQRAWI, IS  
REPRESENTING MULLA MUSTAFA). AQRAWI, WHO SAW MINISTER  
JANUARY 29, SAID PRESIDENT AREF AND TAHIR YAHYA AND OTHERS  
"FURIOUS" WITH USG. WE DO NOT KNOW REASON FOR IRAQI FEELING  
WHICH SEEMS CONSIDERABLY MORE INTENSE THAN FACT SHOULD WARRANT.  
POSSIBLY (1) GOI FEARS USG AND UK PLANNING USE KURDS PRESSURE IT TO  
COME TO AGREEMENT WITH IPC OR 2) IT FEARS ISRAELI PLANS EXPLOIT  
CFN 8 (1) (2) (3) (4) 29 1) 2)

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-2- 641, FEBRUARY 2, 8 A.M., FROM BAGHDAD

PAGE THREE RUQVWG 1252 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
KURDISH ISSUE IN WESTERN PRESS AND RADIO OR 3) GOI, WHICH APPARENTLY  
PLANNING ATTACK KURDS IN SPRING, WANTS NO KURDISH REPRESENTATIVE  
NEAR UN WHEN FIGHTING RESUMED.

FORMIN NAJI TALIB TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR GOI BELIEVES US  
AND UK GIVING AID TO KURDS INDIRECTLY THROUGH IRANIANS. INDICATED  
IRAN WAS WESTERN PUPPET WHICH COULD NOT ACT ON OWN. THERE IS LITTLE  
DOUBT THAT THIS VIEW IS WIDELY SHARED BY BOTH GOVERNMENT AND NON-  
GOVERNMENT IRAQIS.

"STABILITY" IN IRAQ

A. PROMULGATION OF "SAFETY LAW"

"SAFETY LAW" REPLACING MARTIAL ADMINISTRATION LAW OF 1935,  
PROMULGATED JANUARY 31 AMID GREAT FANFARE. PREAMBLE OF LAW SAYS  
IT DESIGNED FREE IRAQI PEOPLE FROM "YOKER OF OPPRESSION" WHICH IT  
SUFFERED FOR THIRD OF CENTURY. PRESS SAYS THIS MADE POSSIBLE  
BY "UNPRESIDENTED STABILITY" WHICH IRAQI NOW ENJOYING.

NEWS RECEIVED WITH TOTAL APATHY IN BAGHDAD. NO INCREASE  
IN PERSONAL FREEDOM EXPECTED.

B. PRESS CENSORSHIP

IRAQ'S "STABILITY" HAS ALSO PERMITTED GOI TO LIFT CENSOR-  
SHIP ON ALL ARAB PUBLICATION "PROVIDED THEY DO NOT CONTRAVENE  
CFN 3) NOT 1935 31 NOT

PAGE FOUR RUQVWG 1252 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
IRAQI PRESS LAW", I.E. NO CHANGE IN VIGOROUS CENSORSHIP.

C. PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED

ACCORDING GOI OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT, 500 MORE POLITICAL  
PRISONERS, "WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR PRISON TERMS" TO BE RELEASED  
FROM PRISON ON OCCASION "ID AL-FITR", FEBRUARY 2.

ANTI-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

WEST GERMAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL WIDELY REPORTED  
HERE BY LOCAL PRESS ALTHOUGH USG ROLE NOT YET EMPHASIZED. VISIT  
EAST GERMAN PRESIDENT ULBRICHT TO CAIRO ALSO PUBLICIZED THEME BEING  
"WHAT ELSE CAN WEST GERMANS EXPECT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES". THREAT  
RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY HAS, HOWEVER. NOT BEEN REPEATED HERE.

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THIS SEEMS BE ULTIMATE WEAPON RESERVED FOR ISRAELI-WEST GERMAN EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS. (A-431, NOVEMBER 10, 1964)

ATTACK ON "VOICE OF IRAQI PEOPLE"

OFFICIAL GOI PRESS ORGAN, AL-JUMHURIYA, JANUARY 31 ATTACKED "VOICE OF IRAQI PEOPLE" (SOVIET BLOC CLANDESTINE STATION) FOR ITS DEFENSE OF SYRIAN BAATH REGIME AND ITS CRITICISM OF AREF GOVERNMENT. EDITORIAL WAS IN RESPONSE TO STRONG PROVOCATION BUT NONETHELESS WAS HEAVILY VEILED; IT SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS BEGINNING OF TREND AWAY FROM CLOSE RELATIONS WITH BLOC. PAPER DID CFN 500 2 NOT 431 10 1964 31 NOT

PAGE FIVE RUQVWG 1252 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
NOT CONDEMN ANY COMMUNIST COUNTRY. IT DID NOT INDICATE LOCATION OF TRANSMITTER AND CONNECTED IT ONLY WITH LOCAL "SHU'UBIYA" (TECHNICALLY NON-ARABS MASQUERADING AS ARABS) NOT WITH COMMUNISM. IN 1963 BAATHI JARGON "SHU'UBIYA" WAS SYNONYM FOR COMMUNISM BUT SINCE NOVEMBER 18, 1963 IN IRAQ IT HAS GENERALLY MEANT IRANIANS, KURDS, SHI'IA OR BAATH.

RUMORS IMPENDING MINISTERIAL SHIFTS

CABINET AND NCRC MET IN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING JANUARY 28. ALTHOUGH NO DETAILS RELEASED, SEVERAL SOURCES CLOSE TO CABINET MEMBERS REPORT THAT MINISTERS FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JUSTICE AND EDUCATION SUBMITTED RESIGNATIONS IN PROTEST AGAINST MILITARY RELUCTANCE TURN OVER POWER TO CIVILIANS, AS PROMISED IN NOVEMBER. BRITISH EMBASSY HAS SAME REPORT WITH ADDITION THAT PRESIDENT AREF TRYING EXPLOIT CABINET CRISIS TO ELIMINATE STRONG NASSERITES IN GOVERNMENT; I.E. MINISTER INTERIOR ABD AL-HAMID AND MINGUIDANCE FARHAN. AREF STRONGLY OPPOSED IN THIS BY AIR FORCE COMMANDER AREF ABD AL-RAZZAQ

KIRKUK SULPHUR EXTRACTION AND LOCOMOTIVES

SULPHUR EXTRACTION CONTRACT FINALLY SIGNED WITH PARSONS AS WAS PURCHASE OF FIVE US LOCOMOTIVES FROM ALCO.

GP-3.

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Action

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JANUARY 26, 1965  
5:29 AM

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FROM: BAGHDAD

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ACTION: SECSTATE 614

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RMR

DATE: JANUARY 26, NOON

WEEKLY REVIEW

KURDS.

EARLY LAST WEEK GOI PRESENTED KURDS ITS "FINAL" OFFER WHICH SUMMARIZED IS: "LAY DOWN YOUR ARMS AND YOU WILL BE GIVEN FULL RIGHTS AS IRAQI CITIZENS". GOI DID NOT AGREE FREE KURDISH POLITICAL PRISONERS, RETURN KURDS TO LANDS FROM WHICH THEY HAD BEEN EXPELLED OR ACCEPT KURDISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE. KURDS THEN TOLD GOI THEY UNDERSTOOD DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY SOME POINTS THEIR EARLIER DEMANDS AND WERE PREPARED MAKE THEIR "MINIMUM" OFFER: KURDS WILLING GIVE UP DEMANDS FOR 1) SELF-GOVERNMENT; 2) KURDIER PARLIAMENT; 3) UNITED KURDISTAN; 4) PROPORTIONAL DIVISION OF OIL INCOME. THEY STILL DEMANDING 1) KURDISH ADMINISTRATORS IN

*Backward 614*

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KURDISH AREAS; 2) RECOGNITION OF KURDISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE; 3) DISBANDING "JOSH" AND RETURN OF KURDS AND ARABS TO THEIR PLACES OF ORIGIN; 4) AMENDING CONSTITUTION TO READ: "ARAB PEOPLE OF IRAQ IS PART OF ARAB NATION AND GIVING SPECIFIC RECOGNITION KURDISH NATIONALITY; 5) RETURN OF PESHMERGO TO POLICE AND ARMY BUT RETENTION OF "3,000-4,000" MAN FORCE UNDER COMMAND MULLA MUSTAFA PENDING FINAL SOLUTION KURDISH PROBLEM IN CONTEXT DEMOCRATIC IRAQ.

KURDS TELL US THERE NO QUESTION OF SURRENDER BUT THEY REDUCED THEIR DEMANDS CONSIDERABLY BECAUSE 1) THEY DESIRE AVOID BLOODSHED AND FIND FINAL SOLUTION; 2) PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THEIR OFFER WILL CONVINCE ARABS AND WORLD THAT KURDS ARE REASONABLE; HENCE WILL REDUCE IRAQI SOLDIERS' DETERMINATION TO FIGHT; 3) GOI REJECTION (WHICH KURDS EXPECT) EVEN THIS MILD PROPOSAL WOULD UNITE ALL KURDS BEHIND REVOLUTION.

KURDISH OFFER, ALTHOUGH PRESENTED BY MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI'S MEN IN BAGHDAD, DOES NOT YET HAVE MULLA'S FINAL APPROVAL. IT ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE OPPOSED BY THE KDP MILITANTS AND IF GOI WERE TO ACCEPT IT, KURDS WOULD BE SPLIT.

GOI COULD CONCEIVABLY BE PERSUADED ACCEPT MOST OF KURDISH DEMANDS EXCEPT INDEPENDENT KURDISH ARMED FORCE, POINT WHICH KURDS NOT DISPOSED YIELD. NONETHELESS, UNLESS GOI IS ALREADY DETERMINED FIGHT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS A NEGOTIATING SITUATION, DESPITE "FINAL" POSITION PUT FORWARD BY EACH SIDE, WITH SOME POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ALLOW KURDS SUBSTANCE OF INDEPENDENT FORCE AND WOULD SAVE IRAQI FACE THROUGH OBSERVANCE PROPER FICTION AND NOMENCLATURE.

LAWYERS ELECTION.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER BREAK-UP OF LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ELECTION BY GOI THUGS, PRESS LAUNCHED STRONG CAMPAIGN AGAINST

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"PSEUDO-NATIONALISTS" (SAMARRA'I LIST) AND "REACTIONARIES" (DURI LIST) WHO OPPOSED GOI'S CANDIDATE, THE INCUMBENT SHIBIB. PUBLIC REACTION TO GOI ACTION STRONGLY NEGATIVE AND OFFICIAL POSITION MODIFIED DURING WEEK. MOST RECENT EDITORIALS AND PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS (INCLUDING ONE FROM PRESIDENT AREF) LIMITED TO CONDEMNING VIOLENCE AND CHIDING LAWYERS FOR NOT BEING ABLE ACT LIKE ADULTS.

WE UNDERSTAND THERE HAVE BEEN REPERCUSSIONS IN CABINET WHERE SEVERAL MINISTERS VIGOROUSLY OBJECTED TO FLAGRANT GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN ELECTION. MINISTER JUSTICE, ABD AL-SATTAR ALI HUSSAIN, AND MINISTER EDUCATION, SHUKRI SALAH ZAKI, WHO PERSONAL FRIENDS OF SAMARRA'I, PARTICULARLY ANNOYED.

CASE NOT YET SETTLED. SHIBIB MAINTAINS HIS GROUP WILL REMAIN IN OFFICE UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS. JUSTICE MINISTER SAYS GROUP CEASED EXISTENCE WHEN ELECTIONS SCHEDULED AND AFFAIRS OF ASSOCIATION WILL BE MANAGED BY MINISTRY UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS ARE HELD.

PERSONAL FREEDOM IN IRAQ.

GOI CONTINUES GIVE CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY TO "UNPRECEDENTED" STABILITY AND PERSONAL FREEDOM NOW EXISTING IN IRAQ. CLAIMS OVER 800 POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR PRISON TERMS HAVE BEEN RELEASED AND PROMISES OTHER PRISONERS WHO BEING HELD WITHOUT CHARGE WILL BE RELEASED "SOON". GOI HAS ALSO PROMISED REPLACEMENT "IN NEAR FUTURE" OF MARTIAL LAW BY "SAFETY LAW" AND ABOLITION RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL FOR ALL BUT "A FEW" IRAQIS. GOI CONTRASTS ITS POSITIONS WITH "TERROR" OF BAATHI MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IN SYRIA, WHOSE DOWNFALL IS REGULARLY PREDICTED.

FEW IRAQIS SWALLOW GOI LINE. MOST USUAL IRAQI CONCLUSION IS THAT GOVERNMENT, BY TOUTING ITS POPULARITY AND

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STRENGTH, MUST BE WEAKER THAN THEY HAD THOUGHT. INCREASING FREQUENCY AND FULSOMENESS OF PANEGYRICS TO AREF, WHICH STRONGLY REMINISCENT THOSE COMPOSED FOR QASIM, ALSO ADDING TO GENERAL MALAISE.

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.

MINGUIDANCE FARHAN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT MEMBERSHIP WILL BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE FEBRUARY 8.

TURKS.

WARM PRAISE OF TURKEY MADE DURING RECENT TURKISH GOOD-WILL VISIT IS COOLING. GOI PRESS, APPARENTLY FOLLOWING LINE SET IN CAIRO, NOW SAYING IT SPLENDID THAT TURKEY TRYING WIN FRIENDSHIP OF ARABS BUT IF IT REALLY SINCERE IT MUST BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

KIRKUK SULPHUR EXTRACTION PROJET...

FOR UNKNOWN REASONS IRAQIS HAVE RAISED SERIOUS NEW CONDITION IN CONTRACT TERMS WHICH PARSONS COMPANY AND EMBASSY THOUGHT SETTLED IN DECEMBER. POSSIBILITY OF REFUSAL BY PARSONS ACCEPT CHANGE IS HIGH. IF GOI, AS IT CLAIMS, MUST STAND BY NEW DEMAND, LIKELY THAT CONTRACT WILL NOT GO TO AMERICAN FIRM.

GP-3.

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TELAVIV CINCSTRIKE/CINCEAFSA UNN JAN 19-2PM

WEEKLY REVIEW

FIGHTS AT LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION ELECTION

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION ELECTION MEETING JANUARY 15 BROKEN  
UP BY GANG THUGS WHO PENETRATED ASSOCIATION PREMISES CHOUTING  
"AREF, NASSER", AND PROCEEDED ATTACK ADHERENTS FAIQ SAMMARAI  
GROUP. THEY ACCUSED SAMMARAI AND HUSSAIN JAMIL (ON SAMMARAI  
LIST) OF BEING IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST AGENTS. ELECTION  
JUDGES WALKED OUT AND POSTPONED ELECTION, SINE DIE.

ALTHOUGH THEY CLAIMED THEY REPRESENTED ARAB SOCIALIST UNION,  
CFN 597 15 SINE DIE

RMR

PAGE TWO RUQVWG 1182 CONFIDENTIAL  
SEVERAL DEMONSTRATORS WERE IDENTIFIED BY BY LAWYERS AS BEING PUBLIC  
SECURITY AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. PRESS, FOLLOWING  
DAYS, DEPLOYED VIOLENCE; ASU DENIED IT SUPPORTING ANY SPECIFIC  
LIST BUT BOTH GOVERNMENT PAPERS AND ASU SAID IT OBVIOUS "ORPHANS  
OF OLD REGIME" COULD NOT BE PERMITTED REGAIN STRENGTH IN IRAQ  
THROUGH PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS.

IN SPITE ITS CLAIM OF NEUTRALITY, GOI SUPPORTING CANDIDACY OF  
INCUMBENT ABD AL-RAZZAK SHABIB, WHO ACCORDING MOST SOURCES, HAD  
NO CHANCE OF WINNING IN FREE ELECTION. ABD AL-MUHSIN DURI LIST,  
WHICH INCLUDES SIX FORMER MEMBERS PARLIAMENT, INITIALLY WAS  
GIVEN LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS BUT SEEMS TO HAVE WON SUPPORT  
MANY SHIA AND KURDS. SAMMARAI GRUP, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY  
CONSIDERED GREATEST THREAT TO GOVERNMENT AND ONLY ITS MEMBERS  
WERE ATTACKED BY THUGS.

ACTION HAS HAD STRONG NEGATIVE EFFECT FAR BEYOND LEGAL  
CIRCLES. MOST POLITICALLY SENSITIVE IRAQIS CONSIDER IT

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ADMISSION OF GOI WEAKNESS. THEY ASKING HOW GOI CAN CONTINUE  
SPEAK OF FREE GENERAL ELECTIONS WITH LAWYERS ELECTIONS AS AN  
EARNEST OK ITS INTENTIONS. MEMBERS BOTH SAMMARAI AND DURI  
GROUPS NOW THREATENING BOYCOTT ELECTIONS (IF THEY ARE HELD)  
CFN NOT NO

PAGE THREE RUQVWG 1182 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
UNLESS STRONG GUARANTEES GIVEN THAT THERE WILL BE NO GOVERNMENT  
INTERFERENCE.

KURDS

ALTHOUGH KURDS STILL MAINTAIN THEY HAVE PROOF GOVERNMENT  
PLANS ATTACK THEM IN SPRING, KURDISH DELEGATION LED BY NEW  
KURDISTAN DEMOSRATIC PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL, HABIB MUHAMMAD  
KARIM, AND INCLUDING CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS, AQID SADIQ AND  
HASHIM AQRAWI, ARRIVED BAGHDAD JANUARY 13 TO "EXPLORE" GOI'S  
INTENTIONS. KURDS MET MININTERIOR SUBHI ABD AL-HAMID, WHO  
PROPOSED ONLY THAT "PARTNERSHIP ARABS AND KURDS IN IRAQ" BE  
DEFINED AS ABSENCE DISCRIMINATION AND THAT KURDISH PESHMERGA  
JOIN SECOND DIVISION AND BE STATIONED IN NORTHERN IRAQ; KURDS  
REITERATED THEIR DEMANDS OF OCTOBER 11. IN SEPARATE MEETINGS  
PRIMIN YAHYA, ACCORDING TO HABIB KARIM, MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROMISES  
TO KURDS (WHICH KURDS BELIEVE HE COULD NEVER KEEP), CONDEMNED  
PRESIDENT AREF, PRESIDENT NASSER AND EVEN ARABISM. SAID ARAB  
UNITY WOULD NEVER BE ACHIEVED AND SAID HE READY TO RESIGN  
POSITION IF ANYONE ELSE COULD BE FOUND TO TAKE IT.

MEANWHILE CONDITION IN NORTH REPORTED TENSE BUT QUIET.  
GOI REPORTED ATTEMPTING MOLLIFY KURDS BY PERMITTING  
SOMEWHAT FAIRER DISTRIBUTION OF CARE FOOD.  
CFN NO 13 11

PAGE FOUR RUQVWG 1182 C O N F I D E N T I A L

PRIMIN FOR SOME TIME HAS BEEN TELLING KURDS HE WILLING  
MAKE SWEEPING CONCESSIONS BUT HELD BACK BY OTHERS IN GOVERNMENT.  
QUITE POSSIBLE YAHYA LOOKING FOR KURDISH SUPPORT IN SHOW-DOWN  
BETWEEN HIM AND NASSERITES.

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CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

ANNOUNCEMENT NAMES OF CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY MEMBERS AGAIN POSTPONED. ASU ORGAN THAWRA ARABIYA EDITORIAL JANUARY 19 SAID ASSEMBLY MUST REPRESENT ONLY WORKERS AND PEASANTS, NOT BOURGEOIS, OR IT WILL BE FAILURE.

GOI, WHICH HAS HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY PERSUADING PROMINENT IRAQIS JOIN NEW ORGANIZATION, NOW APPARENTLY ABANDONING PLANS FOR ASSEMBLY OF ELITE. IT SHOULD HAVE NO TROUBLE FINDING ONE HUNDRED WORKERS AND PEASANTS WILLING ACCEPT ID 120 PER MONTH TO SERVE IN NEW BODY.

AMBASSADOR TO TEHRAN

FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES TELL US SHAKIR MUSTAF SALIM, AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO TEHRAN. WILL LEAVE FOR NEW POST EARLY FEBRUARY.

JOINT POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MEETINGS TO BE IN BAGHDAD

FIRST MEETING OF JOINT IRAQI-UAR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
CFN 19 120

PAGE FIVE RUQVWG 1132 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN HELD IN BAGHDAD END OF DECEMBER, POSTPONED, ACCORDING GOVERNMENT PRESS, UNTIL IMMEDIATELY AFTER ID-AL-FITR, I.E. EARLY FEBRUARY. POSSIBILITY NASCER'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD ONCE AGAIN WITH US.

NEW OFFICERS GROUP ATTACKS GOVERNMENT

PAMPHLET SIGNED BY "FREE OFFICER" DISTRIBUTED BAGHDAD JANUARY 6. IT CONDEMNS PRESENT AND PREVIOUS REGIMES "WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT REVOLUTIONS" BUT COULD NOT GOVERN COUNTRY. PAMPHLET SAYS OFFICERS INVOLVED OPPOSED TO NURI AL-SAID REGIME BUT FAVOR RESTORATION STABILITY TO COUNTRY AND PROMISE BRING IT ABOUT.

PROGRAM SEEMS SIMILAR TO THAT OF "IRAQI REFORM PARTY" BUT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON COMPOSITION NEW GROUP. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH EARLIER IDENTICALLY NAMED ORGANIZATIONS OF ARAB NATIONALIST AND BAATHI OFFICERS.

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RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS

GOI ANNOUNCED IT WILL RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR PRISON TERMS. PRESS JANUARY 18 PUBLISHED NAMES OF 133 WHO ALREADY RELEASED - MANY SEEM BE COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND SOME BATHIS ALSO BENEFITED FROM DECREE. PRESS HAS INTERPRETED MOVE AS FURTHER PROOF IRAQ'S STABILITY.

ADMISSION THAT PRISONERS NOT RELEASED WHEN SENTENCES COMPLETED HAS ALSO HAD CONSIDERABLE NEGATIVE EFFECT HERE. MANY IRAQIS, EVEN ARAB NATIONALISTS, SAY IT INCREDIBLE THAT GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE SUCH ADMISSION AND EXPECT WIN CREDIT FROM POPULACE FOR ITS LIBERALITY.

NO MENTION HAS BEEN MADE OF PRISONERS WHO HELD WITHOUT TRAIL AND NO INDICATIONS EXISTING PRISON SENTENCES TO BE REDUCED.

IRAQI DINAR IN BEIRUT

TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE, WHICH CLAIMED IRAQI DINAR RISING ON BEIRUT MARKET BECAUSE IRANIANS BUYING DINARS TO USE TO INCITE KURDS, WIDELY QUOTED IN IRAQ. GOI, TAKING COGNIZANCE THESE REPORTS, CLAIMS RISE OF DINAR SIGN OF IRAQ'S UNPRECEDENTED STABILITY.

PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCED FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN

PRIMIN YAHYA, IN PRESS INTERVIEW JANUARY 17, ANNOUNCED FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN. EXPENDITURES TO BE ID 820 MILLION OF

WHICH 550 MILLION FROM GOVERNMENT AND 270 FROM PRIVATE SECTOR. 530 MILLION OF GOVERNMENT SHARE FOR INVESTMENT. PLAN BASED ON INCREASE OF OIL REVENUES 1965. INCOME ESTIMATED AT ID 148 MILLION COMPARED WITH ID 126 MILLION IN 1964. DETAILS REPORTED SEPARATELY.

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TO : Department of State  
1964 DEC 13 AM 9 46ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION  
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FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: December 8, 1964.

SUBJECT: Conversation with Minister of Interior

REF :

## SUMMARY

Minister of Interior, Subhi Abd al-Hamid, finds his new job a large and difficult one because of the nature of Iraq. He is taking a leading role in dealing with the Kurdish problem and states the new GOI will handle it "in a very smooth way." He is seeking to put more vigor into liwa administrations and to obtain more money for them. Village improvements will now have a higher priority.

The Minister recognized that the Embassy was not working against the GOI and said he would now order the Director General of Security to bring Yacub Khan's case to a close. He had just had a message from Nasser al-Hani about the intervention of the Department in the case.

\*\*\*\*\*

I called on Subhi Abd al-Hamid on December 5, congratulating him on his new capacity as Minister of Interior, regretting that he was not making the trip to the UN and Washington he had planned for so long. I remarked that he now had the largest command of his career, involving over 50,000 police and security men, plus the Mutasarrifs, and their staffs. Abdal-Hamid remarked he thought that given the nature of Iraq he had the toughest job in the Government and probably the toughest job in the Arab world. Since coming to the Ministry three weeks ago he had spent most of his time studying. Soon he would begin to take over as he completed his knowledge of the ramifications of his job (he may have said this to excuse himself for failing to release Yacub Khan).

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Drafted by: Amb:RCStrong:mvm 12/7/64

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador Strong

Clearances: Seen in draft by:  
DCM, Consulate, POL

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, Baghdad's A-524.


Kurds: I noted that one of the items he inherited was the question of administrative decentralization and its applicability to the Kurdish question, and that he was reported to be taking a leading role in seeking a settlement of that question. He said this was one of the things he had been studying. In two days he would leave for a visit to all the northern liwas for a first-hand examination. He agreed with me that the new members of the Cabinet wished to arrange things with the Kurds and assured me that the GOI intended to deal with the problem "in a very smooth way." I remarked on the basic importance of the Kurdish question to the well-being of Iraq and wished him and the GOI wisdom and luck in dealing with it. To my question about the new Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya, Muhammad Rashid Dawood al-Hamami, the Minister replied that he was a retired Brigadier and a good man for the job.

Governing Iraq. I remarked on my belief that Iraq was difficult to govern. Abd al-Hamid quickly agreed and said that one-thousand years ago the calif Ma'awiya had said to his son: "My son, if the people want a new governor every day, you must give them a new governor every day." In this respect, he said, things had not changed. He did not really know what the people wanted, and perhaps the people themselves did not. I replied that there was a difference between "what" and "how." For example, there seemed to be wide agreement among the people that there should be universal education, that social services should be uplifted, and that the villages should receive some of the attention lavished heretofore on the cities. The disagreements, as is the case elsewhere, stem largely from the question How these things are to be done. The communists say they can do it more quickly and effectively, but this claim is demonstrably false, as conditions in the Soviet Union witness after 47 years of communist rule. Abd al-Hamid agreed, saying that many Iraqi visitors had found many places in the Soviet Union just as primitive as villages in Iraq.

I noted that there were great changes in Iraq, with more coming. Many villages now had good water and electricity. More such projects were under way. Schools had been built in large numbers and more were coming. Hospitals were going up. Streets were being paved. Most of the liwa capitals were in reasonably good shape.

Abd al-Hamid commented that he had sent instructions to all the mutasarrifs to proceed rapidly with the construction of hospitals, schools, streets, and other approved projects. He had gone to the Cabinet to assure sufficient funds. He and Fuad al-Rikabi, Minister of Municipal and Village Affairs had agreed that the villages were to receive much more attention and this had become the policy of the GOI. He and Rikabi between them plan to visit every village in Iraq.

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
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Page 3, Baghdad's A-524

Yacub Khan. The Minister was prepared for my initiation of this old subject. He said he had written the subject "in his book" to deal with. In fact, a message had just come in from Ambassador Nasser al-Hani that the Department of State had called him in to discuss the subject. While Foreign Minister, he said he had asked Rashid Muslih to close the case but had been refused. Now he would issue an order to the D.G. of Security to bring it to a close.

I said this would be much appreciated. We knew Khan was writing a long report about his activities. He had many friends and visited them often. But I was confident he was doing nothing improper. However, if he had done something wrong, I'd like to know about it in order to determine what action to take. As the Minister knew, the Embassy was not working against the GOI (Abd al-Hamid agreed emphatically); if either an Iraqi or an American employee acted improperly on his own initiative, I would take corrective action whenever informed by the Minister. Donald Wadley of AIL had left Iraq as agreed on November 6 and his employment with the US Government had already been terminated.

The Minister promised cooperation with the Embassy.



Robert C. Strong

cc: Amb, DCM, Pol,  
Central Files

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET/ACTION

NEA-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2 IRAQ

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OSD	USIA	NSA
19	8	3
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A 497

SECRET

COPY NO.

SERIES A

FOR RM USE ONLY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State, Washington  
INFO : AMMAN, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV

FROM : AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

DATE: DECEMBER 2, 1964

SUBJECT : British Ambassador's Views on Recent Developments in Iraq

REF :

In a 90 minute talk with our Ambassador, British Ambassador Sir Roger Allen (memorandum of conversation is enclosed) expressed the following views:

Present Government

The government formed on November 14, 1964 is uniformly Nasserite. The strongest men in the cabinet, Minister of the Interior, Subhi Abd al-Hamid, and Minister of Guidance, Abd al-Karim Farhan are avid unionists intent on forcing Nasser to conclude union with Iraq. The Consultative Assembly will never be formed and the Army will never get out of politics as promised in the new ministerial program.

Nasser's Goals in Iraq and the Arab World

The UAR troops are in Iraq to protect the regime. There are about 1000 men here now and the number will be increased. (We believe there are not more than 600 men). Nasser is motivated solely by his desire to get his hands on Iraq. Nasser's policy of rapprochement toward his Arab brothers has almost run its course and his open designs on them will soon become apparent. Anti-Nasser forces in Iraq are ineffectual.

Kurds

A settlement of the Kurdish problem is impossible. The GOI will never make concessions to the Kurds and the war will start soon - with Iranian encouragement.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: POL:JEAKins:ega:12/2/64

Contents and Classification Approved by: AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. STRONG

Clearances: DCM:JWAdams

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 938522  
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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A 497  
Baghdad, Iraq  
December 2, 1964

Iranian and other Interference in Iraq

Iran's interference in Iraq today is probably not effective. However, there are many Iraqis who dislike the present regime and would welcome any outside help to overthrow it - even help coming from Iran. The British are not and have not been and will not interfere in Iraq's internal affairs. They recognize their inability to act here. Many Iraqis undoubtedly see the US and the UK behind the Iranian action. It is unlikely, however, that any outside pressure was responsible for the recent shift in the cabinet toward a more overtly Arab nationalist policy.


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Ambassador Strong then outlined how his views differ from those of his British colleague - particularly the negative effect of outside pressure in Iraq. If events are allowed to proceed normally, the basic anti-Egyptian feelings of most Iraqis will by themselves frustrate Egyptian plans to bring about unity. Attempts by non-Arabs to stir up troubles between Iraq and the UAR would probably only strengthen the unity-minded regime.

Conclusion

The dialogue was somewhat rambling and very inconclusive, with agreement that some things were very unclear now but would become clear before too long, such as the role of the UAR troops at Taji. While Allen stated that the British were "not doing anything", it is quite clear that their posture toward Iraq has not been a friendly one, their opposition to unity is well known as is their negative attitude toward Nasser, and they are believed to be behind Iran and the Kurds.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

*Encl. att in DT*

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

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A 497  
Attachment, pg. 1  
Baghdad, Iraq

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Roger Allen, British Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador to Iraq

SUBJECT : Iraqi and Arab Scene

DATE : November 25, 1964


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I called on Allen for 90 minutes for a general survey of Iraq following the recent cabinet changes. As in the past, our points of disagreement and differences in emphasis were more noteworthy than our points of agreement.

Allen agreed the cabinet was almost uniformly unionist, interpreting this to mean it would do practically anything Nasser wants. He doesn't really distinguish between brands and degrees of Nasserism and unionism. He regarded the new members as of little consequence, asserted a Kurdish settlement could never be achieved, said a Consultative Council could not be established, said the Army could not be gotten out of politics, and credited the cabinet leaders with being willful men determined to bring Nasser to Iraq. They have the bit in their teeth and cannot soon be ousted. The Egyptian troops at Taji, which he believes number about 1000 now with 90 tanks, are there to keep this government in power and they are the only thing keeping it in power. He thinks the number of UAR troops will be increased substantially because the present contingent is not really big enough to take and hold Baghdad; thus Nasser must put in more. Nasser's only thought is to get his hands on Iraq (though later Allen said he didn't really know what Nasser wanted). If UAR troops are used, the Iraqi forces won't stand up to them and the people will be easily cowed. He considers Taher Yahya to have lost almost all influence, and believes that Aref may stay in office for a while because Nasser will find it hard to shake him off, it is hard to find a suitable successor, and he represents continuity with the past. Rashid Muslih's departure he recognized as confirming the inability of "Iraqi-firsters" to do anything effective at this juncture, which inability he attributed to the strength and determination of the Nasserists.

Minister of Defense Muhsin Habib is carried on British books as a Shi'a nonentity. The Ministry will be controlled by the Acting Chief of Staff and a clique in key positions. Allen would not comment on Naji Talib. Shukhri Salih Zaki, he said, was too much a gentleman to last very long. Adib al-Jadir, he simply despises as a loathsome person. Abd al-Sattar Ali Hussein he does not know, but doesn't think he could be very much. Fuad Rikabi he did not mention. The men with power in the cabinet continue to be Subhi Abd al-Hamid and Abd al-Karim Farhan and their military supporters. They will force Nasser's hand on unity, if Nasser's hand needs to be forced.

In Allen's view there is no evidence that outside pressure had anything to do with the strengthening of the unionist hold on the reins of power. Like the

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-2-

A 497  
Attachment, pg. 2  
Baghdad, Iraq

US, the UK has been trying to persuade the Shah to calm down and not to mix in Iraqi internal affairs. He doubts the Shah will listen, if only because he is genuinely worried about the Persian Gulf, and because he is concerned at the thought of Nasser's presence in force on his borders. Allen halfway agreed that there was some tendency among Arabs to unite against outside interference even when they were trying to cut each other's throats, but he thought in this case there were a good many Iraqis who welcomed the prospect of outside help. He doubted that Iran could be effective in Iraq now, and said if he were advising the Shah he would tell him that this was not the time to try a coup because the Nasserists were riding too high. He agreed that many Iraqi leaders are likely to credit the US and UK with being behind the Shah but commented that the UK got blamed whether it did anything or not. He concurred that the US and UK position here perhaps had begun to suffer a bit because of Iranian plotting because he, too, felt the Iraqi security authorities must have a good deal of information of what is going on.

As for the Kurds, Allen thought Iran could prove to have a good deal of influence because of Kurdish dependence on supplies from Iran. He thought Iranian encouragement of renewed fighting would carry weight eventually because the GOI could do nothing to satisfy the Kurds.

Nasser's policy of Arab rapprochement had almost run its course, Allen thought. He doubted there would be more than one more Summit meeting, if that, and the whole thing would soon collapse. He believed Nasser would pull some troops out of Yemen but would have a large force there. He agreed Saudi-UAR rapprochement would be slow and difficult if it was ever completed.

Regarding British policy, Allen said bitterly his government had no policy unless one could call policy the act of standing on the status quo and letting the UK be kicked by Nasser at will. He thought my comments about letting the Arabs alone, so that internal Arab divisions could have free play, really had no applicability to the UK because the UK wasn't doing anything and didn't plan to do anything (I did not argue with him). He questioned how far Nasser could be allowed to go on attacking the position of the Western oil companies. The adoption of a positive policy was expensive, and creating new political arrangements was very time-consuming. Even when the UK did take a positive step, such as the creation of the South Arabian Federation, it got kicked by Nasser.

My Views, Where they Differ from those of Allen.

The new cabinet is more homogenous and better balanced. The new men have come in with the support of the UAR and are determined to put Iraq in order. Whether they can do so, even with strong UAR support, is doubtful, but they will have a try and may have more success than now judged. There are 7 or 8 Shi'as in the cabinet. Why? Even if not good Shi'as they will have to try to smooth down sectarianism. I had previously predicted to Allen that the next cabinet change would come about through internal adjustment in the NCRC and not by the maneuver of tanks. This had now happened. I had also predicted that the Iraqi-

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Authority <u>MMO 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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-3-

A 497

Attachment pg.3

Baghdad, Iraq

firsters in the Army could not move against the unionists when the country is under hostile non-Arab pressures. One cannot say the unionists are strong because they have the bit in their teeth and are determined. One has to know Arab temperament and psychology and one must then examine trends and events in their light in order to make judgments as to causes. We don't need "evidence", and cannot get it, to be satisfied as to the effect of external pressures. We know 90% or more of all Iraqis oppose unity, but what is rendering the opposition ineffective? One should look at Syria in 1957-8 for lessons which apply today regarding Iraq. There is a real mystique of Arab solidarity against the foreigner among Arab nationalists, and nationalists are the only ones who really count in Iraq today, whether of the Iraq-first or unionist stripe. They simply cannot let themselves be the tools of others. Iran can create some disturbances in Iraq but cannot be decisive in changing the GOI or its policies. To engage in less than decisive action creates an even more harmful situation.

We continue to estimate UAR troops at Camp Taji to be about 600 and believe they will participate in a joint maneuver with Iraqi forces in the near future, perhaps in the Samarra area. Contrary to Allen's views we had not expected them to participate in the Iraqi maneuvers in the south and again in the north during the first half of October. I still believe that although a small contingent of UAR troops arrived suddenly at a critical time for the regime, the UAR was not in a position to seize Iraq by military force because 1) there would be a very strong general Iraqi reaction including the Iraqi Army, 2) such action would not be accepted or recognized by much of the world, and 3) Nasser's policy of Arab rapprochement would be destroyed. One other thing I thought Iraqis would refuse to accept was UAR control of Iraqi finances. I considered Nasser's policy of Arab rapprochement to have been adopted as a longer-term course of action following failure of other policies and following long careful study. While its duration might not be infinite, I doubted Nasser wanted to destroy it so soon when there were so many benefits.

However, I did think that there was some risk of stronger UAR action in Iraq if the outside pressures became intolerable, as they had on Syria, and if more and more Iraqis became convinced that a larger UAR role in Iraq was a necessary alternative to chaos. I dwelt on the necessity for outsiders to let Iraq alone and let the normal forces operate.

I also expressed the opinion that the Kurds would want to keep good relations with Iran because of the supply line and the hope of getting more support from Iran, but I doubted the Kurds would make themselves Iranian tools. However, the situation was fraught with danger and if fighting resumed, British and American interests could suffer a good deal more. While the GOI did not appear now to be giving into Kurdish, UAR, USSR, communist and US pressures and persuasion for a Kurdish negotiation, perhaps this would eventually come about. The Arab chauvinists were strong and we would have to wait and see what was done. The Kurds could bring a lot of pressure to bear and there were many Iraqis who did not want renewed fighting. There would be a lot of blood on the streets if Kurds and Shi'as combined efforts, but I doubted the Shi'as could be organized very well.

*Robert E. Strong*  
Robert E. Strong

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Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

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1964 NOV 6 PM 2 39

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 2 IRAQ

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A-419

CONFIDENTIAL

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

NOV 6 AM 11 10

Info : Amman, Ankara, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus,  
Jidda, Kuwait, London, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tehran

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: NOVEMBER 3, 1964

SUBJECT: Views of the British Ambassador on Iraqi and Arab Affairs.

REF :

The British Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, in a call on the Ambassador on October 30, discussed the following subjects (a memorandum of conversation is enclosed):

Egyptian Troops in Iraq.

Allen agreed with the Ambassador that there were only about 300 Egyptian troops in Iraq at present, but he thought the Ambassador was too conservative in his estimate that only 300 more would arrive soon. The two ambassadors agreed that the question would be resolved during November when it could be observed how many Egyptians come for the projected joint maneuvers and whether or not they return subsequently.

Arab Unity.

Allen believed that Nasser wants to take over Iraq completely, and that the GOI is already dominated by Nasserites. He thought Nasser could send troops to Baghdad at any time and that he might well do so if requested to by Aref. He also thought that these troops could control Baghdad and hence all of Iraq. The Ambassador listed the reasons why such action is improbable and why Nasser could not contemplate entering constitutional unity with Iraq at this time. Although Allen agreed with most of the Ambassador's points, he thought Nasser's greed would overcome his reason and he might be tempted to move suddenly in Iraq.

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GROUP THREE: DOWNGRADED AT  
12-YEAR INTERVALS: NOT  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: POL:JEakins:mvm 11/3/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Ambassador Strong

Clearances:

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2 of Baghdad's A- 419


Internal Situation in Iraq

Allen thought the situation in Iraq had changed little during his two-months absence, but the divisions were now sharper and the Nasserites were clearly on top. The Ambassador replied that this was not strictly true; the unionists had been defeated in Cairo and thereby weakened. The prospects of increased Egyptian interference in Iraqi domestic affairs would not strengthen UAR influence in Iraq, but would be likely to alienate Iraqis. Some formerly pro-Nasser men already seemed to have shifted to Iraq-first positions.

Oil.

Allen was not hopeful for a quick agreement with Iraq on the oil question. He did not know the reason for the current Iraqi desire for a recess in negotiations, but thought it might relate to OPEC. He did not believe that the British elections and the prospects for a changed Labor policy in the area were factors in Iraqi thinking. Allen agreed with the Ambassador that nationalization of the IPC was improbable.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Confidential Memcon dated  
October 30, 1964

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05



CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

October 30, 1964

Participants: Sir Roger Allen, British Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador

Subject: Iraq and Unity

Allen returned to Iraq October 15 after two months of leave. He came in today for a review of the situation. After discussing briefly the arrests of two Embassy local employees for purposes unknown to me and the discomfiture of the Foreign Minister at being balked by the Minister of Interior over their release, we exchanged thoughts as summarized below.

Egyptian Troops in Iraq. Allen raised this at once asking how many I thought were here and how many more were coming. We agreed there were about 300 at Camp Taji and that they had been issued Soviet-made tanks. I said I expected another batch, perhaps about the same size, for maneuvers some time in November. Allen expressed the view repeatedly throughout the rest of the conversation that Nasser might well send in a large force. He kept returning to the subject, worrying it from several angles. We agreed that the next month was likely to see the maneuvers question resolved, and we would then be able to observe whether the Egyptians go home.

Unity. Allen said Nasser wanted above all to take over Iraq, and Iraq is now dominated by Nasserites. Although he appeared to have slowed the pace of unity he could at any time send in a force which, working with the Nasserites here, could seize control of Baghdad and then no one could do anything about it, because control of Baghdad means control of Iraq. While on the surface the October 16 agreement was a setback for the Nasserists here, much depended on how the agreement was implemented. If ranking figures on each side were appointed to the Joint Political Command, and if Nasser came to Baghdad, it would mean Nasser intends seriously to pursue unity. If lesser figures were appointed and somebody represented Nasser at the sessions of the UPC in Baghdad, it might then be time to draw the conclusion Nasser was in fact being cautious. However, Allen thought that Nasser would find it hard to turn down his adherents if they said their survival depended on his support, particularly troops.

I said I had been observing Nasser's behavior for ten years, and had observed that of Iraq for equally long and there were certain things of which I was convinced: (a) in any formal sort of unity with Iraq Nasser must have legitimacy and credibility; (b) unity was not possible

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now in a formal sense because it would not be credible in the eyes of the world; (c) further, it was obvious that, if created on paper, unity would not long endure; (d) any arrangement giving the UAR police power, control of Iraqi military forces and control over Iraqi revenues could not be implemented; (e) Nasser is interested in a unity arrangement with Iraq when conditions permit, and it would appear that the UAR will become involved directly in efforts to find solutions to Iraq's internal problems, with initial emphasis on the Kurds; (f) the more Egyptians placed in official positions in Iraq and the more Egypt tries to tell Iraqis how to run their affairs, the more friction there will be; (g) also, Nasser is now pursuing a policy of harmonizing inter-Arab relations and seeking unity of purposes and unity of action without formal union; (h) this policy is likely to be pursued for a period of several years because it was adopted after long consideration and after other courses had proved failures; (i) if Nasser were to try to seize Iraq, not only would Iraq react, but so would other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia; (j) this would destroy the harmony Nasser seeks to buttress his own position and objectives and particularly would remove the possibility of a Yemen settlement which he wants; (k) there is no need for us to adopt a posture of opposition to UAR-Iraqi unity because it will be a long, long time in coming about, and open opposition could only have unfavorable results; (l) the best thing is to let nature take its course; (m) the Persians are on the wrong track entirely and are making things worse, not better; (n) the present GOI is feeble and unpopular, but a successor regime could be much worse if it were hostile to Nasser and thus forced to rely on the Soviet Bloc and the internal communists.

Allen said he could agree partially, but thought Nasser must want control of Iraq very badly and thus might be tempted to move suddenly. I said all indications are very much against it, and even if the Nasserists were ousted it might very well prove possible for the Iraqi-firsters to conduct a policy of reasonably close cooperation with Nasser, thus reducing internal tensions and creating greater harmony in the Arab world.

Internal Situation in Iraq. Allen found that the basic situation had not changed during his absence, but the issues had become sharper and the confrontation between factions in the GOI had begun to occur to some degree. However, he thought the Nasserists clearly on top and the Iraqi-firsters likely to lose out; I said this could occur but it was by no means certain. There was increasing confrontation, the Iraqi-firsters being led by Rashid Muslih, but there seemed to be some realignment of thinking; some of the pro-Nasser types appeared to be switching to the Iraqi-first element, which would be quite in keeping with Iraqi character. I said that after all the Nasserists had taken a defeat in Cairo on the unity question, and were weakened by it. Also, the likelihood of Egyptian interference in internal Iraqi affairs would be likely to lead chauvinistic

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By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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Page 3, Enclosure 1,  
to Baghdad's A- 419

Iraqi Arabs to want a change. For example, many Iraqi Arabs simply did not want to make concessions to the Kurds. Would they stand still while Nasser forces them to make a compromise, when compromise is alien to their nature if another alternative is available? No one knows when the show-down will come, or over what, but there is likely to be one eventually, perhaps within the NCRC, peaceably. It may take some time. The Nasserists don't have it all their own way.

Allen continued to believe that the Nasserists were all-powerful and that Nasser would have to support them, perhaps even with bayonets.

Yemen. Allen said he was not at all sure Nasser wanted a settlement of the Yemen problem. I said I was rather sure he wanted to get out from under the burdens which hurt his finances and his development program, and got him into trouble with bankers and other powerful countries. I said the settlement would be slow in coming because the situation was intricate and Faysal was a cautious, slow-moving man who was determined to extract the maximum. Nevertheless, Nasser showed every sign of intending to make a reconciliation with Faysal and in time he might succeed reasonably well, though the previous relation between the two men could not be fully restored.

OIL. Allen said he was not very hopeful for a settlement. He could not figure out the reason for the current Iraqi desire for a recess in negotiations, though it could related to OPEC. He ruled out the possibility that the British elections and prospects for a Labor Government had anything to do with it. I told him I had heard in Basra of INOC plans to proceed with development of an area in the south, and had had this confirmed later by Salih Kubba. Now the GOI has allocated ID 5 million to INOC. Allen said no area had been allocated to INOC, at least publicly. Allen speculated what Nasser's intentions were on oil, and thought perhaps he intended to try to create an Arab oil organization with Iraq as a key to it. I said Algeria might well join in and then pressure would be placed on the others. Allen agreed that nationalization of IPC was improbable because the GOI could not survive such an action and there would be no money for anything.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

Amb:RCS:mvm  
11/2/64

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNATURE ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 13-3 IRAQ		
NEA-5			<b>AIRGRAM</b>			XR POL 2 IRAQ		
NO. 393			CONFIDENTIAL			FOR RM USE ONLY		
TO :	DEPARTMENT OF STATE							
INFO :	ALEPPO, AMMAN, BAGDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, LONDON, TABRIZ, TEHRAN.							
FROM :	Ambassador BAGHDAD							
SUBJECT :	Northern Affairs Minister Views Iraq and the Middle East.							
DATE :	October 27, 1964							
REF :								
<p>Below is a summary of the second part of a conversation concerning the situation in Iraq and the Middle East held on October 23 between Mas'ud Muhammad, Minister for Northern Affairs, and Ambassador Robert C. Strong. (The memorandum of conversation is attached.) The first part, relative to the Kurdish problem, was reported separately by Airgram No. 392.</p> <p>Minister Muhammad described a very deep split in the cabinet between Interior Minister Rashid Muslih, who is against immediate unity and socialism on the one hand and Guidance Minister Abd al-Karim Farhan, Health Minister Shamil al-Samarrai and Foreign Minister Subhi Abd al-Hamid on the other hand who want to realize unity and socialism with no delay. Therefore, changes in the government will occur because these groups will not be able to continue to work together. Most Iraqis are against unity but it might be forced on the country without a plebiscite through a military coup by the extremists. The United States should take a more active role in the area and not allow the situation to go the way it did in Europe during the rise of Hitler. Nasser may not be able to cause a world war but he can cause trouble as he is now doing in the Yemen.</p> <p>The Ambassador replied that the United States is a neutral observer of the local scene but desires to help any government in Iraq for the sake of its people. Nasser can not be compared to Hitler. He is not promoting his interests by war. He lacks a strong economic, industrial and technological base. The Egyptians would never agree to unity with</p>								
<p>GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.</p>								
<p>FORM DS-323</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>FOR DEPT. USE ONLY</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out</p>								
<p>Drawn by: POL:TJScotes:mlh:10/27/64</p> <p>Clearances: DCM:JWAdams</p> <p>Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB:RCStrong</p>								

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By SP NARA Date 11/18/05

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
Page 2, Airgram No. 393  
Baghdad, Iraq.

Iraq without a plebiscite; they are too clever.

COMMENT: The Embassy has frequently reported the split between the Yahya-Muslih and Farhan-Abd al-Hamid factions, but the question still remains: who is strong enough to do what to whom and when? We cannot make a prediction. Whether Muslih is in fact the man capable of embodying the all-too-real grievances of most Iraqis is also a very important question. Without such a man who could also muster effective support from within the Army, it is difficult to see how any basic change in the regime would occur. Even more important, at the present time the anti-Nasserist forces in Iraq lack a suitable cause around which to rally in view of the delay in unity. Any anti-regime move coming on the heels of the recent Cairo Declaration would be interpreted as anti-unity and pro-imperialist. While this split is full of portentous meaning, we cannot assume that it presages a major change in the immediate future. Thus, until the right cause, the right man and the right army officers conjoin, Iraq will continue in its present unhappy state.

Mas'ud Muhammad's comments about Nasser are to be expected from a man long-associated with the conservative Iraqi Arab and Kurdish tribal elements.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

As stated.



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ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-5

RM/R REP AF

ARA EUR FE

NEA CU INR

E P IO

L FBO AID

AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

85 AIRGRAM

POL 2 IRAQ

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A-57.

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NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : AmEmbassy BAGHDAD

1964 AUG 18 AM 11 18

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

AUG 18 9 39 AM '64

SUBJECT : Political Section Airgram List

REF :

Unless the Embassy prefers to continue the practice, the Department suggests that the monthly list of Political Section airgrams be discontinued.

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Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:LFDinsmore:8/17/64

Contents and Classification Approved by: *Amv*  
NEA/NE - H. M. Symmes

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
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Page 2, Airgram No. A-153  
Baghdad, Iraq.

Agriculture is important in Iraq, but certain industrial projects could be profitable, particularly sulphur recovery and fertilizer.

COMMENT: From his point of view, Ambassador Huweidi may have good reason to feel that Iraq's situation is improving. Time will tell, for there is no way now to make a confident judgment. However, his ideological blinders may be preventing him from seeing the pitfalls. For example is his estimate of the Kurdish situation reasonably accurate or open to question? Has the GOI gained sufficient support and cohesion to withstand challenges? However, his position does give him access to the current thinking of the regime and for this reason his comments are noteworthy. He appears to reflect a keen UAR interest in pursuing unity with Iraq.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

  
Enclosure:

As stated.

  
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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>



Encl. 1, Page 1  
to Baghdad's A- 153

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Amembassy BAGHDAD,  
August 8, 1964

Participants: Amin Huweidi, UAR Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador

Subject: Situation in Iraq.

.....

After an introductory discussion of the weather and the situation in Southeast Asia we discussed Iraq, summarized as follows:

1. Stability. To my question how he saw things in Iraq, Huweidi responded that speaking generally he thought the situation improving. If one looked back ten years, one could see significant changes. Ten years ago no one in Iraq would admit anything was wrong or unsatisfactory. Today there is significant self-criticism. Formerly there was great violence when changes occurred, and much blood. The present regime has not been vindictive. Formerly a change in control meant sweeping changes in government personnel. The present regime has made far fewer changes and has used proper procedures. Today criticism is permitted without penalty. Formerly political parties had full license and only sought their own interests which were destructive of national interests. Today parties are put aside and the Arab Socialist Union is to be the means of political education and social reform, a long job.

Huweidi thought the current military leaders were cooperating together well. However, he indicated uncertainty over the future because he was unsure the present leaders would retain the loyalty of the bulk of Army officers. Always there were ambitious officers seeking to form groups with a view to seizing power. He gave little credence to the thought that Shi'a enlisted men and NCO's could effectively challenge the government. Likewise he doubted that the Shi'as generally could mount a real challenge to the regime.

2. Kurds. Huweidi considers the situation reasonably good for the present. The tribal chiefs are on top. The KDP is agitating for action on a "now or never" basis, calculating that if they cannot stir up a conflict in the near future they will have lost their chance. The GOI has made a number of moves: (a) it has lifted the economic blockade, and shops that before February were empty are now full of goods; (b) it is allowing Kurdish to be the language of instruction in schools in the Kurdish areas; (c) it has released most Kurdish prisoners; (d) it has created a development plan for the north; (e) it has repaired roads and bridges in the north; (f) it has encouraged a return to normal occupations by Kurds in the north; (g) it has provided Barzani with funds and ammunition.

In Huweidi's view it will be hard for the KDP to stir up a resumption of fighting. There is some tension in the north but there is a condition of peace which will not easily be broken. The areas from which GOI administration is

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-2-

excluded are small and of little significance. Admittedly the GOI has not decided on an administrative system for the north nor on the level of Kurdish participation. This will come. The KDP are challenging the tribal chiefs and eventually could perhaps give the Kurdish problem a new face, but Huweidi thinks that is a long-term problem. He sees the Kurdish problem essentially as an economic problem, development and access to goods, and believes the GOI will prove able to handle it. In his opinion one must simply "wait and see." He would not comment whether or not the GOI was really dealing with the Kurdish problem in a thoughtful, integrated fashion with due regard for the long term.

3. Nationalization. Huweidi criticized the GOI for misleading its people by saying up to July 13 there would be no nationalization. He agreed no one will now believe the GOI. He approved nationalization itself but he would give no indication whether the UAR thought there should be further steps. He seemed to think that the most important needs had been met: (1) the State now had ID 70-80 million in resources, including those of banks and insurance companies, through which it could implement its plans for growth in the nationalized sectors; and (2) it was now possible to preclude the wealthy from using their resources against the government or against the state; and (3) the GOI was gaining needed support from those who otherwise would support the Baathis or commies. He criticized entrepreneurs for using shareholders money and bank loans to promote their own purposes while keeping their own wealth safe outside Iraq. He saw no reason why private persons wanting to create enterprises should not do so with their own funds or even sell shares to the public, but he agreed that confidence had been destroyed. He agreed it would make sense for the GOI to permit private shareholding in nationalized firms but doubted it would be done. He said that Khair al-Din Haseeb's book, in which all these factors in Iraq had been analyzed, had been translated into English, was available, and was worth reading.

4. Development. Huweidi expressed interest in the Embassy's note of July 4 concerning economic cooperation with the GOI. He said the USG proposal on the Eski Mosul Dam was a very important and wise move, and he asked whether we had yet had a reply. He gave no other indication of his or his government's view, nor did he forecast what the GOI reply would be.

Huweidi agreed with the US view that agriculture should have high priority in Iraq. President Aref, he said, is often heard to talk of the importance of agriculture. The budget for this year was increased first from ID 9 million to ID 16 million and then to ID 22 million, but the real problem is getting the money spent. There is a limit to what can be done in one year. He recognized the fact that social uplift could come with a rise in rural income and that likewise a sound agriculture would produce capital and also markets for local consumer industries. He supported certain industrial projects, however, particularly sulphur recovery and fertilizer.

*Robert C. Strong*

Robert C. Strong

cc: Dept., NE, INR/RNA  
Amb, Pol, Econ, CF

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ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 17 HUNG-IRAQ		
NEA-5			AIRGRAM			POL 2 IRAQ		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-102			CONFIDENTIAL		
1	5	4	NO.			CSM 21		
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			DATE: AUGUST 4, 1964		
NEA	CU	IND	INFO : BUDAPEST			ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION		
E	P	IS	FROM : AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD			SUBJECT: Views of New Hungarian Ambassador on the Situation in Iraq and Situation of Communism in the World.		
L	FBO	AID	REF :					
AGR	COM	FRB						
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Although the new Hungarian Ambassador, Lajos S. Nagy, finds Iraq very unstable and most of the Iraqis opposed to socialism and unity, nonetheless he believes that the government is now committed to this policy and that it will have to continue to implement it. He also expects something to happen in Iraq but does not know when, nor who will do what, how or for what reason.

Hungary as well as the other Eastern European states are making rapid progress in their relatively free status because voluntary cooperation is a better basis for international communism than domination by one country. Communist China is a great danger, however, because it is using doctrine to pursue selfish national interests.

For the Ambassador:

*James E. Akins*  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

GROUP 4  
Downgraded at 3-year intervals,  
declassified 12 years after date of origin.

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Drafted by: POL:TJ3/tes:mlh:08/04/64

Clearances: DCM:JWAdams

Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB:RCStrong

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

Enclosure 1, Page 1  
Airgram No, A-102  
Baghdad, Iraq.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Amembassy, Baghdad,  
July 31, 1964.

PARTICIPANTS: Lajos S. NAGY, Hungarian Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador

SUBJECT: Situation in Iraq; Situation of Communism in the World.

1. Iraq. Ambassador Nagy finds Iraq very unstable. He expects something to happen but doesn't know when, nor who will do what, how and for what reason. He finds strong sentiment even among the lower classes, against nationalization. In his opinion, Islam has strong influence in Iraq and the religious leaders are opposed to socialism, but he thinks it quite easy to find passages in the Koran which support the concept of socialism. Nagy finds it fascinating that a government so blithely has misled its people as has the GOI. Now no one will believe anything it says. He thinks in its weakness the GOI will have to press Nasser for early unity and that Nasser may have to give in in the hope of preserving the regime. But he finds most people here opposed to unity and doesn't believe unity will work. But now, having started on the road to socialism, Iraq will have to continue along it, and this brings the question of oil to the forefront.

2. Communism. Ambassador Nagy apparently is pleased with the greater freedom Eastern European states have achieved and the greater flexibility they have obtained in dealing with internal affairs. He regards this as a healthy return to nationalism, which is an ineradicable force and a valuable one. Voluntary cooperation he considers a better basis for international communism than domination by one country. He feels Hungary is making much more rapid progress in its current relatively free status.

Nagy regards Red China's charges against the Soviets and its policy line to be simply the reflection of a clash of national interests between China and the USSR. The Chinese have their own reasons for doing and saying what they do, but since the world faces the question of self-destruction by nuclear warfare or a compromising of difference, it is impossible for sane people to accept the Chinese line. If China continues its present policies, it will become very dangerous. In any case, China is destined in time to become the major world problem.

However, Nagy stated that he was certain that when Mao Tse-tung died there would be a considerable modification in Chinese policy and posture, and this would have wide repercussions. He implied that the Chinese would then be less insistent on the correctness of their own doctrine, which is Mao's own.

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POL 2 IRAQ

*Baghdad 95*

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

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Action

Control: 21781  
Rec'd: JULY 28, 1964  
2:51 A.M.

NEA FROM: BAGHDAD

Info ACTION: SECSTATE 95

SS	INFO:	AMMAN	UNNUMBERED
G		ANKARA	UNNUMBERED
SP		BASRA	UNNUMBERED
L		BEIRUT	UNNUMBERED
EUR		CAIRO	UNNUMBERED
IO		DAMASCUS	UNNUMBERED
ATD		DHAHRAN	UNNUMBERED
P		JIDDA	UNNUMBERED
USTIA		KUWAIT	UNNUMBERED
NSC		LONDON	UNNUMBERED
INR		TAIZ	UNNUMBERED
CIA		TEHRAN	UNNUMBERED
NSA		TEL AVIV	UNNUMBERED
OSD		POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA	UNNUMBERED
ARMY			
NAVY			
AIR			
RMR			

DATE: JULY 28, 8 A.M.

WEEKLY REVIEW

WITH NO SOLUTION IN SIGHT FOR ITS MULTITUDE OF PROBLEMS, IRAQI ACTIONS DURING WEEK MADE MATTERS WORSE. IN ITS CLOSING MEETING, ARAB SOCIALIST UNION (WITH PRESIDENT AREF PRESENT AND VOTING) UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED AMENDMENTS TO CHARTER CALLING FOR LIBERATION OF ISKENDERUN AND ARABISTAN (THEREBY ASSURING HOSTILITY OF IRAN AND GRATUITOUSLY INCURRING THAT OF TURKEY) AND DEMANDING ELIMINATION OF "EXPLOITATIVE CAPITAL," (LEADING TO LOCAL DISCUSSION OF GOI INTENTIONS TOWARD IPC AND OFF-SETTING ITS EFFORTS TO ASSURE LOCAL BUSINESSMEN THAT WAVE OF NATIONALIZATION HAS PASSED). ACCORDING TO CAS REPORT, GOI HAS ALSO ISSUED ORDERS TO ARREST THOSE SHI'A WHO LED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS JULY 1 AT HUSSAIN ARBI-IIN AND JULY 9 AT NAJAF. GOI MAY BELIEVE MOVE WILL BREAK SHI'A NERVE BUT IT MORE LIKELY INSURE CONTINUING SHI'A UNREST.

THE MANY IRAQIS WHO CONSIDER NASSER DIABOLUS EX MACHINA ON LOCAL SCENE ARE MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT HE IS IMPLEMENTING SCHEME TO REDUCE IRAQ TO CHAOS, THEREBY FORCING

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-2- 95, JULY 28, 8 A.M. FROM BAGHDAD

IRAQIS - EVEN THOSE WHO HATE NASSER - TO TURN TO HIM FOR STABILITY HE WOULD PROMISE COUNTRY.

ASU IS SHOWING SIGN OF INTERNAL STRAIN. ITS SLOGAN IS "NO PARTIES, NO BLOCKS, AND NO PERSONALITIES," BUT THERE IS OBVIOUS JOCKEYING FOR POWER. SALAM AHMAD, HEAD OF THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT, WHO BROUGHT HIS GROUP INTO ASU ON STIPULATION HE PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ITS ORGANIZATION, NOW SEEMS IN STRONGEST POSITION. HE IS ACTIVELY OPPOSED BY ABD AL-RAZZAK SHIBIB, AHMAD HABUBI AND FUAD RIKABI, ALL OF WHOM CONSIDER AHMAD UNWORTHY OF ROLE. AHMAD IS UNPREPARED, SCHOOL TEACHER, FREQUENTLY UNWASHED AND UNSHAVEN, AND IS NOT AN ELECTRIFYING SPEAKER, BUT PROBABLY MORE INTELLIGENT, BETTER ORGANIZER AND MORE ACCOMPLISHED SCHEMER THAN HIS OPPONENTS.

SHI'A REACTION

SHI'A HELD MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD'S KADHAMAIN SHRINE ON JULY 22 AND 23, NAJAF ON JULY 23, AND KUFA, JULY 26, IN WHICH THEY DENOUNCED SOCIALISM AS BEING AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAM. SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADER, AMJAD ZAHAWI, HAS REISSUED HIS FATWA AGAINST SOCIALISM, BUT REACTION LACKING. SHI'A ARE AWAITING PRONOUNCEMENT OF MUHSIN AL-HAKIM, WHICH WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLY GREATER EFFECT. EXPLANATION FOR HIS RETICENCE IN ISSUING FATWA IS THAT IF GOI IGNORED IT (AS IT WOULD), HAKIM WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ISSUE CALL TO JIHAD - A FAR MORE SERIOUS MATTER.

KURDS

MULLA MUSTAFA'S NEW POLITICAL BUREAU REPORTEDLY HAS REACHED SAME CONCLUSION AS THAT OF FORMER MEMBERS, I.E., GOI WILL GRANT KURDS NO CONCESSIONS AND PLANS ATTACK THEM SOON. ACCORDINGLY, KURDS UNDER MULLA MUSTAFA HAVE DRAFTED, AND ALLEGEDLY WILL SEND GOI THIS WEEK, ULTIMATUM DEMANDING NEGOTIATIONS ON DEFINITION OF KURDISH AUTONOMY START SOON OR KURDS WILL SET-UP THEIR OWN ADMINISTRATION.

MOST OLD MEMBERS OF POLITICAL BUREAU HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN IRAN - ACTION INTERPRETED BY MULLA MUSTAFA AS FINAL PROOF THEY HAVE SOLD OUT TO SHAH.

KURDS OF BOTH GROUPS STILL HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION BEFORE FIGHTING RESUMED. IF THERE IS NONE, OLD POLITICAL

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-3- 95, JULY 28, 8 A.M. FROM BAGHDAD

BUREAU MAY HAVE GOOD CHANCE OF CAPTURING CONTROL OF KURDISH MOVEMENT FROM MULLA WHO HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCREDITED BY HIS FAITH IN AREF. POLITICAL BUREAU APPEARS LIKELY HAVE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF ARMS AND MONEY FROM IRAN WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERING WHAT ROLE TO PLAY. RENEWED IRAQI CALL FOR LIBERATION "ARABISTAN" SCARCELY LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE IRAN TO ADOPT NEUTRAL POSITION IN KURDISH-IRAQ STRUGGLE.

COMMENT: WHETHER AS UK AMBASSADOR REMARKED GOI HAS "GOTTEN AWAY WITH" NATIONALIZATION AND ACCELERATED PACE OF UNITY, OR WHETHER RELATIVE ABSENCE OF ABOVE-SURFACE REACTIONS MEANS SUBSURFACE TURMOIL, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT ISSUES BOUND TO GENERATE MORE HEAT AND THAT INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES PLUS GROWING EXTERNAL PRESSURES LIKELY LEAD TO SERIOUS TROUBLE INCLUDING POSSIBLE EFFORT CREATE UAR-IRAQI UNION QUICKLY. STRONG

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By <i>SE</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

POL 2 IRAQ

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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WEEKLY REVIEW

E

1. NATIONALIZATION.

AID

P

A. GENERAL. BUSINESS COMMUNITY DEMORALIZED BY  
JULY 14 NATIONALIZATION DECREES. BAGHDAD AIRPORT WITNESSING  
UNIQUE MID-JULY PHENOMENON OF UNDERCAPACITY OUTWARD FLIGHTS  
AND PACKED PLANES BRINGING BACK MERCHANTS AND OTHER SHARE-  
CFN 66 1 14

USIA

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CIA

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PAGE TWO RUQVBD 0130A CONFIDENTIAL  
HOLDERS SEEKING ASSESS DAMAGE AND CUT LOSSES BEFORE EXPECTED  
NEXT ROUND OF NATIONALIZATION. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN  
NO INDICATION IT PLANS PROCEED FARTHER, UNIVERSAL BELIEF  
THAT EGYPTIAN PATTERN WILL BE FOLLOWED - I.E. SMALLER  
FACTORIES, OFFICE BUILDINGS, TRADING COMPANIES - EVEN PRIVATE  
CLINICS AND PHARMACIES SOON TO BE TAKEN OVER BY GOVERNMENT  
AND ALL WITH ONLY NOMINAL COMPENSATION. GOI NOW ESTIMATES  
TOTAL CAPITAL OF FIRMS NATIONALIZED AT ID 25.5 MILLION.

B. IPC. BOTH GOI ASSERTION THAT NATIONALIZATION  
FOLLOWS NATURALLY FROM ARAB SOCIALISM AND THE ARAB SOCIALIST  
UNION THEME THAT IRAQ MUST BE "LIBERATED FROM FOREIGN AND  
DOMESTIC CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION" LEAD MANY IRAQIS TO  
CONCLUSION THAT IPC WILL BE HIT SOON. MINPETROLEUM WATTARI  
REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD OPEC COLLEAGUES THAT HE WILL BE FIRST  
OPEC MINISTER TO NATIONALIZE "HIS" OIL COMPANY. HOWEVER,  
IPC HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY IN ANY OFFICIAL  
DECLARATION NOR DO WE BELIEVE GOI CONTEMPLATING ACTION.

C. RATIONALE. FEW IRAQIS QUESTION REPORT THAT  
NASSER INFORMED GOI (THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER ABD AL-HAMID  
JULY 5) THAT HE REFUSED ENTER UNION WITH IRAQ AS LONG AS  
CFN 25.5 5

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-2- 66, July 20, 2 P.M., (SECTION I OF II) From Baghdad

BOURGEOIS CLASS EXISTED AND THAT IRAQ MOVED ACCORDINGLY TO DESTROY IT. HOWEVER, TALIB JAMIL, NEW HEAD OF NATIONALIZED INSURANCE ESTABLISHMENT, HAS GIVEN FRIENDS DIFFERENT VERSION. ACCORDING TO MAMIL, GOI ORIGINALLY HAD NOT INTENDED TO NATIONALIZE FIRMS BUT WAS SHAKEN BY SHI'A ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS AT HUSSAIN "ARBACIIN" IN KERBALA JULY 1 AND DECIDED TO BREAK SHI'A POWER. FIRST MOVE WAS TO DESTROY LARGE SHI'A MERCHANTS THROUGH BUSINESS NATIONALIZATION AND SMALL SHI'A MERCHANTS BY RESTRICTING BANK CREDIT FROM NEWLY NATIONALIZED BANKS. FOMMIN ABD AL-HAMID VISITED CAIRO JULY 5, NOT TO GET ORDERS FROM NASSER AS IS POPULARLY BELIEVE, BUT TO GET NASSER'S APPROVAL OF PLAN. NASSER APPROVED. ACCORDING TO JAMIL, ONLY INNER CIRCLE ARMY OFFICERS AROUND PRESIDENT ANHXNSND KHAIR AL-DIN HASIB, NEW ACTING PRESIDENT OF ECONOMIC ESTABLISHMENT AND BANKS, PRIVY TO PLANS.

2. REACTION.

REACTION HAS NOT BEEN ANGER BUT HOPELESSNESS, DESPONDENCY AND DESIRE TO FLEE COUNTRY - ARMY IS ALL-POWERFUL AND IT IS FREE TO RUIN COUNTRY IF IT PLEASES. THERE WERE WIDESPREAD REPORTS JULY 18 OF MERCHANT'S STRIKE IN BAGHDAD AND SOUTH TO BE HELD  
CFN 1 5 2

PAGE FOUR RUQVBD 0130A C O N F I D E N T I A L  
JULY 20, BUT THE REPORT WAS COUNTERED IMMEDIATELY BY WORD THAT GOI WOULD SEIZE AND SELL PROPERTY OF ANY STRIKING MERCHANT. IN ANY CASE, BAGHDAD QUIET AND SHOWS NO SIGNS OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY.

REFORM PARTY HAS ISSUEFC ANOTHER PAMPHLET THREATENING GOVERNMENT WITH DESTRUCTION BUT ITS COMPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES, IF ANY, ARE WELL DISGUISED.

SHI'A CITIES OF SOUTH SEEM QUIET. LONG AWAITED FATWA RPT FATWA FROM NAJAF AGAINST SOCIALISM HAS NOT MATERIALIED, BUT IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO CONCLUDE THAT GOVERNMENT ACTION HAS BEEN SUCCESS THERE. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT SHI'A MERCHANTS - INCLUDING SMALL HANDLERS - ARE PUTTING PRESSURE ON RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT AGAINST GOI.

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-3- 66, July 20, 2 P.M., (SECTION I OF II) From Baghdad

MAY BE SOMETIME BEFORE EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION MOBILIZED  
OR BEFORE IT BECOMES REASONABLE TO ASSUME SUCH OPPOSITION  
WILL NOT BE CREATED.

3. ARAB SOCIALIST UNION HOLDS MEETINGS.

WORKING MEETINGS OF ASU, HELD JULY 17-19, PROVIDED IRAQ  
WITH FIRST OPEN FORUM SINCE JULY 14, 1958. ALTHOUGH 1300  
MEMBERS WERE CAREFULLY CHOSEN AND MOST SPEECHES LAUDED GOI,  
CFN 20 3 17-19 14 1958 1300

PAGE FIVE RUQVBD 2130A C O N F I D E N T I A L  
AREF, AND GUIDANCE MINISTER FARHAN, RELATIVELY FREE DISCUSSION  
WAS PERMITTED. ON JULY 18, SUGGESTION WAS MADE FROM FLOOR  
THAT MEMBERSHIP IN ASU BE EXPANDED, THAT GOVERNMENT SELECTED  
LEADERSHIP RESIGN AND THAT ELECTIONS BE HELD. SUGGESTION  
WAS SHOUTED DWN BUT GOT VISIBLE SUPPORT FROM SOME OF THOSE  
PRESENT. ASU ORGAN, THAWRA ARABIYA WROTE FOLLOWING DAY,  
THAT THERE WAS NO PLACE IN ASU FOR "GROUPS OR BLOCKS" AND  
EVERYONE HAPPY WITH PRESENT LEADERSHIP (ERGO - NO ELECTIONS  
NECESSARY). JULY 19, WHEN SPEAKER EXTOLLED DEMOCRACY VOICE  
FROM FLOOR SHOUTED THAT THERE WAS NO DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ AND  
COULD BE NONE UNTIL ELECTIONS WERE HELD. HE TO WAS SHOUTED  
DOWN BUT GOT HEATED SUPPORT FROM FEW MEMBERS WHO IN TURN WERE  
SILENCED.

IN SPITE OF DISSENT, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT GOVERN-  
MENTAL PROGRAM FOR ASU WILL BE ACCEPTED WITHOUT CHANGE.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

38

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CONFIDENTIAL SET TWO OF TWO 66  
INFO AMMAN ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS  
DHAMRAN JIDDA KUWAIT LONDON TAIZ TEHRAN  
TELAVIV POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNN JULY 20-2 PM  
WEEKLY REVIEW  
4. KURDS

INTER-KURDISH MEETING SCHEDULED EARLY JULY TO RECONCILE  
MULLA MUSTAFA AND KDP POLITICAL BUREAU NEVER HELD. MULLA,  
ACTING AS KDP PRESIDENT, ISSUED ORDER JULY 7, EXPELLING FROM  
KDP ALL POLITICAL BUREAU MEMBERS EXCEPT SALIH ABDULLAH YUSUFI.  
TWO MEMBERS NOW IN BAGHDAD; IBRAHIM AHMAD AND JALAL TALABANI  
BELIEVED IN IRAN; REMAINDER "FROZEN" IN KURDISTAN.  
CFN 66 4 7

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 0130B CONFIDENTIAL

OUTSTANDING DISPUTE WAS ON RESUMPTION HOSTILITIES.  
POLITICAL BUREAU INSISTED THAT GOI PROMISES WORTHLESS; THAT  
GOI PREPARING FOR WAR AGAINST KURDS AND HAD PLACED LARGE  
ORDERS WITH US, USSR AND ENGLAND FOR ARMS AND AMMUNITION  
WHICH COULD ONLY BE USED IN KURDISTAN; THAT GOI NOW WEAK  
AND SHIA SOLDIERS WOULD NOT FIGHT. KURDS MUST THEREFORE  
ISSUE ULTIMATUM TO GOI TO START NEGOTIATIONS OR FACE RENEWED  
HOSTILITIES. MULLA'S REFUSAL DO SO IS PROOF HE HAS SOLD  
OUT TO AREF.

MULLA STILL PROCLAIMING FAITH IN GOI'S PROMISES AND  
STILL SAYS HE HAS HOPE NASSER WILL PERSUADE GOI MAKE  
CONCESSIONS TO KURDS. IN ANY CASE KURDS MUST NOT BEAR ONUS  
OF STARTING FIGHT.

THERE WERE SEVERAL SEVERE CLASHES BETWEEN MULLA AND  
POLITICAL BUREAU ADHERENTS EARLY JULY BUT POLITICAL BUREAU,  
ACCORDING TO NURI ABMAD TAHA, WITHDREW "TO SAVE KURDS FROM  
DISASTER OF CIVIL WAR".

MULLA HAS TOLD PRIVATELY THAT HE HAS LITTLE  
FAITH IN GOVERNMENT; THAT IT IS WEAK AND WILL SOON DISAPPEAR.

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-2- 66, JULY 20, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM BAGHDAD

HE WILL THEN REACH AGREEMENT WITH SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT OR

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 0130B C O N F I D E N T I A L  
WILL RESUME FIGHTING. IN MEANTIME HE CONTINUES RECRUIT  
PESHMERGA RPT PESHMERGO.

MULLA SEEMS TO HAVE WON FIRST ROUND IN STRUGGLE WITH  
POLITICAL BUREAU BUT WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE CONSOLIDATE HIS  
POSITION AMONG KURDS APPEARS CONTINGENT ON HIS WINNING SOME  
CONCESSIONS FROM GOI WHICH, AS FAR AS WE KNOW, SEEMS  
UNWILLING CONCEDE MUCH OF SUBSTANCE TO KURDS.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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KUWAIT LONDON TAIZ TEHRAN TELAVIV  
POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNN JULY 14-3:00PM

WEEKLY REVIEW

1. ARAB SOCIALIST UNION (ASU) - FORMATION OF ARAB  
SOCIALIST UNION --ASU--(AKA ONE ARAB MOVEMENT--OAM), GOI'S  
POLITICAL ACTION BODY, FINALLY ANNOUNCED JULY 12. LIST RE-  
PORTEDLY ORGANIZED BY FUAD RIKABI AND AHMAD HABUBI BUT MOST  
OF 1300 OTHER NAMES ON LIST ARE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND  
UNKNOWN WORKERS, PEASANTS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN WITH NAMES TOO  
CFN 44 1 12 1300

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 0079 CONFIDENTIAL  
COMMON TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION (C.E.), MUHAMMAD JASIM). NEW  
ORGANIZATION, WHICH WILL HOLD MEETINGS JULY 14-24, ALSO IN-  
CLUDES "PERSONALITIES", BUT BABA ALI, RASHID ALI GAILANI,  
MUHAMMAD MAHDI KUBBA, AND RIDHI SHABIBI AND ALL OTHERS WE  
HAVE CONTACTED FIRST LEARNED OF THEIR ADHERENCE TO MOVEMENT  
WHEN LIST READ ON RADIO; NONE INTENDS PARTICIPATE IN ANY ITS  
ACTIONS. FAIQ SAMARRAI (ISTIQLAL LEADER) AND SALAM AHMED  
(LEADER OF ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT), BOTH SHOWN AS MEMBERS,  
STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY IN MID-JUNE THEY WOULD NOT JOIN.  
NOTABLE OMISSION FROM LIST WAS AYAD THABIT, STRONG NASSERITE.

AREF AND HIS POLITICAL ORGANIZERS WERE NOT OVERWHELMED  
WITH APPLICATIONS TO JOIN ASU-OAM AND, AFTER MANY FALSE STARTS  
AND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ITS FORMATION, APPARENTLY DECIDED ORGANI-  
ZATION MUST BE LAUNCHED BEFORE 14TH JULY CELEBRATIONS. ASU  
ORGANIZERS APPEAR TO HVE SELECTED MEMBERS ARBITRARILY,  
WITHOUT CONSULTATION OR APPROVAL, COUNTING ON MEMBERS' UN-  
WILLINGNESS CONTRADICT GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTION THEY HAD JOINED.

2. AREF TRIES RESTORE HIS POSITION IN ARMY- PRESIDENT

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-2- 44, JULY 14, 3 PM: (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BAGHDAD

AREF, WITH LITTLE ADVANCE NOTICE, CALLED MEETING EVENING  
JULY 7 IN RASHID MILITARY CAMP OF ALL OFFICERS ON ACTIVE  
CFN 14 24 14 2 7

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
DUTY IN BAGHDAD AREA. ESTIMATES OF THOSE ATTENDING VARY BE-  
TWEEN 800 AND 2200. AREF GAVE 2 ONE HALF HOUR EMOTIONAL AND DIS-  
JOINTED SPEECH AND ACCOUNTS HIS REMARKS VARY CON-  
SIDERABLY. ALL PRESENT AGREE THAT AREF GAVE TEARFUL PLEA  
FOR IRAQI UNITY AND ARMY SUPPORT; HE STATED HE HAD WORKED  
FOR GOOD OF IRAQ AND WOULD RESIGN IF HE WERE NO LONGER  
WANTED. THIS FOLLOWED BY FEW OFFICERS PROCLAIMING LOYALTY  
AND THEN BY EVERY OFFICER PRESENT RENEWING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE  
TO AREF PERSONALLY.

DURING HARANGUE AREF REPORTEDLY ATTACKED, OBLIQUELY,  
ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT FOR DEMANDING IMMEDIATE UNION WITH  
UAR AND SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADERS FOR INTRIGUES AGAINST HIM.  
HE DID, HOWEVER, PAY TRIBUTE TO ENLISTED MEN, WHOM HE IDENTI-  
FIED AS SHI'A, AND SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD TAKE OVER THEIR  
PROTECTION. THERE WERE ALSO STANDARD ATTACKS ON BAATH AND  
IMPERIALISM BUT NOT ON COMMUNISM.

AREF MAY HAVE ENHANCED POSITION IN SHORT RUN BUT IT  
DOUBTFUL IF HE PERMANENTLY INCREASED STRENGTH. SCENE WAS  
APPARENTLY TOO UNDIGNIFIED AND EMOTIONAL EVEN FOR ARAB  
OFFICERS WHO NOT NOTED FOR DEVOTION TO COOL LOGIC. MANY NOW  
APPEAR RESENT BEING TRICKED INTO SHOW OF LOYALTY THEY DID NOT  
FEEL.

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CONFIDENTIAL SETWO OF TWO ACTION DEPT 44  
INFO AMMAN ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS DHARRAN JIDDA  
KUWAIT LONDON TAIJZ TEHRAN TELAVIV  
POLAD CINCSRIKE/CINCEAFSA UNN JULY 14-3:20PM

3. KURDS - OFF-AGAIN, ON-AGAIN KURDISH RECONCILIATION  
SEEMS TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN COMPLETELY. THERE UNCONFIRMED  
REPORT MULLA MUSTAFA HAS ARRESTED KDP SECRETARY GENERAL  
IBRAHIM AHMED AND HAS "FROZEN" OTHER KDP LEADERS. MAS'UD  
MUHAMMAD, KURDISH MINISTER OF STATE, WHO IS PERSONAL FRIEND  
OF MULLA MUSTAFA AND A LONG-TIME OPEN ENEMY OF KDP, HAS STATED  
THAT KDP INTRANSIGENT BUT MULLA MUSTAFA LARGELY TO BLAME FOR  
SPLIT BETWEEN TWO GRUPS. MAS'UD BELIEVES IF KURDS WERE  
UNITED, GOI WOULD GRANT CERTAIN CONCESSIONS BUT WITH KURDS  
SEEMINGLY BENT ON SUICIDE, GOI WILL MAKE NO MOVE GRANT "KURDISH  
NATIONAL RIGHTS" AND PROBABLY WILL EVEN RENEGE ON PROMISE RE-  
CONSTRUCT NORTH. MAS'UD INTENDS LEAVE FOR KURDISTAN JULY 13  
IN YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT RECONCILE TWO GROUPS. TWO SOURCES  
HAVE REPORTED CLASH NEAR DERBENDI KHAN DAM RECENTLY BETWEEN  
MULLA MUSTAFA'S FORCES AND THOSE OF KDP.  
CFN 3 13

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L

GOVERNMENT AGAIN HAS OPPORTUNITY INCREASE SPLIT IN  
KURDISH MOVEMENT BY MAKING SOME CONCESSIONS TO MULLA MUSTAFA,  
WHO BASES HIS POSITION ON TRUST IN GOVERNMENT'S PROMISES.  
IF GOI MAKES NO CONCESSION BY END SUMMER, KDP LIKELY MAKE  
MAJOR EFFORT TO DISCREDIT MULLA MUSTAFA AS DUPE OF GOVERNMENT  
WITH VIEW TO RENEWING FIGHTING WITH AS MUCH TRIBAL BACKING  
AS POSSIBLE.

4. US REVIEW OF AVAILABLE FINANCING FOR MAJOR PROJECTS-  
FONOFF OFFICIALS TOLD AMBASSADOR FONMIN SENT EMBASSY'S JULY 4  
NOTE TO CONCIL OF MINISTERS WITH "FAVORABLE" RECOMMENDATIONS  
AND ALSO SENT "DIRECTIVES" TO PERTINENT MINISTRIES REGARDING  
USE OF AVAILABLE WESTERN CREDITS FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.

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-2- 44, July 14, 3 PM, from Baghdad (Section Two of Two)

CHIEF OF PRESIDENTIAL DIWAN TOLD AMBASSADOR HE HAD DISCUSSED NOTE WITH PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN, AND PROGNOSTICATED "GOOD" RESULTS. WEEKLY ECONOMIC PAPER PUBLISHED FULL TEXT US STATEMENT JULY 13.

RUMANIAN CHARGE JULY 12 QUESTIONED EMBOFF. ABOUT OFFER AND ASKED IF IT WERE "AMERICAN ANSWER TO SOVIET OFFER BUILD MOSUL DAM". RUMANIAN, WHO GAVE NO DETAILS RUSSIAN OFFER, WAS TOLD IT WAS INDEPENDENT SUGGESTION.  
CEN 4 4 13 12

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 0079 C O N F I D E U O T I A L

5. HARASSMENT EMBASSY EMPLOYEES - AFTER HARASSMENT EMBASSY EMPLOYEES BY IRAQI SECURITY FORCES EARLY JUNE, EMBASSY COUNSELOR PROTESTED TO FONMINISTRY AND ACTIONS CEASED. DURING LAST WEEK OVERT SECURITY SURVEILLANCE RESUMED. TYPEWRITER REPAIRMAN QUESTIONED ABOUT EMBASSY OFFICERS AND IRAQI SECURITY OFFICERS TRIED RECRUIT LOCAL TELEPHONE OPERATOR. OTHER IRAQI EMPLOYEES STOPPED AND QUESTIONED AT EMBASSY EXIT. SENIOR TRANSLATOR SAYS HE HAS LEARNED HIS NAME ON LIST 300 SUSPECT PERSONS.

6. NASIR AL-HANI REPORTED LEAVING WASHINGTON - COUNCIL MINISTERS APPROVED LAW JULY 11 PROHIBITING FONMIN OFFICIALS MARRIAGE WITH FOREIGNERS. ACCORDING FONMIN SOURCES, LAW WILL APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, NASIR AL-HANI (ALONG WITH AMBASSADOR JABIR OMAR IN BONN) WILL BE RECALLED SHORTLY.

7. SHI'A UNREST - CELEBRATION IN NAJAF JULY 9 OF DEATH IMAM HASAN WAS AGAIN OCCASION OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT SHIA DEMONSTRATION. SAME SLOGANS AND POEMS WHICH WERE RECITED AT MUCH LARGER MUSSAIN "ARBA'IN" WERE REPEATED. CROWDS TAUNTED POLICE AND SECURITY OFFICIALS BUT THERE WERE NO OPEN CLASHES.  
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-3- 44, July 14, 3 PM, from Baghdad (Section Two of Two)

PAGE FOUR RUQVBD 0079 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SHIA HOLY PERIOD WHICH BEGAN FIRST MUHARRAM (MAY 13) NOW COMPLETED. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY WORDS, COMPLAINTS AND INSULTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT AREF BUT THE OFT-RUMORED ARMED UPRISING DID NOT TAKE PLACE. GOI CAN RELAX IN KNOWLEDGE THERE WILL NOT BE ANOTHER EASILY EXPLOITED SHIA FESTIVAL (WITH EXCEPTION OF MUHAMMAD'S BIRTHDAY JULY 22) FOR ANOTHER TEN MONTHS.

8. MIN GUIDANCE THREATENS EXPEL DIPLOMAT - MIN GUIDANCE FARHAN, IN PRESS INTERVIEW, REFERRING TO EARLIER CHARGE MADE BY FONMIN (EMBTEL 23), SAID GOI HAD ASSEMBLED PROOF OF ACTIVITIES RECENTLY ARRIVED DIPLOMAT IN STIRRING UP SECTARIANISM. SAID DIPLOMATS WHO MISBEHAVE WILL BE EXPELLED.

ALTHOUGH FARHAN'S WORDS, AS THOSE EARLIER OF FONMIN, MAY APPLY TO BRITISH (BRITISH FIRST SECRETARY ARRIVED EARLY JUNE), FARHAN PROBABLY WANTED IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TAKE DUE NOTE.

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			<p>TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE</p> <p>INFO : ANKARA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS; KUWAIT, TEHRAN.</p> <p>FROM : Embassy BAGHDAD</p> <p>DATE: JULY 9, 1964</p> <p>SUBJECT: Iraqi Minister of Culture and Guidance Holds Press Conference.</p> <p>REF :</p> <p>Brigadier Abd al-Karim FARHAN, Iraq's Minister of Culture and Guidance, held a press conference on July 8. A summary of his remarks follows:</p> <p><u>Unity:</u> The government is determined to proceed toward unity. On July 14, the Arab Socialist Federation will hold its first conference, with 1000 persons attending. On the same day, the Federation's official newspaper, al-Thawra, will appear. There will be important announcements made, such as the abolition of certain military courts so as to return the nation to normal conditions.</p> <p><u>GOI Retaliation to Imperialist Plotting:</u> Such positive moves as the above have stirred up an enemy pact to undermine the government. Imperialism has become active, and there have been secret meetings of which the government is aware. Alien spies will be ejected. The GOI will also have to expel certain diplomatic officials if they violate their status by inciting to intrigue and riot.</p> <p><u>Religious Leaders:</u> He said that the religious leaders were basically good, and he called upon them to oppose imperialism and its agents. Any religious men who try to sow discord and enmity are followers of the devil.</p> <p><u>GOI Is All-Iraqi:</u> The GOI is a government of the people, its citizens are Iraqis first, it does not discriminate and will fill government posts on the basis of ability and conduct. Patriotic Iraqis will disregard shu'ubite rumors and falsehoods.</p>			
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LONDON TAIZ TEHRAN TELAVIV  
POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNN JULY 7, 9 PM

WEEKLY REVIEW

1. IRANIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS - IRANIAN EMBASSY DELIGHTED  
AT "SUCCESS" ITS NEW HARD-LINE POLICY. IRANIAN COUNSELOR  
CLAIMS THAT SINCE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED HIS CREDENTIALS,  
PRESS ATTACKS ON IRAN AND HARASSMENT IRAN NATIONALS IN IRAQ  
HAVE CEASED COMPLETELY. IRANIANS HE SAID, NOW INTEND TAKE

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 0041 CONFIDENTIAL  
SIMILAR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE IRAQIS--UNLESS GOI RESUMES ITS  
ATTACKS ON SHAH OR IRANIAN POLICY.

IRANIAN TOUGH APPROACH MAY HAVE SHORT-TERM EFFECT ON  
CERTAIN LIMITED ISSUES BUT SEEMS UNLIKELY GOI IN LONG RUN  
WILL CONTINUE REACT DOCILELY TO IRANIAN PRESSURE AND THAT  
BASIC ISSUES WILL REMAIN INTRACTABLE. WE BELIEVE THEY WILL  
SEEK RETALIATE THROUGH CLOSER RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NASSER  
(WHICH IRANIANS FEAR) OR, MORE DANGEROUSLY, THROUGH IN-  
CREASED COOPERATION WITH SOVIET BLOC.

FONMIN HAS GONE TO CAIRO UNANNOUNCED. CAN ONLY  
SPECULATE ON HIS PURPOSES.

2. USG RELATIONS WITH IRAQ- POSITION OF US IN LAST  
TWO WEEKS HAS DETERIORATED STEADILY. MAIN REASON PROBABLY  
IRAQI ASSOCIATION OF USG WITH RECENT IRANIAN THREATS. SUNNI  
ARABS, WHO BELIEVE IRANIANS ARE BEHIND INCREASED SHI'A  
RESTIVENESS, CONVINCED INSPIRATION COMES FROM USG. PRESIDENT  
AREF HAS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED HIS SUSPICIONS OF USG ACTIONS  
AND IRANIAN APPROACH NO DOUBT HAS INCREASED HIS HOSTILITY.  
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-2- 23, July 7, 9 p.m., from Baghdad

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 0041 C O N F I D E N T I A L

WIDESPREAD BELIEF (SHARED BY AT LEAST SOME MINISTERS) THAT USG USED BAATH AS ITS INSTRUMENT NOW ENLARGED BY ACCUSATION THAT USG INTENDS RESTORE BAATHIS TO POWER IN IRAQ AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO NASSER AND SOP TO OUR ALLIES TURKEY AND IRAN.

NO OFFICIAL REACTION AS YET TO US PROPOSAL ON ESKI MOSUL DAM. NEWS HAS NOT BEEN PUBLISHED BY LOCAL PRESS BUT PRIVATE REACTION, AS FAR WE ABLE JUDGE, UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE. WE INTEND CAMPAIGN FOR GENERAL PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF PROPOSAL AND OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

FOURTH OF JULY RECEPTION POORLY ATTENDED BY IRAQIS OF WHOM 13 OF 58 INVITEES CAME. FOUR OF 20 IRAQIS ATTENDED DINNER BY AMBASSADOR FOR KILLGORE JULY 5. ARMA INFORMED JULY 6 THAT IRAQI MILITARY OFFICERS INVITED HIS RECEPTION JULY 7 WILL BE UNABLE ATTEND.

3. SECTARIANISM - ACCORDING TO MUTASARRIF OF KERBALA, BETWEEN 700,000 AND 900,000 SHI'A GATHERED IN KERBALA JULY 1 TO PAY HONOR TO MEMORY OF IMAM HUSSAIN. ALMOST ALL BANNERS AND SLOGANS HAD POLITICAL OVERTONES, ALTHOUGH SOME WERE COINED IN 7TH CENTURY ISLAMIC TERMINOLOGY. OTHER  
CFN 13 58 20 5 6 7 700,000 900,000 1

PAGE FOUR RUQVBD 0041 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
CHANTS AND POEMS WERE OPENLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND WERE GREETED WITH DELIGHT BY THE CROWDS. NONETHELESS, ARMY AND POLICE, IN SPITE OF TAUNTS, DID NOT ATTEMPT INTERFERE AND GATHERING DISPERSED PEACEFULLY. CELEBRATION ANNIVERSARY DEATH HASAN JULY 9 EXPECTED BE EXCUSE NEW AND MORE DARING DEMONSTRATIONS EXPLOITING GOI'S RELUCTANCE TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION.

GOI NOTICEABLY DISTURBED BY SHI'A DISCONTENT, BUT UNWILLING RECOGNIZE SHI'A HAVE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES, ATTRIBUTE IT TO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE. THERE IS WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT IRANIANS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR UNREST AND IRANIANS HAVE DONE NOTHING DISCOURAGE THIS BELIEF. NONETHELESS, FONMIN SUBHI ABD AL-HAMID, IN TELEVISED SPEECH, ACCUSED "FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENT" OF BEING BEHIND "UNWORTHY SECTARIANISM". FROM CONTEXT AND LANGUAGE USED, WOULD APPEAR ALLEGED AGENT BRITISH.

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-3- 23, July 7, 9 p.m., from Baghdad

4. IRAQ RELATIONS WITH PERSIAN GULF STATES - IRAQI DELEGATION TO PERSIAN GULF STATES EARLY JUNE FOLLOWED BY VISIT SHAIKH SAQAR OF SHARJA TO BAGHDAD DURING WEEK. SAQAR GIVEN ALL HONORS OF VISITING CHIEF OF STATE. IRAQ PREPARING FOR VISIT OF QATAR RULER IN NEAR FUTURE. THESE  
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PAGE FIVE RUQVBD 0041 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
VISITS PART OF IRAQI CAMPAIGN AGAINST IMPERIALISM IN GULF AREA.

RATIFICATION OF IRAQI-KUWAITI WATERS AGREEMENT GIVEN WIDE PUBLICITY AS WAS KUWAITI REFUSAL TO EXTEND A LOAN TO SYRIA.

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1964 JUL 6 AM 7 29

INFO : BASRA, CAIRO, TEHRAN

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: JULY 2, 1964

SUBJECT: Views of Iraqi Shi'a Businessmen on Situation in Iraq

REF :

In a long conversation with the Ambassador, Jawad Jaifar, an Iraqi Shi'a businessman, listed Iraq's problems as (1) Nasser, (2) returning the Iraqi army to its barracks, (3) internal divisions, and (4) re-creating sound bases for agriculture. A summary of his views follows. A memorandum of the conversation is enclosed.

Nasser - There can be no stability in Iraq until Nasser ceases interference. Nasser is unwilling to try to solve Iraq's internal problems and knows that his influence is greatest when Iraq is weak. Nasser wants to use Iraq as a political pawn. In spite of the fact that Nasser is the prime trouble maker in the Arab world, the United States subsidizes him. Nasser will undoubtedly try to subvert Kuwait and the Persian Gulf Arab states sometime. Egypt without Nasser would not be a problem for the other Arab states.

Army - The Iraqi army officers are men of limited intelligence and poor education. They are ambitious and venal and in no way suited to run the country. The army is an excessive drain on the treasury and it must be returned to the barracks.

Tahir Yahya is rational and intelligent for an army officer. He is opposed to Arab unity and socialism and perhaps, especially if he were to work with Shi'a and Kurds, might be instrumental in weakening the influence of the army in the country.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:  
POL:JEAKins:CHS:anders:mjb:7/2/64Contents and Classification Approved by:  
AMB:RCStrongClearances:  
DCM:JWAdams

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, Airgram No. A-0007  
Baghdad, Iraq

The army realizes that its main internal threat is the Shi'a enlisted men and NCO's. It is trying to overcome this by recruiting Sunni Arabs from Ramadi liwa.

Internal Divisions

Kurds - The Kurdish tribal chieftains are uninterested in independence and would be satisfied by government measures for area development and public education in the north. Mulla Mustafa is no longer the paramount tribal leader but only a front for other chieftains. The tribal leaders are much stronger than the KDP.

The Kurds stopped fighting because they were tired of the war, were already in control of large parts of the north, and were at least partially convinced Nasser would persuade the Iraqi government to make peace with them. The Kurds do not trust Nasser, although they still remain in touch with him. There has been some contact between Kurds and Shi'as but the well-organized Kurds do not believe that the unorganized Shi'a would be very potent allies.

Shi'a - The Shi'a have been disturbed by the government's talk on Arab unity and socialism and particularly by its active discrimination against Shi'a. They are disorganized, have no leaders, and are not well financed although there is a possibility that they are receiving money from Turkey and Iran. Thirty or forty of the southern Euphrates shaikhs are still strong and are talking of revolt and sabotage, but the Shi'a Fatimite party is no real threat to the regime.

The Merchant Class - Sunni as well as Shi'a merchants have been antagonized by the government's talk of socialism and particularly by its entry into the fields of import and distribution of basic commodities. The statements made by government Ministers to restore business confidence have not been successful because the businessmen do not wish to be reassured.

Sunni Attempt to Control - There is a plan by Sunni Arabs to maintain monopoly of power in Iraq. It is masterminded by Minister of Finance Jawad al-Abusi, President of Baghdad University Abd al-Aziz al-Duri, and Chief of the President's Diwan Badia Sharif al-Ani.

Agriculture - Iraqi agriculture was ruined by an unwise application of the Agrarian Reform Law. Agricultural production this year will probably be better with enough wheat to cover Iraq's needs and some barley for export only because the agricultural reform law has not been applied vigorously in the north. Next year's crop will probably be lower.

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
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Page 3, Airgram No. A-0007  
Baghdad, Iraq

The current peasant ownership of land is accompanied by neglect of farming and the only way agricultural production can be increased would be through large-scale contract farming.

For the Ambassador:

  
James E. Akins  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memcon - June 29, 1964; Ambassador Strong  
and Mr. Jawad Jaffar.

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Enclosure 1, Page 1  
Airgram No. A-0007  
Baghdad, Iraq.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

June 29, 1964.

Participants: Jawad Jaffar, Iraqi (Shi'a) businessman  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador

Subject: Situation in Iraq.

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At a private luncheon at my residence Jaffar summarized Iraq's problems in order of priority as being Nasser, "to get rid of" the Iraqi Army, Iraq's internal divisions (which cannot be overcome as long as Nasser is active) and creation of a sound agriculture. All together, these problems create a serious danger of rampant communism in Iraq. This ought to worry the US a great deal.

Jaffar's remarks are summarized under various headings, though generally they are so inter-related that the separation is artificial.

1. Nasser is Jaffar's bete noir. There can be no stability and progress in Iraq until Nasser lets Iraq alone. Nasser does not want unity with Iraq now any more than he wants unity with Yemen, because he does not want to shoulder the problems that would come with unity. What Nasser wants is to use Iraq as a pawn or a tool, with sufficient control over Iraq to serve his own purposes. By helping to keep the Iraqi Government weak, Nasser can increase his influence in Iraq. The whole Arab world has suffered from Nasser the last several years and provision of US food has supplied Nasser the financial means to continue his campaign. If Nasser disappears Egypt will lose much of its capability to cause trouble because there is not another Nasser in sight. One of these days Nasser will subvert Kuwait and through a puppet government control the Gulf.

2. Iraqi Army. Iraqi Army officers predominantly are men who did not qualify for higher education and they are mainly from unimportant families who hope their sons may some day make them rich and important. Thus Army officers are generally of limited intelligence, poorly educated, highly ambitious, venal, and utterly unsuited to run the country. Some day means may be found to put the Army in its barracks, to whittle it down to size, and to prevent it from plundering the treasury for large amounts of unneeded weapons. Iraq is far from Israel, is in no danger, and has little real interest in the Palestine problem.

If the Kurds and the Shi'as are able to reach agreement on an alliance, it is not impossible that they will be able to force the Army out of politics and bring it back under civilian control. He does not underrate the difficulties.

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Enclosure 1, Page 2,  
Airgram No. A-0007  
Baghdad, Iraq.

3. Internal Divisions.

a) Kurds. The bulk of the Kurdish tribal chieftains do not speak of independence, in contrast to the KDP. They want to live as part of Iraq and to return to the relationships that existed in the days of Nuri. They want the North to be developed and their people to be educated. Mulla Mustafa Barzani is no longer paramount among the tribes. He has been weakened and now is dependent on the Pizhdar tribes for protection, which is why he is living in the Pizhdar area instead of returning to Barzan. He is a front for other tribal leaders. The KDP is very weak compared to the tribes. The young men of the tribes still follow their chieftains willingly and have refused agrarian reform in some areas where it was offered. The tribal system will break down ultimately, but it is still strong.

The reasons the Kurds stopped fighting were a) they were tired of the war, b) Nasser made promises to them, and c) they actually control a good deal of the north and are thus in a good position. They are going to give the government an opportunity to prove its sincerity. There have been discussions about an alliance between Kurdish and Shi'a leaders, but there may be some difficulties because the well-organized Kurds find the Shi'as unorganized, lacking leadership, and of uncertain capabilities. The Kurds are not seeking a new war but want to find ways to bring the Sunni Arabs to their senses. They do not now trust Nasser but they continue to communicate with him.

Jaffar proposed that in the near future he bring an elderly Kurd to the residence for tea to discuss Kurdish affairs, one Majid Mustafa, an officer in the Ottoman Army who later turned civil administrator and who has maintained his ties in the Kurdish tribal areas. I concurred.

b) Shi'as. Jaffar said the Shi'as have become more aroused than at any time since the state of Iraq was established. The Nasserite-dominated government had gone out of its way to discriminate against them. Practically every Shi'a, whether educated or uneducated, was opposed to unity with Sunni Egypt. GOI mouthings about socialism compounded the reaction. Confidence should be restored, but in fact nothing the present GOI could say would restore confidence. Aref is a man of limited intelligence and is so weak that he has to run to the UAR to gain the approval of the Iraqi Nasserites. Aref will be gotten rid of because he is unable to play the game as well as Qasim. In addition, Qasim came into power with great momentum. The Baathis came in with only a little momentum, and when the present GOI took over the wheel was about standing still and this GOI has not the strength to get it turning again.

Instead of acting to restore confidence, the Sunnis are taking measures to destroy it further. Recognizing the economic power of Shi'a merchants, the Ministry of Economy has set up a purchasing board to undertake the importation and distribution to small shopkeepers of the commodities imported on a large scale such as tea and sugar. Other items will be added from time to time until the important

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Enclosure 1, Page 3,  
Airgram No. A-0007  
Baghdad, Iraq.

Shi'a merchants are driven out of business, unless the GOI can be made to drop the new system. An effort will be made, and a strong one. That there is no confidence in Iraq is shown by the fact that although ID 105 million worth of banknotes have been issued, there are only ID 45 million in circulation. The rest are in private safes or hidden in the ground.

Jaffar credits Jawad Abusi (Minister of Finance), Badia Sharif al-Ani (Chief of the President's Diwan), and Abd al-Aziz Duri (President of Baghdad University) as being the three most influential men in working out measures for Aref to implement to assure continued Sunni control of Iraq. Aref lacks the ability to think of things himself. These three men have long been notorious and have collaborated. They are still doing so.

In Jaffar's opinion Prime Minister Yahya is a rational and unusually intelligent man for an Army officer. He believes Yahya is opposed to unity, utterly opposed to socialism, persuaded of the need to unify Iraq, and biding his time until the Nasserists make a mistake. The Kurds and Shi'as both think they can work with Yahya and in due course persuade him to get the Army back into the barracks.

c) Possible Shi'a Revolt. Jaffar said the Shi'as were not well organized and lacked leadership. Money was also a problem. It was not impossible that Iran and even Turkey would be willing to provide some finance. The US should regard this as a way to assure the defeat of communism. There are Shi'as working outside the country as well as within trying to create a real movement. Some 20 or 40 shaikhs in the Euphrates Valley still have strong followings. They have discussed the possibilities of raising a revolt and consider that they can successfully engage in sabotage of roads, bridges, railways, government enterprises. It is widely believed that discipline in the Army is poor, that the rebellious Shi'a spirit has infected the heavy Shi'a majority among NCO's and enlisted men and that they cannot be counted on to fight against Shi'as in revolt in the south. Organizing them would be another and probably difficult matter. Realizing the danger, the Army is believed to be recruiting some 6000 men from Dulaym (Ramadi liwa) where the purest and most devoted Sunnis are found.

Again, if the Shi'as are able to establish some organization and obtain some financing, a Kurdish-Shi'a alliance will become a reality. This might initially push the GOI closer to Nasser but eventually there would be a reaction which would topple the GOI and Aref and assure a better government. The so-called Fatemite party is not an organized, effective group. Rather there are some younger religious men who do a certain amount of talking, but there is no substance.

Another countermove being taken by the GOI is the renewed wooing of labor by showing it favoritism against employers. If this continues, it will mean no private enterprise can be conducted profitably.

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Enclosure 1, Page 4,  
Airgram No. A-0007  
Baghdad, Iraq.

4. Communism. The communists (and the Baathis) are benefitting immensely from the unwisdom of the Nasserists. Large numbers of Shi'as are joining the party or working with it as a means of expressing their hostility to this government because of its pro-unity position and discrimination against the Shi'as. The Communist Party has already recovered from the blows given it by the Baathis and are hard at work. If this situation continues, they will attain a position from which to mount a real assault in search of power. The KDP will cooperate with them, Kamel Chaderchi and what part of the National Democratic Party remains will also, and probably some of the unprincipled Baathis. There is thus a real threat to US interests unless the present GOI is removed and a sane government is installed which will return to the pre-1958 days of internal conciliation.

(I stated that the USG had no intention of intervening in internal Iraqi affairs and would work with whatever government was in office except a communist-controlled one).

5. Agriculture. Jaffar was bitter about the ruin of Iraqi agriculture by unwise application of the Agrarian Reform Law. He himself had more than 100,000 dunums taken from him, all of which has returned to desert. He has not been paid and does not expect to be. He has urged the GOI not to make more seizures and not to distribute miri lands until what already has been expropriated has been distributed and is in working order. He also has urged that undistributed and miri lands be contracted out in larger than 1,000 dunum parcels in order to assure use of modern methods and good management. The 1,000 dunums he still holds he is not farming because it is not worth the trouble. He can't find a good foreman nor can he find a skilled mechanic not to mention a tractor driver.

When I mentioned the vast tracts of grain I had seen in the Tel Afar area west of Mosul, Jaffar stated that because of the trouble with Syria and the resultant GOI desire to keep the Shawmar Shaikhs happy in that strategic part of Iraq, the GOI was not pushing land reform, so the shaikhs were still supervising the large scale mechanized farming and also were given contracts for large areas of miri lands. The result would be that this year Iraq would produce enough wheat to feed itself, and enough barley to export some to the Persian Gulf area but not enough for export elsewhere. Next year, he said, Iraq will not produce enough wheat to meet its own needs and will have to have more surplus wheat from the US despite its wealth of land and water. I gave the usual plug for technical education in agriculture.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

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POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNN JUNE 30-2:15 PM

1964 JUN 30 12:35 P.M.

CONTROL: 28498

WEEKLY REVIEW; SUMMARY FOR JUNE

MOST STRIKING CHARACTERISTIC OF MONTH WAS STEADY EROSION POSITION PRESIDENT ABD AL-SALAM AREF. SHIA AND KURDISH OPPOSITION ELEMENTS, LONG AGO UNITED IN BELIEF THAT AREF MUST GO, NOW JOINED BY ARAB NATIONALISTS WHO HAVE BECOME CONVINCED AREF NO LONGER IS ASSET TO THEIR CAUSE. IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO UAR ZAKI RELIABLY QUOTED AS SAYING AREF MADE CFN 1114

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 2529 CONFIDENTIAL  
COMPLETE ASS OF HIMSELF IN CAIRO AND ALL IRAQIS THERE SHRUNK IN EMBARRASSMENT EVERY TIME HE OPENED HIS MOUTH.

LIKELIHOOD IS GROWING OF MOVE TO REPLACE AREF. PALACE COUP BY ARAB NATIONALISTS UNDER FOMIN ABD AL-HAMID AND GUIDANCE MINISTER FARHAN, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN NO IMMEDIATE STRIKING CHANGE IN POLICY (ALTHOUGH COULD EVENTUALLY ACCELERATE UNIONIST TENDENCIES), COULD PERHAPS BE EFFECTED WITHOUT SERIOUS INTERNAL DISTURBANCES THOUGH SUCCESSION TO PRESIDENCY MIGHT CREATE NEW ISSUE. MOVE BY PRIMIN TAHIR YANYA COULD, HOWEVER, PROVOKE REACTION FROM ARAB NATIONALISTS, FOLLOWED BY MOVES BY BAATHIS AND COMMUNISTS TO ENHANCE OWN POSITIONS. WE UNABLE GAUGE STRENGTHS OF VARIOUS FACTIONS BUT ASSME TWO MAIN GROUPS INARMY RELATIVELY EVENLY BALANCED, NOR ARE WE ABLE GUESS WHEN MOVE LIKELY OCCUR. COULD BE EARLY OR LONG DELAYED.

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-2- 1114, JUNE 30 FROM BAGHDAD (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SHIA DISCONTENT - APPROACH OF "ARBA·IIN" (40TH DAY AFTER ANNIVERSARY OF ASSASSINATION OF HUSSAIN IBN ALI) HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY TWO WEEKS OF STREET SERMONS IN BAGHDAD AND ALL OF SOUTHERN IRAQ IN WHICH CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS "OMMAYAD POLICIES" WAS OPEN AND TRENCANT. CELEBRATION  
CFN 40

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
CULMINATES IN SHIA GATHERING IN KERBALA JULY 1. SINCE JUNE 26 TRUCKS LOADED WITH SUPPLIES, TENTS, AND PEOPLE FROM KUT, HAI, AND AMARA TRANSITING BAGHDAD ON WAY TO KERBALA. LARGE CONTINGENT SHIA PLAN WALKING 25 MILES FROM MUSA·IB TO KERBALA. SHIA ESTIMATE THAT MILLION PERSONS WILL REACH KERBALA; WHILE THIS UNDOUBTEDLY GROSS EXAGGERATION, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THIS MEETING WILL BE LARGEST IN RECENT TIMES AND THAT ITS PURPOSE ONLY INCIDENTIALLY TO PAY RESPECTS TO MEMORY OF IMAM HUSSAIN. LARGE GROUP HOT, SHORT-TEMPERED SHIAS RECEPTIVE TO ANTI-GOVERNMENT HARANGUES IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BUT GOVERNMENT HAS MASKED ANY CONCERN OVER PRE-ARBA·IIN SERMONS OR CONCENTRATIONS IN KERBALA. TO THE CONTRARY, IT HAS ADDED FUEL TO FIRE BY INSTRUCTING, OR AT LEAST ENCOURAGING, SUNNI PREACHERS TO ATTACK THE "CHOSROITES" (I.E., SHIA PERSIANS) FOR ANTI-ARAB AND DIVISIVE BELIEFS.

NEW IRANIAN POLICY OF HARD LINE TOWARD IRAQ WILL EXACERBATE SITUATION AND ANY DISORDERS WILL BE LAID TO IRANIAN FOMENTATION. US WILL GET SOME OF BLAME.

KURDS - MEETING OF ALL KURDISH LEADERS WAS HELD END OF JUNE AND REPORTEDLY UNITY, OR SEMBLANCE THEREOF, ONCE AGAIN RESTORED. MULLA MUSTAFA, ACCORDING TO INDEPENDENT KURD WHO JUST RETURNED FROM NORTH, TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO SPLIT KDP BY SUGGESTING THAT JALAL TAPLBANI TAKE OVER SECRETARYSHIP FROM IBRAHIM AHMAD. WHEN PARTY SOLIDARITY PREVAILED MULLA INITIALLY TURNED AGAINST ENTIRE POLITICAL BUREAU BUT HEN RECOGNIZED HIS INCREASING ISOLATION AND AT LAST TENTATIVELY HAS AGREED WORK WITH PARTY.

SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT ARGE NUMBER OF KURDISH COMMUNISTS INCLUDED IN MULLA MUSTAFA·S ENTOURAGE. ALTHOUGH MULLA INSISTS THEY HAVE RENOUNCED COMMUNISM, KDP LEADERS ARE CONVINCED THAT THY ARE BEHIND MULLA·S OPPOSITION TO PARTY.

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-3- 1114, JUNE 30 FROM BAGHDAD (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

ALL FACTIONS, HOWEVER, EXPRESS FIRM CONVICTION THAT DAYS OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT ARE NUMBERED AND AREF WILL SOON BE REMOVED. THEY PLAN NO ACTION NOW, HAVE STOPPED INSISTING THAT NEGOTIATIONS BE STARTED AND WILL TRY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH AREF'S SUCCESSOR.

MEANWHILE, MAS'UD MUHAMMAD, NEW KURDISH MINISTER OF STATE, HAS BEEN APPOINTED HEAD NEWLY FORMED "COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH". MAS'UD HAS TOLD KURDISH FRIENDS HIS

PAGE FOUR RUQVBD 2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
COMMITTEE WILL REPLACE "COMMITTEE FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF NORTH" (UNDER MUTASARRIF KIRKUK), WILL CONTAIN ARABS AND KURDS AND HAS BEEN PROMISED ID 11 MILLION TO START OPERATIONS. (PART OF THIS SUM MAY BE LOCAL PROCEEDS FROM PL 480 SALES)

OTHER KURDS SEEM SKEPTICAL THAT NEW COMMITTEE CAN BE ANY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OLD ONE UNLESS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CHANGED.

PLOTS - RUMORS OF PLOTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUED THROUGHOUT MONTH. ALTHOUGH CAPABILITIES OF BAAATH AND COMMUNISTS ARE LIMITED, REPORTS THEIR IMPENDING ACTION HAVE OBVIOUSLY WORRIED GOVERNMENT. EXTRAORDINARY SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY AREF EACH TIME HE LEAVES PALACE. ON AREF'S SCHEDULED VISITS, STREETS ARE LINED WITH TANKS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND SOLDIERS ENTIRE DISTANCE FROM PALACE TO DESTINATION.

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INFO AMMAN ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS DHAHRAN  
JIDDA KUWAIT LONDON-TAIZ TEHRAN TEL AVIV POLAD-GINGSTRIKE/  
CINCMEAFSA-UNNUMBERED, JUNE 30--2:40 P.M.

GOVERNMENT HAS MOVED AGAIN AGAINST BAATHIS AND THERE  
HAVE BEEN LARGE NUMBERS OF ARRESTS RECENTLY. ARMY WAS  
CALLED INTO CAMP WASHASH NIGHT OF JUNE 26, ALLEGEDLY TO  
PUT DOWN "COMMUNIST PLOT". ARMY OFFICER INVOLVED IN  
ACTION TOLD US THAT ARMY HAD BEEN TOLD  
"PLOT" IF SUCCESSFUL WOULD HAVE SIGNALLED GENERAL COMMUNIST  
UPRISING THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO HAVE BEEN  
CFN 1114 25

PAGE TWO RUQVBD 2529 CONFIDENTIAL  
GOVERNMENT PRECAUTIONARY MOVE AND MOST PROBABLY WAS DIRECTED  
AGAINST LEFT-WING BAATHIS WHICH GOVERNMENT CHOSE TO LABEL  
COMMUNISTS.

MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLE, FIVE MINISTERS, DISMISSED IN  
JUNE 17 CABINET RESHUFFLE, APPARENTLY RELIEVED FOR DIFFERENT  
(LARGELY NON-POLITICAL) REASONS. NEW APPOINTMENTS REPRESENT  
NO NEW TRENDS, RELIEVED NO INTERNAL TENSIONS, AND SOLVED  
NONE OF IRAQ'S PROBLEMS. TWO NASSERITE ARAB NATIONALISTS,  
FUAD RIKABI AND AHMAD HABUBI, WHO BELIEVED THEY WERE TO BE  
GIVEN PORTFOLIOS, DISAPPOINTED BUT STILL REPORTEDLY WORKING  
ON ORGANIZATION "ONE ARAB MOVEMENT".

ARAB UNION AND SOCIALISM - PROCLAMATION OF "UNITY  
DOCUMENT" END OF MAY AND ARAB SOCIALISM WHICH HAS TO ACCOMPANY  
IT, HAVE DEMORALIZED THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. GOVERNMENT  
SUBSEQUENTLY HAS TRIED TO REASSURE THE LOCAL BUSINESS MEN  
THAT ARAB SOCIALISM DOES NOT MEAN THE SAME IN IRAQ AS IN  
EGYPT, THAT GOVERNMENT PLANS NO WIDE-SCALE NATIONALIZATION  
AND THAT THERE IS PLACE FOR PRIVATE CAPITAL IN IRAQ.  
MINISTERS OF UNION, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND GUIDANCE DURING  
MONTH ALL MADE STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT. BUT BUSINESS  
CFN 17

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-2- 1114, JUNE 30 FROM BAGHDAD (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
COMMUNITY CONVINCED GOVERNMENT DOTH PROTEST TOO MUCH.  
NOTHING THIS GOVERNMENT CAN SAY WILL RESTORE CONFIDENCE.

UAR EMBASSY HAS VIGOROUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY TOLD IRAQIS  
(AND THIS EMBASSY) THAT NASSER DOES NOT WANT UNION WITH IRAQ  
NOW OR FOR MANY YEARS; IRAQ HAS MANY PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE  
SOLVED FIRST, BUT IRAQIS ARE PUSHING FOR UNION. UAR  
COUNSELOR IN LONG TALK WITH EMBOFF PUSHED THIS LINE WITH  
ADDITION THAT UAR IS BAFFLED BY "AGREEMENT" BETWEEN IRAQI  
GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNISTS. UAR OFFICIAL SAID MANY COMMUNISTS  
STILL IN PRISON BUT MANY HAVE BEEN RELEASED AND GOVERNMENT IS  
DOING NOTHING TO HINDER THEIR FREE ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRY;  
SAID COMMUNIST RE-ORGANIZATION PROCEEDING AT VERY RAPID PACE.  
HE ADDED THAT IRAQIS SHOULD FOLLOW UAR MODEL OF CONTROLLING  
LOCAL COMMUNISTS.

ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ARE  
CONCENTRATING ON THE BAATH RATHER THAN COMMUNIST DANGER, THERE  
DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE GOVERNMENT-COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY. THE  
MOTIVE BEHIND THE UAR STATEMENT MAY BE TO IMPLANT IN OUR MINDS  
THE DANGER OF COMMUNISM IN IRAQ AND ENCOURAGE BELIEF THAT  
ONLY NASSER CAN ADEQUATELY COMBAT THIS DANGER - AS HE DID IN  
CFN

PEE FOUR RUQVBD 2529 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
SYRIA IN 1958. HOWEVER, REPORTS FROM NUMEROUS OTHER SOURCES  
INDICATE COMMIES (AND BAATH) ARE RECEIVING ACCRETIONS OF  
STRENGTH BECAUSE OF WIDESPREAD HOSTILITY TO UNITY, AND COMMIES  
BECOMING MUCH BOLDER.

AS INDICATED IN OUR REVIEW FOR APRIL, ISSUES JOINED,  
ORGANIZATIONS BEING BUILD AND TIGHTENED, AND EVENTUALLY  
SOMETHING WILL POP.

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POL 3 IRAQ

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*36  
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DATE: JUNE 23, 9 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

## WEEKLY REVIEW

MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLE. CABINET RESHUFFLE OF JUNE 17 BROUGHT IN FIVE NEW FACES BUT SEEMED TO PRESAGE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT POLICY. TWO NEW MINISTERS (HUSAIN AL-HABIB, COMMUNICATIONS; HASAN ZALZALA, INDUSTRY) ARE SHIA AND A THIRD (ISMAIL MUSTAFA, MUNICIPALITIES) MAY BE, BRINGING SHIA REPRESENTATION IN THE CABINET TO FIVE OR SIX. NONE OF SHIA MINISTERS, HOWEVER, IS STRONGLY RELIGIOUS AND NONE REPRESENTS SHIA ASPIRATIONS. ONE NEW MINISTER, MAS'UD MUHAMMAD (MINISTER OF STATE), IS A KURD BUT UNCERTAIN HOW APPOINTMENT WILL AFFECT DEVELOPMENT KURDISH PROBLEM (SEE KURDS BELOW).

OF GREATER INTEREST ARE APPOINTMENTS WHICH DID NOT TAKE PLACE. FUAD RIKABI, A NASSERITE, EX-BAATHI AND LEADER OF

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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-2- 1087, JUNE 23, 9 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BAGHDAD

THE "SOCIALIST UNIONIST MOVEMENT" AND AHMAD HABUBI, MEMBER OF ARAB SOCIALIST PARTY AND ALSO A NASSERITE, WERE PERSONALLY CONVINCED THEY WERE TO BE APPOINTED, RESPECTIVELY, TO MINISTRIES OF PLANNING AND MUNICIPALITIES BUT WERE TOLD LATE JUNE 17 THEY WERE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR "PARTY MEN" IN GOVERNMENT.

RUMORS CONTINUE CIRCULATE THAT FURTHER SHAKE-UP MUST SOON TAKE PLACE.

AREF'S ORGANIZATION FOR POLITICAL ACTION. PRESS CONTINUES TO REPORT SUPPORT GIVEN TO "ARAB SOCIALIST UNION FOR IRAQI REGION" (FORMERLY "ONE ARAB MOVEMENT") BY NUMEROUS "PERSONALITIES". DEMONSTRATIONS IN FAVOR OF NEW ORGANIZATION ARE ALSO WIDELY REPORTED BY GOVERNMENT. IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, FROM REFUSAL TO APPOINT RIKABI AND HABUBI TO MINISTRIES BECAUSE "PARTY" ACTIVITY THAT EVEN THEIR TWO GROUPS (BOTH OF WHICH ARE NASSERITE) HAVE NOT YET DISSOLVED THEMSELVES IN NEW ORGANIZATION. LEADERS OF LARGER ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT STILL RELUCTANT TO DISBAND THEIR ORGANIZATION IN FAVOR OF AREF'S GROUP.

GOVERNMENT MAY WELL EVENTUALLY SUCCEED IN FORMING NEW POLITICAL UNION BUT IS EVIDENTLY HAVING MUCH GREATER DIFFICULTY THAN ANTICIPATED.

RELATIONS WITH IRAN. IRAQI PRESS ATTACKS ON IRAN (FOLLOWING EXECUTION OF THREE ARABS FROM KHUZISTAN) CONTINUED DURING WEEK. THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER, AL-HURRIYA, WROTE ARABS KILLED MERELY BECAUSE OF ACCUSATION THEY WERE WORKING FOR "LIBERATION OF HOMELAND". PAPER ALSO RECALLED "ARABISTAN", HOMELAND OF 3 MILLION ARABS, HAD BEEN "AN INDEPENDENT ARAB PRINCIPALITY (UNTIL) OCCUPATION BY IRANIAN FORCES IN 1925". EDITORIALS IN OTHER PAPERS FOLLOWED THIS LEAD BUT BECAME MORE VIOLENT. STRONGEST EDITORIAL APPEARED JUNE 20 WHEN AL-ARAB, ARAB

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-3- 1087, JUNE 23, 9 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BAGHDAD

NATIONALIST DAILY, ATTACKED IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND SHAH VICIOUSLY FOR SUPPRESSION OF "SEVEN MILLION" ARABS OF ARABISTAN. ATTACK EVIDENTLY EXCEEDED GOI WISHES AND ON JUNE 21 AL-ARAB PRINTED A WARNING LETTER FROM MINISTRY OF GUIDANCE THAT GOI WANTED TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND STRONG ATTACKS ON ANY OF THEM, IF REPEATED, WOULD RESULT IN SUSPENSION.

KURDS. REPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT OFFER TO KURDS (SEE EMBTEL 1056) WHICH ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF KURDISH SELF-RULE AND ALLOWED KURDS RETAIN ARMS AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION DURING TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS FALSE, ACCORDING KDP SOURCES. KDP BELIEVE RUMOR MAY HAVE BEEN CIRCULATED BY GOVERNMENT.

GOI LATEST OFFER OF JUNE 2 WAS MUCH SAME AS EARLIER OFFERS OF DECENTRALIZATION FOR IRAQ ALTHOUGH IT DID AGREE APPOINT KURDISH MINISTERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN PROPORTION TO NUMBER OF KURDS IN COUNTRY. GOI SAID KURDISH NATIONAL RIGHTS WOULD BE DEFINED BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WILL BE ELECTED AT END OF TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. KURDS HAVE MADE COUNTER PROPOSALS WHICH RETREAT SOMEWHAT FROM EARLIER DEMANDS (THEY NO LONGER DEMAND PROPORTIONAL SHARE OF OIL REVENUE, KURDISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, OR FREE ELECTIONS IN KURDISTAN) BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION GOI PREPARED ACCEPT MODIFIED DEMANDS.

MAS'UD MUHAMMAD DISCUSSED HIS APPOINTMENT TO A CABINET POSITION WITH BOTH MULLA MUSTAFA AND KDP POLITICAL BUREAU. MULLA MUSTAFA MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED IT AND ALTHOUGH KDP BELIEVED APPOINTMENT INUTILE, PARTY AGREED NOT TO OPPOSE.

OPEN SPLIT BETWEEN MULLA MUSTAFA AND POLITICAL BUREAU AFTER THE FEBRUARY TRUCE WHICH WAS PATCHED UP END OF APRIL NOW SEEMS AGAIN TO BE ON VERGE OF RECURRING. ACCORDING TO KDP SOURCES, MULLA MUSTAFA MAINTAINS THERE NO SPLIT BETWEEN

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-4- 1087, JUNE 23, 9 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BAGHDAD

HIM AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP BUT HE IS NEVERTHELESS DETERMINED REMOVE ALL PRESENT MEMBERS OF POLITICAL BUREAU, INCLUDING JALAL TALABANI AND SALIH ABDULLA AL-YUSUFI WITH WHOM HE HAD MAINTAINED GOOD RELATIONS DURING EARLIER PHASE OF SPLIT.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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JUNE 23, 1964  
4:32 AM

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FROM: BAGHDAD

ACTION: SECSTATE 1087

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DATE: JUNE 23, 9 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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MEETING OF ALL KURDS IS TO BE HELD END OF JUNE IN ANOTHER ATTEMPT PATCH UP INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES. KDP INTENDS ONCE AGAIN TO PROPOSE FORMING "REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL" TO CARRY ON ALL CONTACTS WITH GOI BUT MULLA MUSTAFA IS NOT EXPECTED TO ACCEPT PROPOSAL.

KDP REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD, WHO LONG KNOWN AND TRUSTED BY EMB OFFICER, MAINTAINS THAT KURDISH COMMUNISTS WHO HAD FLED TO NORTH AND HAD BEEN "FROZEN" BY KDP WERE RELEASED BY MULLA MUSTAFA AFTER FEBRUARY 10 AND HE NOW HAS SURROUNDED HIMSELF EXCLUSIVELY WITH THESE MEN. MULLA MAINTAINS, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN UP THEIR COMMUNISM AND ARE NOW LOYAL ONLY TO HIM, DARA TAWFIQ, A WELL KNOWN COMMUNIST, IS NOW ALLEGEDLY MULLA MUSTAFA'S PERSONAL MESSENGER TO TAHIR YAHYA AND TWO KURDS INFAMOUS FOR THEIR

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By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

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-2- 1087, JUNE 23, 9 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM BAGHDAD

PARTICIPATION IN POPULAR RESISTANCE FORCES DURING "RED TIDE",  
TAHA BAMERNI AND JALA BALTA, ARE AMONG MULLA'S CLOSEST  
ADVISORS.

COMMENT: WE HAVE NO SEPARATE CONFIRMATION OF COMMUNISTS  
IN MULLA MUSTAFA'S ENTOURAGE. MULLA MUSTAFA (AS WELL AS KDP)  
STILL ASKING FOR HELP FROM WEST BUT, AS HE MUST EVENTUALLY  
CONCLUDE IT WILL NEVER BE FORTHCOMING, HE MAY HAVE STARTED  
MENDING FENCES WITH RUSSIANS. KDP LEADERS FEAR THERE HAS  
BEEN AGREEMENT AMONG COMMUNISTS, GOI AND MULLA MUSTAFA TO  
ELIMINATE KURDISH PARTY, ALTHOUGH FOR DIFFERENT REASONS.  
COMMUNISTS BELIEVE DESTRUCTION OF KDP ILHEY\* WILL ENABLE THEM  
CAPTURE KURDISH NATIONALISM; GOVERNMENT BELIEVES KURDISH  
MOVEMENT CAN BE CRUSHED IF PARTY IS ELIMINATED; MULLA MUSTAFA  
BELIEVES ELIMINATION OF PARTY WILL LEAVE HIM IN UNDISPUTED  
CONTROL OF KURDS. WE CANNOT YET JUDGE IF KDP ANALYSIS IS  
CORRECT BUT FACTS AS REPORTED BY KDP REPRESENTATIVE MAY BE  
ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE.

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\*AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2 IRAQ	
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TO : Department

Info : Baghdad, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Nouakchott, Rabat, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tunis

FROM : American Embassy Paris

SUBJECT : Aref Interview

REF :

DATE: June 17, 1964

LE MONDE of June 12, 1964 carries an exclusive interview with Iraq's Chief of State Marshall Abdel Salam AREF; highlights:

On the death of General KASSEM: He was a traitor; he appropriated the revolution AREF had organized. Aref had no recourse but to let justice take its course.

On the Massacre of the Communists: Aref was opposed to the killings. When he learned of the excesses he asked the Ba'ath leaders for an explanation; they lied when they denied their intention to murder the Communists.

On political prisoners: Only criminals remain in the prisons today. Those who denounced the nefarious activities of the Iraqi Communist Party have been released.

On a general amnesty: The Iraqi revolution has not had the benefits of 12 years of stability (as in the UAR). Iraq is a "factory of coups d'etat." The tribalism in certain parts of the country requires that the guilty be punished. In any event Aref will relinquish his special powers and abolish martial law as soon as conditions permit...

On parties: The Iraqi people will form a single political organism. The revolution's provisional constitution will lead to general elections in three years. Parliament will then elaborate a fundamental law in

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:PSebastian;aa-6-15-64

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JABovey, Jr.

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accordance with the wish of the people.

On Palestine: Iraq wants peace but is in a state of legitimate self defense. The Palestinian Arabs are victims of aggression. Iraq favors the application of the pertinent UN resolution, excepting the resolution on partition. Iraq wants to see a return to a democratic state in which only native born Palestinian Jews and Arabs would be at home. Insofar as the future of that part of Palestine annexed by Jordan is concerned, it should be decided by the Palestinian people.

On Arab Unity: Errors have been committed in the past in the attempts made to achieve unity. They will not be repeated. Nasser and Aref decided to organize a Planning Council to study the means of achieving unity between Iraq and Egypt, and how to avoid British counteraction. It will proceed scientifically and prudently.

On the Kurds: Iraq's Kurds are Moslems. Their right to use their own language will be respected. Most civil servants in Northern Iraq are Kurds. Mustapha BARZANI and Aref agree. The adherents of the Kurdish Democratic Party around Barzani are warmongers, spies and agents of imperialism. Barzani is trying to find ways to dissolve this party, as is Aref.

On Iraq's Foreign Relations: The Soviet and Iraqi Governments' views diverge on a certain number of points including Arab Unity and the need for a world-wide anti-imperialistic front; but the Soviet Union has shown its goodwill by agreeing to continue its military and economic aid to Iraq.

The US on the other hand is responsible for the survival of Israel and the UK. Great Britain is maintaining herself in South Arabia by force.

Aref is optimistic on the future of Franco-Iraqi relations. French policy towards the Arab World and particularly towards Algeria cause Iraq to hope for a further development of the friendship between the two peoples. Iraq approves President de Gaulle's policies vis à vis the imperialist alliances. However, France must stop favoring Israel.

For the Ambassador:

*John A. Bovey, Jr.*

John A. Bovey, Jr.  
Counselor of Embassy

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
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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ACTION DEPT 1055 AMMAN ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT

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JUNE 16-8 AM

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WEEKLY REVIEW

AID

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KURDS - ACCORDING TO KURDISH SOURCES, GOI DISTURBED BY FAILURE TAHIR YAHYA MAKE HEADWAY IN SETTLING KURDIS PROBLEM AND MADE NEW OFFER TO KURDS JUNE 9: GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE SOME FORM KURDISH SELF-RULE--DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT BEFORE END OF "TRANSITIONAL PERIOD" IN 1967; KURDISH CFN 1055 16-8 9 1967

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PAGE TWO RUQVBD 2411 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
"PERSHMERGA" TO RETAIN THEIR ARMS AND ORGANIZATION AND BE  
ABSORBED INTO IRAQI MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AS GENDARMES  
(DARAK) RESPONSIBLE FOR ORDER IN NORTHERN IRAQ; APPOINTMENT  
OF THREE OR FOUR KURDISH MINISTERS WITH ONE AS DEPUTY  
PREMIER. GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY SUGGESTED BABA ALI SHAIKH  
MAHMUD BARZINJA, AKRAM JAF (DG OF TOBACCO MONOPOLY) AND  
MAS'UD MUHAMMAD (FORMER DEPUTY WHO PERSONAL FRIEND OF  
MULLA MUSTAFA). BABA ALI HAS STATED THAT ALTHOUGH HIS NAME  
MAY HAVE BEEN PROPOSED TO MULLA MUSTAFA, HE HAS NOT BEEN  
CONSULTED BY GOI NOR DID HE INTEND TO ACCEPT ANY MINI-  
STERIAL POSITION.

CABINET RESHUFFLE- GOVERNMENT REPORTEDLY CONTINUES CON-  
TACTING PROMINENT SHIA WITH OFFERS CABINET POSITIONS BUT  
LONG-RUMORED MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLE STILL NOT TAKEN PLACE.  
CHANGES PROBABLY AWAITING DECISION ON KURDISH PARTICIPA-  
TION.

MOST WIDELY REPORTED CHANGES THOSE IN MINISTRIES  
PLANNING, INDUSTRY, COMMUNICATIONS, MUNICIPALITIES, EDUCA-  
TION, FINANCE AND MOST WIDELY REPORTED CANDIDATES, IN ADDI-  
TION TO KURDS, ARE FUAD RIKABI AND AYAD THABIT (EX-BAATHI

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-2- 1056, JUNE 16, 8 A.M. FROM BAGHDAD

PAGE THREE RUQVBD 2411 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
NASSERITIES); HASAN ZALZALA, PRESENTLY AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN;  
ABD AL-HADI AL-RAQI, FORMER MUTASARRIF OF NASARIYA; BRIG.  
ABD AL-AZIZ UQAILI, BASRA PORT DIRECTION; AND MUHSIN  
HUSSAIN HABIB.

ONE ARAB MOVEMENT - PRESS REPORTED JUNE 15 THAT "ALL  
ARAB NATIONALIST GROUPS" HAD MET AND DECIDED DISSOLVE  
GROUPS AND JOIN NEW NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION; "OVER 500  
PROMINENT PERSONALITIES" ALSO GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT. NO  
NAME OF ANY NATIONALIST GROUP OR ANY "PERSONALITY" HAS BEEN  
PUBLISHED AND IT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE ARAB NATIONALIST  
MOVEMENT WILL JOIN.

NAME OF NEW ORGANIZATION CHANGED FROM "ONE ARAB  
MOVEMENT" TO "ARAB SOCIALIST UNION FOR THE IRAQI REGION."  
NEW NAME WILL TEND NEGATE EFFORTS MINISTERS FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS AND UNITY WHO HAVE RECENTLY BEEN TRYING CONVINCE  
IRAQIS THAT GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTEND TO RUSH INTO UNION,  
THAT CONDITIONS DIFFER IN IRAQ AND THAT ARAB SOCIALISM DOES  
NOT MEAN SAME IN IRAQ AS IN EGYPT.

MINISTER OF GUIDANCE FARHAN REPORTED BY ONE SOURCE TO  
BE SLATED TO HEAD MOVEMENT, POSSIBLY LEAVING MINISTRY.  
CFN 15 500

PAGE FOUR RUQVBD 2411 C O N F I D E N T I A L

RELATIONS WITH IRAN - IRANIAN AMBASSADOR FARIDANI TOLD  
ME SHORTLY BEFORE HE LEFT THAT IRAQ FOMMIN HAS REQUESTED  
THAT THREE IRANIAN ARABS SENTENCED TO DEATH IN KHUZISTAN BE  
FREED TO IRAQI CUSTODY. THIS WAS OF COURSE REJECTED AS  
INTERVENTION IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS. RECENT EXECUTION OF THE  
THREE MEN BROUGHT FORTH MOST VIOLENT ANTI-IRANIAN EDITORIALS  
SEEN RECENTLY IN LOCAL PRESS. ONE PAPER CALLED ON ALL ARAB  
LEADERS TO OPPOSE "OPPRESSIVE DICTATORIAL REGIME" IN IRAN  
AND TO PUT STOP TO "BUTCHERY OF ARABS IN ARABISTAN".

RELATION WITH US - JOINT US-ISRAEL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED  
AT THE CLOSE OF ESHKOL'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BROUGHT  
CURRENT ANTI-AMERICAN PRESS CAMPAIGN TO A PEAK IN VOLUME  
AND BITTERNESS. ARAB INVECTIVE IS WELL KNOWN AND THERE  
IS NO POINT IN QUOTING IT AGAIN.

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy BAGHDAD

578

Info

Your 866 and 871.

Before decision can be made here re Embassy's proposal counter insurgency training for mobile police and security officials Department needs know your informal estimate scope of program. How many participants do you envisage in first year?

GP-3.

end

RUSIK

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:LFDinsmore:he:6/11/64

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NE - Rodger P. Davies

FORM  
8-63 DS-322

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ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2 IRAC POL 17-4 UAR-US FOR RM USE ONLY	
NEA-5			<b>AIRGRAM</b>			
RM/R	REP	AF	A-992	CONFIDENTIAL	HANDLING INDICATOR	
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ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE	JUN 11 1964 11 57		
5	5		INFO : AMMAN, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TABRIZ, TEHRAN.			
NEA	CU	INR	FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD	DATE: JUNE 9, 1964 6/15		
E	P	IO	SUBJECT : UAR Ambassador's Views on the Soviet Bloc and Communism, Arab Unity, the Kurds and Stability in Iraq.			
12	1	2	REF :			
L	FBO	AID	Amin Huwaidi, the UAR Ambassador, expressed the following views on June 4, 1964. A memorandum of my conversation with him is enclosed.			
4/18	5/P	5/14	<u>Soviet Union and Communism</u>			
1	1	1	President Aref has proved himself to be a good Moslem and an anti-communist. In spite of personal antipathy, he and Khrushchev while in Cairo, agreed to restore Soviet-Iraqi economic and military collaboration. For this, Aref would undoubtedly be called a communist by the Zionists.			
AGR	COM	FRB	Iraq will never again be controlled by the communists who are against Arab nationalism. Qasim was overthrown because he relied too heavily on the communists - exactly as Nuri was overthrown because of his collaboration with the West. Both the communists and the Baathis are weak in Iraq. They can be a nuisance but not a danger to the government.			
10	10		Once Iraq properly develops its economic potential the radical movements will lose all appeal. National and secular origins will also become much less important.			
INT	LAB	TAR	GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.			
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Page 2, Airgram No. A-992  
Baghdad, Iraq.

Arab Unity

The May 26 accord was a mere formalization of the existing relations between the UAR and Iraq. The GOI made a mistake in pretending that it was unity itself.

There is no timetable for unity and may take <sup>15</sup>30 years. Preparation for unity will continue but Iraq must first solve its internal problems. A unified political force would be helpful in Iraq but it would be difficult to form.

Some Kurds are opposed to unity but this is a manageable problem. Many educated Shia are pro-unity. Shia of Persian origin are opposed to unity as are some of the clergy who fear that it would threaten their income. Neither of these Shia groups could stir up effective opposition to unity.

Propertied Iraqis - both Sunni and Shia - fear that unity would be against their interests but it is not necessary to have the same degree of nationalization in Iraq as in the UAR.

The UAR has counseled the GOI to be conciliatory toward the Shia and other elements of the population.

Kurds

The UAR advised both the Baath and the present government that the Kurdish problem could not be settled by military means. The present government has reached an agreement with the Kurds which is now being implemented. The GOI will try to raise the economic levels in the North. The current visit of the Prime Minister to the North to see Mulla Mustafa should be fruitful. Mulla Mustafa is a wise man and a great man and he wants peace.

An outbreak of the revolt is unlikely. The Kurds cannot resume fighting and the GOI does not intend to. The UAR will continue to advise both sides to act with moderation.

Stability in Iraq

There have been rumors of a split in the Council of Ministers but all factions realize the necessity of patching up their differences. The country wants stability and the leaders know it. There are many problems to be faced; the GOI understands them and will show wisdom in dealing with them.

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Page 3, Airgram No. A-992  
Baghdad, Iraq.

COMMENT: Huweidi poured a good deal of soothing syrup down my throat. However, he may well be right about the Kurds. He understates the resistance of Iraq to unity with Egypt. It seems clear that the UAR is encouraging a conciliatory GOI line on socialism, Shia participation in public offices, and on the Kurdish problem. Absence of a timetable for unity is a pragmatic approach and can be accepted by the UAR, which does have a comprehension of Iraq's internal problems and which can afford to delay unity somewhat because in effect it has control of Iraq's foreign policy as well as a voice in internal policy. But unity preparations will go forward and there will be a real effort to create a united political front. While Huweidi did not want to admit any real difficulty in controlling the communists in Iraq, he probably is aware that there is a problem.

Huweidi carefully avoided any indication as to what form renewed GOI-Soviet economic collaboration will take.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

Enclosure: *St. Adams*

As stated.

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By <i>SE</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>



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Enclosure 1, Page 1  
Airgram NO. A-992  
Baghdad, Iraq

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 4, 1964

Participants: Amin Huweidi, UAR Ambassador to Iraq  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador to Iraq

Subject: Soviets and Communism; Unity; Stability in Iraq

My call lasted more than two hours. Huweidi was very friendly, relaxed and confident. I started the conversation by stating that I was concerned at the prospects for trouble in Iraq if things were not handled wisely regarding unity and relations with the Soviets and that my interest was to seek information in the hope of determining whether I should be alarmed and, if so, what could be done. Since the time of our earlier talk (March 26), I had had reason to grow more concerned over future prospects. It would be helpful if Huweidi could give me his views. He did so at length, summarized as follows:

1. Soviets - Communism. In Cairo, Aref had proved to be a good Moslem Arab. He was strongly anti-communist. He and Khrushchev had been far from compatible, although they had agreed to patch things up and to return to collaboration in economic development and armaments. Zionists would now try to convince the world that Aref is really a communist and that Iraq will fall prey to the Soviets. This was tried against Nasser and Egypt in 1955 and arter, but now the world knows Nasser is not a communist and Egypt will never be run by the Soviets. Likewise, Aref will never be a communist or pro-communist and Iraq will never be controlled by the communists. Qasim made a mistake and when he finally realized it, it was too late, the communists having gotten too much of a grip. So Qasim was destroyed for having gone too far with the communists against Arab nationalism just as Nuri Said was destroyed because of going too far with the West against Arab nationalism. In both cases, the bulk of the Iraqis applauded the downfall.

The Communist Party and the Baath Party both were likely to gain some strength in the coming months and years, but neither would be able to do more than create minor troubles. Both were thoroughly discredited with the Iraqi people. Iraq is indeed different from the UAR in that its society is more complex and the individual for some reason has certain fiery characteristics. Some of those in opposition to the GOI will collaborate with the communists, but in every country there is opposition to one degree or another. Unanimity should not be expected here, but its lack would not be a danger. The principal thing to discourage communism is to get along with economic and social development so that people become more satisfied with their lives and don't need radical movements as an outlet. When the country has developed its resources, people are fully employed, and prosperity reigns, there will be far less concern whether one is a Kurd, a Shi'a or a Sunni.

Iraq will never be a communist country, nor will the communists ever become a menace to Iraq's independence, because the communists are against Arab nationalism.

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Enclosure 1, Page 2  
Airgram NO. A-992  
Bagndad, Iraq

2. Unity. The GOI made a mistake in propagandizing the May 26 agreement as being unity itself. This upset those opposed to unity. Actually the May 26 agreement was nothing more than a formalization of the situation that exists between the UAR and Iraq, who are working out common policies and harmonizing their actions. Unity itself will take 10 or 15 or 30 years to achieve. There is no timetable. Preparations for unity will go forward but unity will not come about until conditions are right. Iraq has a lot to do at home. The formation of a unified political force in Iraq was a necessary step. This would be difficult. There would be opposition. But such a front would be formed. By creating the front it would be possible to move Iraq further along the path of political work on the basis of ideas and ideals rather than on the basis of groups around individuals and pursuit of purely personal interests. Iraq had made a bit of progress in this direction in that now many people were engaged in considering what they want for Iraq, how Iraq should be developed. This was not based on individual interests but on the question of what was good for the country. For example, the new Minister of Agriculture had found a budget of I.D. 9 million when he took office. Being a vigorous man and believing in the fundamental importance of agriculture, he had led a campaign for more and eventually won over the whole cabinet, obtaining a budget of I.D. 22 million. The priority being given to agriculture over industry was most encouraging, and the decision was based on what was good for Iraq, not just for one man or for one group. Up to now the Iraqis had built things like big dams and then failed to dig irrigation canals. Now they would get down to it.

Some Kurds were opposed to unity, but this problem was manageable. There were a great many educated Shi'a who were pro-unity. The Shi'a of Persian origin were anti-unity, as were a good many, but not all, of the Shi'a clergy. The latter opposed it because they were afraid of change which might end their freedom to collect money from the faithful. Thus, their opposition was based on a purely selfish position. They were opposed to progress. Their position was a hopeless one because their outmoded tenets could not stand against change. A religion could not live unless it was compatible with the outlook of the times and could adjust to change. A few Shi'a leaders were seeking to modernize the tenets, but as Shi'as became educated they were secularized, continuing to have religious feelings but not being dominated by tenets incompatible with the lives they had to lead.

The Shi'a religious leaders and the Persian minority could not stir up effective opposition to unity. The Shi'a Arabs on the whole were good Arab nationalists and would not stand in the way of unity. The propertied persons, whether Shi'a or Sunni, were concerned about their property, but it was not necessary to have the same nationalization measures as in the UAR. The UAR was counseling the GOI to be conciliatory toward the Shi'as and to reassure other elements of the population.

3. Kurds. The UAR had advised the Baathis not to go to war against the Kurds since military methods would not settle the problem. But the Baathis had their own reasons for wanting a war. After November 18 the UAR again advised the UAR to stop the war and use political means of dealing with the

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Enclosure 1, Page 3  
Airgram No. A-992  
Baghdad, Iraq

Kurds. The UAR had also advised the Kurds to seek peace and promised to continue to advise the GOI to deal wisely and moderately. The GOI had reached an understanding with the Kurds and that understanding was being implemented. Some of the Kurds were very impatient at the time necessary to carry out the understanding, and others were eager for war in order to obtain their rights by force of arms. Actually, all Kurdish prisoners had been released, the economic blockade had been totally lifted, administration was re-established, schools were open, the existence of a Kurdish people was recognized in the constitution, etc. The Prime Minister was now in the north, and the results of his meeting with Mulla Mustafa should be very important. It was most unlikely that the war would start again. The Kurds really could not initiate it and the GOI has no intention of doing so. Mulla Mustafa is a wise man and a great man. He is able to maintain his leadership and is seeking to win over able young men like Jalal Talabani who have been able to think only of fighting. The GOI will carry out a program in the north which will improve the lives of the Kurds and they will have no interest in fighting. After all, the Kurds and the Arabs have lived and worked together for a long time, and the Kurds will again become useful citizens participating in national life. The UAR will do all it can with both the Kurds and the GOI to make things work. The UAR is against Kurdish separatism. The GOI does fear external interference from the Iranians, British, Soviets and even the Americans.

The Kurds in Iraq know they have had much better treatment than elsewhere. Thus they are aware that things can be put back on a good footing and that they can count on reasonably good treatment.


4. Stability in Iraq. After I had referred to many rumors floating about Baghdad, including the latest one about Rashid Muslih, I asked Huweidi's views on prospects for continued collaboration between the factions in the cabinet. Huweidi said as far as he could tell the factions intended to continue to compromise their differences, but since he was not privy to all that went on, he could not predict. He thought the country wanted stability and that the leaders knew this. There were many problems to work out. There was a great deal to do in the economic and social fields. The country had had a rough time in the Qasim and Baathi eras and now was the time to keep on the track. The GOI knew the problems and he thought they would show wisdom in dealing with them.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

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*Pol 2 IRAQ*

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

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Action

Control: 7830  
Rec'd: JUNE 9, 1964  
3:39 A.M.

NEA

FROM: BAGHDAD

Info

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ACTION: SECSTATE 1034

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ARMY

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NAVY

AIR

DATE: JUNE 9, 8 A.M.

COM

LAB

RMR

WEEKLY REVIEW

UAR-IRAQI PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL GOI APPOINTED THREE MEMBERS TO JOIN UAR-IRAQI PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL JUNE 7: NAJI TALIB (EX-BRIGADIER, REPUTED NASSERITE, SHIA; MINISTER SOCIAL AFFAIRS IMMEDIATELY AFTER 1958 REVOLUTION AND MINISTER INDUSTRY UNDER BAATH UNTIL OCT 1963); ADIB JADIR (PRESIDENT ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION, INDUSTRIALIST, MODERATE NASSERITE SUNNI); ABD AL-SATTAR ALI HUSSAIN (MEMBER ISTIQLAL PARTY, SUNNI, MINISTER WORKS AND HOUSING UNDER BAATH UNTIL OCT 1963, ALSO BELIEVED NASSERITE).

ADIB JADIR SAID HE EXPECTS LEAVE FOR CAIRO IN "MATTER OF WEEKS".

REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW FAR ALLEGED NASSERITES WILLING TO GO

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-2- 1034, JUNE 9, 8 A.M., FROM BAGHDAD

TO GO IN SUBORDINATING IRAQI INTERESTS TO UAR.

ONE ARAB MOVEMENT: AREF'S "ONE ARAB MOVEMENT", DESIGNED TO REPLACE ALL PARTY AND OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN IRAQ, HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING LAUNCHED. "ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT", LARGEST ARAB NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION, REPORTEDLY UNDER GOVT PRESSURE TO DISBAND AND JOIN, BUT ANM LEADERSHIP RELUCTANT PLACE SELVES UNDER AREF'S DIRECT CONTROL. ONE ARAB MOVEMENT, SO FAR, SEEMS INCLUDE ONLY SMALL GROUPS CONNECTED WITH ABD AL-RAZZAK SHIBIBI'S "ARAB SOCIALIST PARTY" AND FUAD RIKABI'S AND AYAD THABIT'S "SOCIALIST UNIONIST MOVEMENT."

KURDS: PRIMIN TAHIR YAHYA DURING "ROUTINE VISIT TO NORTHERN IRAQ" CALLED ON MULLA MUTAFA IN ERBIL JUNE 2. KURDS SAY THEY DEMONSTRATED RESTORATION THEIR UNITY BY HAVING IBRAHIM AHMAD, SECRETARY KDP, AND JALAL TALABANI, KDP LEADER, PRESENT AT MEETING. PRIMIN OFFERED KURDS SEVERAL CABINET POSITIONS AND DEPUTY PREMIERSHIP BUT MULLA DEMANDED PRIOR AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLE AUTONOMY. WHEN YAHYA SAID HE NOT EMPOWERED TO DISCUSS QUESTION, MULLA, ACCORDING SEVERAL SOURCES (INCLUDING LE MONDE CORRESPONDENT ROULEAU WHO WAS IN KURDISTAN AT TIME) REPLIED HE WILLING TO DISCUSS ONLY MAIN ISSUE SAID REMAINING DETAILS, IF ANY, COULD BE HANDLED BY KDP LEADERS, AND THEN WALKED OUT. PRESIDENT AREF TOLD ROULEAU SUBSEQUENTLY THAT NO NEGOTIATION WOULD BE HELD WITH KURDS.

LETDOWN AFTER BUILDUP OF HOPES OVER PRIMIN'S MEETING WITH BARZANI LIKELY TO CREATE NEW WAVE OF RUMORS AND RENEWAL OF APPEARANCE OF CRISIS SITUATION.

KAMIL CHADERCHI DEMANDS DEMOCRACY: KAMIL CHADERCHI, HEAD OF DEFUNCT NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, PRESENTED LONG LETTER OF COMPLAINT TO GOVT EARLY IN WEEK. SAID INTERIM CONSTITUTION AND "TRANSITIONAL PERIOD" SHOULD BE ABOLISHED AND COUNTRY SHOULD PREPARE IMMEDIATELY FOR FREE, SECRET, PARLIAMENTARY

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-3- 1034, JUNE 9, 8 A.M., FROM BAGHDAD

SECRET, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION. FOUR MEN WHO PRESENTED LETTER TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED, BUT CHADERCHI WAS STILL FREE EVENING JUNE 7.

NEW UNIONS: GOI JUNE 1 GRANTED LICENSES TO NINE NEW TRADE UNIONS, BRINGING TOTAL NOW LICENSED TO 14. MINISTER OF LABOR STATES THAT PROVISIONAL LEADERSHIP APPOINTED BY GOI; CANDIDATES FOR UNION OFFICES BEING SCREENED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE EXCLUSION OF CRIMINALS, ELECTIONS HOPEFULLY TO BE HELD EARLY JULY.

ATTACKS ON US CONTINUE: ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT TO US, WARM WORDS OF WELCOME GIVEN BY USG OFFICIALS AND PARTICULARLY WASHINGTON POST SUGGESTION THAT ARAB PRESS ATTACHES BE DECLARED PERSONE NON GRATAE, HAVE RESULTED IN SPATE ANTI-AMERICAN ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS LOCAL PRESS AND RADIO WHICH SHOWED NO SIGNS ABATEMENT BY END OF WEEK. CAMPAIGN IN CONTRAST WITH CONCILIATORY TONE FORMIN. ABD AL-HAMID'S LONG TALK WITH AMBASSADOR JUNE 3, BUT THERE IS NO POINT IN MAKING ISSUE OF IT.

IRAQI-SOVIET RELATIONS: AREF TOLD ROULEAU AN IRAQI ECONOMIC DELEGATION GOING TO MOSCOW AFTER RETURN OF MILITARY DELEGATION HEADED BY AREF'S BROTHER. GROUNDWORK BEING LAID FOR CONSIDERABLE SOVIET RESURGENCE IN IRAQ, AT WHAT PRICE IS UNCLEAR AS YET.

GP-3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-122

NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: BAGHDAD, KHORRAMSHAHR, KUWAIT, CAIRO

FROM : Amconsul BASRA

SUBJECT: The First Week in Basra Following Unity

REF :

DATE: June 4, 1964

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION

6/15

The initial aggrieved reactions of Basra's middle class community to last week's unity agreement seems to have simmered down probably because business now assumes that unity is far in the future if in the cards at all. Low key unity receptions have contributed to general indifference on the part of the man in the street and a sigh of relief in the business community. Although the general public looked forward with considerable enthusiasm to the arrival of the UAR destroyer AL-RASHID, cynical elements had their day when the ship did not arrive in Basra and was rumored to have never left the UAR. Basra cynics then concluded that the River Force's sudden visit to Kuwait was laid on in exculpation for the Al-Rashid fiasco.

Rather cool and matter-of-fact functions were given by Basra senior officials in honor of unity during the past week. The Mutasarrif's tea was dedicated to the achievement of unity by Basra's poet laureate who delivered an ode to Naser and Arif. The customary dry receptions of the Garrison Commander and the D.G. of Ports were marked by the absence of any allusions to unity. The guests at the receptions studiously avoided discussing unity and appeared to regard the receptions as sheer eye wash for the benefit of Arif and his coterie.

Considerable enthusiasm was evinced by the local population for the first official visit to Basra by a UAR warship. According to a reliable source the visit had been agreed upon by the governments of

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals.

Declassified after 12 years.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: CWHenebry:trw

6-4-64

Contents and Classification Approved by: C.W.Henebry

Clearances:

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By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05



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Page 2, Basra A-122

the UAR and Iraq in late April and scheduled for May 30 to June 3. Complete confusion reigned in official circles in Basra when the destroyer Al-Rashid did not show up. A reliable American radio operator heard the Basra port radio repeatedly calling the Al-Rashid for two days on May 30 and 31. The Al-Rashid did not respond. An official reception for the ship was cancelled at the last moment. The first rumors had the Al-Rashid blockaded by British warships in the Gulf or delayed by the refusal of Gulf ports to provide bunkering facilities. The consensus now holds that the Al-Rashid never sailed from a UAR port.


The Al-Rashid fiasco was followed by a sudden visit of the Iraqi River Force to Kuwait under the command of Brigadier Sabih RAOUF. The visit which began on June 1 was announced as the first naval visit by an Arab fleet to Kuwait. The ships are expected to return to Basra today or, at the latest, by June 6.

Comment

Tempers are even in the business community with only a slight dip of confidence in the central government last week when some suspected that the government might be capable of inflicting unity upon Basrawis. The doubting Thomases were however cheered by non-committal official receptions, the Al-Rashid fiasco, the River Force's sudden and unexplained visit to Kuwait.

*Charles W. Henebry*  
Charles W. Henebry  
American Consul

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2 IRAQ	
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A-930		LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		Air Pouch	
NO.				HANDLING INDICATOR	
TO :	DEPARTMENT OF STATE				
INFO :	Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Aleppo, Basra.				
FROM :	Amembassy BAGHDAD		DATE:		May 12, 1964
SUBJECT :	Conversation between American Ambassador and Adib al-Jadir				
REF :					

The attached memorandum summarizes a further private talk on May 9 with Adib al-JADIR, a leading figure in the local business world and probably an aspirant to high political office.

Jadir believes that despite rumors and stress, political stability will be maintained for a time in Iraq. Nasser, he says, is not pressing Iraq for early unity and all Arabs have learned that unity will take time and preparation. Nasser's new position that Arab socialism as practiced in Egypt is not necessarily good for other Arab countries is a great advance. Real socialism will not work in Iraq, in his opinion. Support from the UAR is important to the GOI and this gives the UAR leverage here.

Jadir analyzed the forces in Iraq for and against unity. His comments on the Shi'a are of particular interest. Whether the Kurds are generally as trustful of Nasser as he indicated remains to be proved. He is quite concerned over the long-term aspect of the Kurdish problem and believes the GOI must adopt an intelligent policy for the long haul as against the apparent current tactic of trying to split the Kurds.

Jadir exhibited deep hostility toward British policy in the Near East but apart from the US position on Palestine had no quarrel with US policy.

Robert C. Strong

Robert C. Strong

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 1, Enclosure 1, to  
Baghdad's A-930

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Amembassy, Baghdad,  
May 9, 1964

Participants: Adib al-Jadir, Industrialist,  
President of Engineers Association,  
President of Iraqi Federation of Industries,  
Member of Board of Central Bank  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador to Iraq

Subject: Economic Conditions; Political Stability; Unity; US and UK Policy

1. Economic Conditions in Iraq. Jadir said the economy was sluggish and new commitments were being avoided by many because of fear of socialism and nationalization. However, he categorically denied reports of large withdrawals of bank deposits in recent days saying that the Central Bank runs a daily check. On no day for some time have withdrawals exceeded deposits. He checked personally with two banks said to be in trouble; the Arab Bank and the Bank of Baghdad. Neither has had any difficulty and the deposits continue to outrun withdrawals.

His own spinning and weaving company has a six-month inventory on hand, which is unprecedented, but the company is operating full time because he expects a good crop in the north plus continued peace there to produce an increased demand which will permit unloading of surplus inventory by the end of September. He is betting on a measured approach to unity and on non-application of Arab socialism to Iraq.

Baghdad, he said, is a great producer of rumors, and there are always groups trying to destroy confidence.

2. Political Stability. The military factions in the cabinet are continuing to compromise their differences, but not necessarily for the sake of the country. They know that if they create an overt crisis the Army will be split and great trouble and a dangerous situation would ensue, the outcome of which neither side is sure. Thus the military members will continue in office, and whatever changes will occur will be among the civilians, who don't count anyhow. He sees this situation obtaining for some time.

3. Unity. Most thinking Iraqis have come to realize that unity, to be soundly based, will take time and preparation. The Syrian withdrawal from the UAR taught the Arabs, including Nasser, a great deal. Nasser is not pressing Iraq for early unity. Nasser also has made it clear that while nationalization was necessary in Egypt since most capital was in foreign hands, nationalization is not necessary in other Arab countries as a condition precedent to unity. He also has defined socialism as social justice, and social justice can be had without nationalization.

In Iraq Jadir thinks real socialism would be a great mistake because it would not work and would cause great trouble. Iraq needs private enterprise along with certain public enterprise.

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Page 2, Enclosure 1,  
to Baghdad's A-930.

One must distinguish carefully the categories for and against unity.

The wealthy generally oppose unity for fear it would lead to socialism in Iraq, but many of these favor close Iraqi relations and cooperation with Egypt.

The intellectuals almost unanimously favor unity to restore Arab dignity and glory.

The Shias are not a monolithic group. Those of Persian origin, whether or not they have Iraqi nationality, are opposed to unity. Both Iran and the British are known to be in touch with them because all three elements have the common interest of opposing unity and dislike of Nasser. Arab Shias are in the majority in favor of unity on much the same bases as Arab Sunnis. The wealthy Shias, however, oppose unity, except for a few, just as do the wealthy Sunnis. The Shia religious men are all dependent on wealthy Shias for their income, unlike the Sunni religious men. Therefore, they oppose union because if unity leads to socialism the wealthy will lose their wealth and the Shia religious men will lose their private income and become dependent on the state.

The Kurds seem to trust Nasser and believe they would get a better deal from him; thus many of them would favor unity and a great number would not oppose it.

Jadid considers that the pressures pushing Iraq toward unity are far weaker than those that propelled Syria into the Egyptian embrace in 1957-58. It is the internal pressures that are perhaps greater than the external pressures at present, and the internal pressures can be met by something less than precipitate unity. Iraq can draw strength from a closer association with the UAR without rushing into unity which would not last anyhow if it were premature.

4. The Kurdish Problem. Jadir disavowed knowledge of the substance of talks being held by the GOI with the Kurds. Apparently the civilian members of the cabinet also lack knowledge, the military keeping everything closely to themselves. It seems certain that Nasser in fact did play a key role in arranging the ceasefire and that the Egyptians continue to have a key role. He thinks they are advising both the GOI and the Kurds, but he does not know what the advice is. The GOI in fact needs the support of the UAR against Kurdish pressures, and this gives the Egyptians great leverage. However, the GOI cannot very well admit publicly the UAR role. However, the fact the Kurds know the UAR is supporting the GOI will have a great influence on their attitude, and as military unification goes forward the Kurds will have further pause for thought.

Apart from the UAR role, the GOI policy of trying to split the Kurds may be valid for the short haul, but in the longer term such a policy will not work. New forces must be at work among Kurdish tribal youth. The tribal system is becoming demodé. The young men sooner or later will be attracted by the KDP intellectual leadership. Thus the GOI must find a better, more

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Page 3, Enclosure 1,  
to Baghdad's A-930.

durable policy, without creating an autonomous area in the north which no Arab can accept.

Jadir believes that there are foreign fingers fiddling with the Kurds. In addition to the Soviet propaganda and financing of the KDP organization in Europe, Jadir says the British are known to be in touch with the Kurds through IPC in Kirkuk. The GOI believes the British are trying to use the Kurds against the GOI. I said I doubted the UK had any capability with the Kurds and I thought it natural there be UK-Kurdish contacts, just as there are low-level US Kurdish contacts at Kurdish initiative through which we urge on the Kurds a course of reason and of cooperation with the GOI as good Iraqi citizens. Jadir said he knew US policy but thoroughly distrusted the British in their outmoded way of doing business.

Jadir said he believed some changes in provincial administration will be made with the Kurds in mind. He agreed that many of the police and local officials in the Kurdish areas should be Kurds and the Kurds should have the right to use their own language. He doubts the ceasefire will be broken soon because neither side really wants it. Kurdish propaganda threatening renewed warfare is designed to keep on the pressure for bargaining purposes. He thinks Barzani is far stronger than the KDP intellectuals, since the latter have few fighting men. Jalal Talabani is one of those who believes in Nasser and thus he will cause no trouble for the GOI.

5. US and UK Policy. Throughout our talk Jadir was bitter about UK policy throughout the Arab world and vowed the UK would be expelled except for commercial relations. I explained the theory and practice of the political vacuum and said it was one thing to expel the UK if there were something to take its place, and another thing to expel them when what would ensue would be chaos, including serious inter-Arab trouble over the spoils. This did not seem to trouble Jadir, who considers the UK anti-Arab, anti-Nasser, anti-Union, pro-reaction, etc.

I explained generally our policy approach to the Arab world and Iraq, including as our principal concern in Iraq as being the establishment of stability and progress in development and social reform. I explained our willingness to work with any non-communist government and our policy of not supporting any one group or country against another. I said the Baathis had no chance to return to power for years, until their image improved greatly and until things again had deteriorated to the point that any element which could bring about a change would be accepted. Jadir agreed and added that he considered the communists unable to become a real force in Iraq again for many years.

Jadir's only quarrel with US policy is over the Palestine question.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

Amb:RCS:mvm 5/12/64

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Authority <i>NNO 932522</i>
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**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

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Action

Control: 8404  
Rec'd: MAY 12, 1964  
2:46 AM

NEA

FROM: BAGHDAD

Info

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 928

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INFO: AMMAN UNNUMBERED  
ANKARA UNNUMBERED

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DATE: MAY 12, 8 AM

RMR

WEEKLY REVIEW

ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PRESIDENT ARIF WILL LEAVE FOR CAIRO MAY 13 ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SUBHI ABD AL-HAMID AND MINISTER FOR UNION AFFAIRS ABD AL-RAZZAYMUHI AL-DIN, COUPLED WITH UAR VICE PRESIDENT'S AMER'S DEPARTING STATEMENT MAY 7 THAT "POSITIVE STEPS IN ARAB FIELD TO REALIZE GOALS OF THE PEOPLE" WOULD BE TAKEN DURING ARIF'S CAIRO VISIT, HAS STIRRED SPECULATION THAT SOME STEP TOWARD UNITY IS IN THE MAKING. TWO BAGHDAD PAPERS CTOIED\* BEIRUT STORY THAT FEDERAL UNION OF UAR, IRAQ, ALGERIA AND YEMEN WILL BE PROCLAIMED FOLLOWING CAIRO TALKS BY NASSER, ARIF, SALLAL, AND BEN BELLA.

SOME BAGHDADIS THINK LOOSE FEDERATION WILL BE FORMED

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-2- 928, MAY 12, 8 AM, FROM BAGHDAD

WHILE OTHERS DISMISS IDEA AS MERE PRESS SPECULATION. ONE USUALLY WELL-INFORMED SOURCE SAYS SUBJECT OF UNITY NOT EVEN DISCUSSED DURING AMER'S VISIT.

AS HAKIM AMER LEFT BAGHDAD, GENERAL ALI AMER ARRIVED. SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT LATTER DISCUSSING FURTHER MILITARY UNIFICATION MOVES IN ACCORDANCE SUMMIT CONFERENCE. WE HAVE NO RPT NO REASON BELIEVE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF IRAQI-EGYPTIAN UNITY IN PROSPECT. SEEMS BE GENERAL AGREEMENT HERE THAT FOUNDATIONS MUST BE LAID AND COUNTRY PREPARED. HAVE NO DOUBT THERE WILL BE LOTS OF UNITY TALK AND CONTINUING STRESS ON MEASURES SHORT OF UNITY. ACTUAL QRN\* UAR SUPPORT NEEDED BY GOI, WHICH JHKSZEDS\* ABSENCE OF OVERT MANIFESTATIONS OF UAR HOSTILITY. UNITY TALK AND SOME MEASURES ARE PRICE TO BE PAID BY IRAQ. AMER'S VISIT NECESSARY TO IRAQI DIGNITY VIEW ARIF'S PREVIOUS TRIPS TO CAIRO AND LACK OF HIGH LEVEL EGYPTIAN VISIT IN RETURN (PARTICULARLY SINCE ARIF GOING TO UAR AGAIN DURING KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT). MILITARY FACTIONS IN GOI CABINET APPEAR TO INTEND TO CONTINUE TO COMPROMISE THEIR DIFFERENCES WHETHER IN INTEREST OF STABILITY OR BECAUSE NEITHER SIDE SURE OF WINNING IN POWER SHOWDOWN.

REPORTS ABOUT PROJECTED CABINET CHANGE FOLLOWING PROMULGATION OF INTERIM CONSTITUTION CONTINUE CIRCULATE BRISKLY. MOST POPULAR RUMORS ARE THAT SEVERAL MINISTERS WHO UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT UNION TO BE DROPPED AND ALL SHI'A MINISTERS RESIGNING. RUMOR PREVALENT SOME MONTHS AGO THAT ABD AL-RAHMAN BAZZAZ, UNTIL RECENTLY IRAQI AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN REVIVED BY TAHA MAARUF, KURDISH NATIONALIST AND EX-DIPLOMAT, WHO CLAIMED HAVE HEARD FROM BAZZAZ HIMSELF ARIF PLANS "KICK UPSTAIRS" INTO NATIONAL COUNCIL OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND (NCRC) MILITARY MEMBERS OF REGIME AND INSTALL BAZZAZ AS PRIME MINISTER AJH\* CIVILIAN CABINET. IN THIS CONNECTION, INTERESTING NOTE NEW LAW DEFINING MEMBERSHIP AND POWERS OF NCRC PUBLISHED MAY 11 NAMES AS MEMBERS BY VIRTUE OF THEIR

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-3- 928, MAY 12, 8 AM, FROM BAGHDAD

POSITIONS (INTER ALIA) PRIME MINISTER AND MILITARY MEMBERS YL\* TOOK ACTIVE PART IN NOV 18 REVOLUTION. SEEMS LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT BAZZAZ'S HQ GFEXCEED\* HIS PROSPECTS AND THAT IF RIF IN THE PAST ENCOURAGED THESE HOPES, HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN NEW READING OF SITUATION.

KURDISH SOURCES REPORT MEETING OF BARZANIBU KDP POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND KURDISH TRIBAL LEADERS TO TAKE PLACE THIS WEEK TO CONSIDER KURDISH POSITION IN WAKE OF DISAPPOINTING (TO THEM) INTERIM CONSTITUTION. SOURCE WHO RECENTLY SAW BARZANI STATED, HOWEVER, THAT MULLA MUSTAFJIGS INITIAL DISCOURAGEMENT OVER FAILURE OF CONSTITUTION TO GIVE SPECIFIC ASSURANCES OF KURDISH RIGHTS HAS BEEN ALLEVIATED BY PRIVATE GOI ASSURANCES THAT ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT GOVERNMENT'S PROMISES TO KURDS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN SHORTLY. GOVERNMENT HAS ABOLISHED POST OF MILITARY GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN AREA AND TRANSFERRED POWERS TO MILITARY GOVERNOR GENERAL AND MINISTER INTERIOR RASHID MUSLIH. SIGNIFICANCE THIS MOVE NOT YET APPARENT. KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES RECENTLY HAVE BEEN REMARKING THAT EGYPT PLAYING BIG ROLE IN KURDISH PROBLEM AND KURDS HAVE FAITH IN NASSER. INCLUSION IN AMER PARTY OF MINISTER FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATION BEING INTERPRETED AS INDICATING SOME OF GOI-UAR TALKS HERE FOCUSED ON REVAMPING OF IRAQI PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION, PRESUMABLY WITH KURDS IN MIND. KURDS ALSO POSSIBLY INFLUENCED IN ATTITUDE BY EVIDENCES OF IRAQI-UAR MOVES TOWARD MORE MILITARY INTEGRATION.

CEREMONY STAGED IN HILLA MAY 8 TO COMMEMORATE 40TH DAY AFTER DEATH OF SHI'A EX-PRIME MINISTER ABD AL-QAHAB MARJANS\* TURNED INTO FLAGRANTLY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION. CROWD ESTIMATED AT 10-15,000 SHIAS FROM SOUTHER ARWOD\* HEARD SPEECHES AND POEMS CONTAINING SCARCELY VEILED ATTACKS ON PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN WHAT AMOUNTED TO MASS PROTEST OF ALLEGED AM'-SHI'A ATTITUDES OF ARIF REGIME.

GOI HAS REACTED TO CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN

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-4- 928, MAY 12, 8 AM, FROM BAGHDAD

EEC AND ISRAEL QX\* CALLING IN BAGHDAD REPRESENTATIVES OF  
EEC MEMBER COUNTRIES AND REGISTERING ORAL AND WRITTEN  
PROTESTS AGAINST ACTION. GOI PRESENTATION INCLUDED  
THREATS OF RETAILATORY ACTION. PRESS HAS GIVEN MAJOR  
PUBLICITY TO THIS ISSUE.

GP-3.

STRONG

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\* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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By	SE NARA Date 11/18/05

66  
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL 2 IRAQ

Baghdad 903

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Action

Control: 2474  
Rec'd: MAY 5, 1964  
5:16 AM

NEA

FROM: BAGHDAD

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 903,

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DATE: MAY 5, 11 AM

RMR

WEEKLY REVIEW

MUCH-POSTPONED VISIT OF UAR VICE PRESIDENT MARSHAL AMER FINALLY COMMENCED MAY 4. RECEIVED AT BAGHDAD AIRPORT BY PRIME MINISTER TAHIR YAHYA, CABINET MINISTERS, SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATIC CORPS.

GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZED CROWD OF ABOUT 15,000 YOUTHS SHOUTED PRO-NASSER AND SOME PRO-ARIF SLOGANS, BLOCKING AMER'S EXIT FROM AIRPORT FOR 20 MINUTES.

RUMORS CIRCULATING IN BAGHDAD REGARDING PURPOSES HIS VISIT INCLUDE: (A) PERSUADE PRESIDENT ARIF TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN SYRIA, (B) ATTEMPT PATCH UP DIFFERENCES

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By SP NARA Date 11/18/05

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-2-903, MAY 5, 11 AM, FROM BAGHDAD

BETWEEN FACTIONS WITHIN IRAQI REGIME, AND (C) DISCUSS PLANS FOR UNION OF UAR, IRAQ AND YEMEN (SALLAL ALLEGEDLY PRESSING NASSER HARD FOR UNION). FACT AMER REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED VISIT NAJAF AND KARBALA WIDELY INTERPRETED AS DESIGNED WOO SHI'A ACCEPTANCE OF ARAB UNIFICATION. SON OF LEADING SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADER SAID MUHSIN HAKIM OF NAJAF TOLD EMBASSY EMPLOYEE HIS FATHER PROBABLY WOULD NOT RECEIVE AMER FOR FEAR MEETING WOULD BE MISREPRESENTED BY GOI AND/OR UAR.

ON EVE OF AMER'S VISIT, PRESIDENT ARIF PROCLAIMED NEW INTERIM CONSTITUTION, TO BE REPLACED BY PERMANENT CONSTITUTION AFTER TRANSITION PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED THREE YEARS. FIRST ARTICLE PROCLAIMED IRAQ DEMOCRATIC, SOCIALIST STATE AND IRAQI PEOPLE PART OF ARAB NATION WHOSE GOAL IS COMPLETE ARAB UNITY. ALSO PLEDGED GOI WORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION UNITY IN SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME "BEGINNING WITH UNITY WITH UAR". QUOTING ONE OF PRESENT MINISTERS, ONE SOURCE TOLD AMBASSADOR CABINET WILL SHORTLY BE ALTERED TO DROP SOME BUT NOT ALL OF MINISTERS WHO OPPOSE STRESS ON UNITY. SOURCE SAID TAHIR YAHYA WILL REMAIN AS PRIME MINISTER AND NEW MINISTERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SELECTED. HE SAID PRESIDENT ARIF DECIDED GO ALONG FOR FEAR OF BEING ATTACKED AS ANOTHER QASIM IF HE TRIES TO BLOCK UNITY. GROWING PRESSURE BY SHI'A PLUS KURDISH PROBLEM REPORTEDLY HAS STRENGTHENED ARAB NATIONALISTS BECAUSE OF GROWING BELIEF SUNNI ARABS NEED NASSER'S PROTECTION.

FOREGOING DEVELOPMENTS ON UNITY FRONT FOLLOW ON HEELS OF RELIABLE REPORTS THAT KURDS HAVE PATCHED UP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BARZANI AND POLITICAL BUREAU OF KDP AND SIGNS OF GROWING DOUBTS ON PART BOTH GOI AND KURDS AS TO PERMANENCE OF CEASE-FIRE IN NORTH. CONTRARY TO KURDISH EXPECTATIONS BASED ON ARIF'S CEASE-FIRE PROCLAMATION, NEW CONSTITUTION MAKES NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO KURDISH RIGHTS AND ONLY CURSORY REFERENCE TO ARAB-KURDISH COOPERATION.

EMPHASIS ON UNITY ALSO LIKELY FURTHER ANTAGONIZE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS INCREASED

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-3-903, MAY 5, 11 AM, FROM BAGHDAD

ANTI-ARABISM. EMBASSY HAS HEARD FROM PRESUMABLY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ WILL BE GOVERNOR OF KHUZISTAN PIRASTA AND THAT HIS APPOINTMENT PRESENTS TOUGHER IRANIAN LINE REGARDING DIFFERENCES WITH IRAQ.

EFFECT OF ALL THE FOREGOING SEEMS LIKELY TO BE HEIGHTENING OF INTERNAL AND AREA TENSIONS. IN EMBASSY'S OPINION, ONLY DISTINCT MINORITY OF IRAQIS FAVOR ANY FORMAL UNION WITH UAR IN NEXT FEW YEARS. NOT ONLY IS PROJECT OPPOSED BY MOST SHI'A, KURDS AND CHRISTIANS, BUT EVEN CONSERVATIVE SUNNIS SHOWING ALARM. BUSINESSMEN REPORT SUBSTANTIAL DROP-OFF IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY DURING PAST WEEK AS RESULT OF UNCERTAINTY OVER GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION WITH REGARD TO "SOCIALISM" AND "UNITY". ALTHOUGH GOI MAY INTEND LITTLE MORE THAN VERBAL UNITY AT THIS JUNCTURE AND NASSER HIMSELF MAY BE WISE ENOUGH TO BRAKE ANY HEADLONG RUSH IN HIS DIRECTION, CURRENT PRESSURES FROM PRO-UNIONISTS CONTAIN SEEDS OF INSTABILITY. TROUBLE LIKELY IF THEY ALLOWED TO GERMIMATE UNCHECKED.

GP-3.

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

POL 2 IRAQ

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A-888

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 224 MAY 4 1964

INFO : BASRA

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: APRIL 28, 1964

SUBJECT : Situation in Northern Iraq: Memoranda of Conversations

REF : Embtel 871

NEA

Enclosed herewith are memoranda of conversations between Ambassador Strong and the Governors of the four northern provinces as well as three other officials in the North. Information contained in the memoranda has been partially reported in separate airgrams according to subject matter.

The Conversations were held between April 9 and 17 when the Ambassador, accompanied by Second Secretary Baas, visited the North to assess the political and economic situation.

*Robert C. Strong*  
Robert C. Strong

Enclosures: 71

7 Memoranda.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

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Drafted by:

ECON:BHBaas:mia;br:ems 4/27/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

DCM:JWAdams

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Authority NND 938522  
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 1 of 2  
Encl. No. 1  
A- 888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME: April 11, 1964; 9:15 am

PLACE: Governor's Offices, Mosul

PARTICIPANTS: Staff Brig. Shakir Mahmud al-Samarra'i, Governor of Mosul  
Ambassador Strong  
Bryan H. Baas

-----  
The Governor has been in his present position only three months. His grasp of the situation is difficult to evaluate, since the information provided on the following topics was rather sketchy:

Destruction in Mosul Province: The Governor said that Mosul Province has suffered very little damage as a result of the Kurdish war. There have been some economic dislocations, and the Governor stated that food and money are being distributed to villagers (but he did not say how much food and money nor how many villagers).

Political Stability: Stability has returned to Mosul Province. Kurds, including the Militia, are returning to their villages. Delegations are being exchanged by the Kurds and the GOI, and tension is being reduced. (The army officer delegated to escort us said that he had personally visited Kurdish villages on behalf of the Government.)

Regional Administration: The Governor said that local administrators are both Kurdish and Arab. Most of the original administrators have returned to their villages (they were in major administrative centers during the war). He added that there are local councils to maintain liaison between the Government and the people, but he gave no meaningful details.

Education: The Governor has ordered school administrators to register all students who apply, and classes will continue through August in order that those students who have missed classes may regain lost time. In response to a question, he said that the medium of instruction is primarily Arabic.

Salahaddin Cavalry: According to the Governor, the intention is to keep this group temporarily, but to eventually get them off the payroll.

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Page 2 of 2  
Encl. No. 1  
A- 888 . from Baghdad

At the end of the conversation the Ambassador stated that the purpose of his trip was to determine what assistance might be required from the USG. The Governor said he was aware of the purpose of the visit and casually enumerated the commodities requested in a note received from the Foreign Ministry. He knew that a formal request had been made and confidently thanked the Ambassador for the commodities in advance.

Comment: The Governor was very friendly and helpful to the extent that he phoned various officials to facilitate the Ambassador's travel. At the same time it was observed that he kept notes on all questions asked. He made no statement that would indicate that there is a food shortage in the province, but our net impression was that the GOI is capable of handling the bulk of any relief problem that may exist in Mosul Province.

Baghdad-Mosul Road: The Governor said he had been insisting with the GOI that the road from Shirqat to Mosul be rebuilt promptly since it is in very bad condition. (We noted on our return to Baghdad that a tender is to be issued shortly for this segment.)

ECON:BHBaas:mla

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Page 1 of 2  
Encl. No. 2  
A- 888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME : April 14, 1964; 10:00 a.m.  
PLACE : Governor's Office, Arbil  
PARTICIPANTS: Brigadier Younis Hussein, Governor of Arbil  
Ambassador Strong  
Bryan H. Baas

The Governor has been in his present position for only six weeks. Previously, he had spent 30 years in the Army. He seems to be a very dynamic individual and claims to work 16 hours per day. He also said that he has visited nearly every village in the Province. He is very proud of his long work days. The following statements were made:

Stability: All is quiet in Arbil Province (population 272, 500). The Governor stated that any trouble we may hear of is purely "individualistic". He did not elaborate, but he may have meant that there has been some trouble but that it is among Kurds or acts by individual Kurds without central direction and is not a GOI-Kurdish conflict.

Rehabilitation: There has been damage to villages, but the Governor did not indicate how many villages are involved. He did say that there are about 2,000 families in need of relief assistance. The GOI is moving to return them to their villages. The GOI will assist in rebuilding public buildings in villages, but the villagers themselves must repair their houses. In this connection the Ambassador mentioned that we had seen many people in tents (80 tents were counted) near the village of Harir on the Arbil-Ruwanduz road west of Spilak pass. The Governor said these people had been in the summer resorts in Shaqlawa and Salahuddin and were waiting to return to the villages of Sufia and Baradostia.

Projects: The Governor discussed two main work projects. One would be the building of a large public garden within the city of Arbil. On this project workers would receive wages half in cash and the other half in food. Another would be the clearing of part of the old buildings on top of the hill in the center of the city. This is the site of a fortress dating to ancient times. (We had previously learned that the population on the hill is Kurdish and Turkish.) The Governor assured us that other housing has been arranged for the people who are to be displaced. He added that there is much work to be done in the whole province and stated that there are plans to build schools, hospitals and roads. Roads must be built into the now remote areas to open them economically and to allow establishment of police posts.

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Page 2 of 2  
Encl. No. 2  
A-888 from Baghdad

Summer Resorts: The Governor expressed his intention to emphasize the building up of summer resorts. He mentioned that he had sent a team of engineers to survey an area in the Gali Ali Beg (a scenic gorge near Ruwanduz). He said that he will make an outright donation of land to anyone who will build a resort at the chosen location within one year. Also he said Jindyan, north-west of Ruwanduz, had been selected as the site of another summer resort.

Agriculture and Land Reform: Agriculture has returned to normal and farmers are working their fields. There are plans to distribute plots of land of 200 dunums each to families living on the plains. In mountainous areas plots will be given to peasants for specialized activities such as tobacco cultivation, grazing and fruit growing, but the Governor was unclear as to how equitable distribution would be made. Another feature is that the government plans to give a plot of land to each family in the villages for a house and garden.

BHBaas:br

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By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 1 of 3  
Encl. No. 3  
A- 888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE : April 15, 1964; 10:00 a.m.  
PLACE : Governor's Office, Kirkuk  
PARTICIPANTS: Major General Naif Hammody, Governor of Kirkuk Province  
Ambassador Strong  
Bryan H. Baas

General Hammody is a likeable, reasonable, vigorous man who seems to be a hard worker. He speaks English quite well and gave satisfactory answers to most of the questions asked. He is fairly new on the job, having assumed his present position about six weeks ago.

The following are specific points covered in the conversation:

Rehabilitation: General Hammody stated that the Kurds are moving back to their villages. The Government is rendering them assistance and is making outright cash payments. He mentioned that he had just authorized the expenditure of ID 5,000 in one unidentified area. He said that he hopes to receive food-stuffs to assist in the relief projects and that he has been in contact with CARE in this connection. He did not indicate the amount of food needed, nor did he say how many people needed relief.

Work Projects: Two main projects are on his mind, and in both cases he plans to pay workers partly in food and partly in cash. One is a scheme to set up a dairy community at Hawija similar to that at Abu Ghraib near Baghdad. This project would utilize irrigation water (for growing fodder) from the Lesser Zab from a canal originating at the village of Batmah. General Hammody stated that this irrigation project was started some time ago but left incomplete. The second project involves a canal around the east of Kirkuk. This canal would begin at the end of the first stage of the main canal from the Dibis Dam and would circle around Kirkuk to the northeast and back to meet the end of the second stage of the main canal. (No contract has been let on the first stage of the main canal. The Dibis Dam will be completed in a few months.) The Governor wishes to use the canal around Kirkuk as a work relief project. This project would take only three months to complete, according to the Governor's estimate, since most of the canal would follow the Chōi River bed. The Governor expects the GOI to agree to begin soon the first stage of the main canal in order to have a source of water for his project. It would be some time before the GOI completes the second stage which would meet the other end

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Page 2 of 3  
Encl. No. 3  
A-888 from Baghdad

of the Governor's canal. In this connection, the Governor stated that the GOI would dig only the main canals--smaller canals would be the responsibility of the farmers.

Land Reform: The Governor stated that the land reform program is underway, and that the program is popular with the people. He said that land is at present being redistributed south of Kirkuk, but he gave no details. The Ambassador raised the question of land redistribution in mountainous areas and mentioned such villages as Barazan, Baradost and Zibar. The Governor acknowledged that land reform is not practical in these areas until roads are built and police posts established. He added in passing that there is a Qa'imaqam in Ranya as well as a police post.

Roads: The GOI plans to build a number of roads into the mountainous areas. The Governor said that the Prime Minister has ordered that the road from Dokan to Ranya be given priority.

As a preface to political questions, the Ambassador pointed out that the USG supports the GOI, not the Kurds. He further explained that, although the USG supports the GOI, it expects the Kurds to be treated fairly. The use of force would only lead to more trouble. The Governor agreed that this is true, and he also expressed his awareness of USG policy toward the Kurdish problem. Other points of discussion were:

Reasons for Ceasefire: The Governor's reply to this question was hardly convincing. He said that Mullah Mustafa is a good man, but old and tired. The GOI offered to rehabilitate the North and to return the villagers to their homes, and Mullah Mustafa accepted the offer. There were very few Kurds who objected to this decision. He added that Mullah Mustafa is still in Ranya and that his brother is in Barzan.

Arab-Kurdish Relations: The Governor promptly pointed out that he has many Kurdish friends and that he likes and admires the Kurds. He made the interesting comment that part of the trouble in the past was caused by Arab officials who did not take the attitude that Arabs and Kurds are brothers. The Governor said that he knows Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad personally, the latter very well since he was a neighbor in Baghdad. Both are concerned only with their own interests and do not really care about the lot of the Kurds as a whole. He suggested that the best solution would be to make them cabinet ministers. Then they would be satisfied and stop causing trouble for the GOI. While on the general subject the Governor avoided answering the Ambassador's question about what situation would have to exist before the Kurdish factions are reconciled with the GOI.

City Intellectuals: The Governor said that they are very few and that they lack support from the great majority of the Kurds. There are no more than 250, and they are known and could be arrested. However, the Governor believes that they should be left alone. He said they are permitted freedom of movement, but it was clear from his comments that they are under careful surveillance.

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Page 3 of 3  
Encl. No. 3  
A- 888 from Baghdad

Communists: Communist Arab officers who have defected to the Kurds number only five or six. Most of them are in Kurdish Iran, but some may be in hiding in the north of Iraq. In the course of his circuitous coverage of this subject, the Governor failed to answer the Ambassador's question and identify where the communists are holding out.

Salahaddin Cavalry: These pro-Government Kurds will be kept on the payroll through the end of the month. It was not clear whether he meant 50 per cent of them are being paid at present, or whether they are on half pay.

BHbaas:br

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By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 1 of 2  
Encl. No. 4  
A- 888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME: April 16, 1964; 6:45 pm

PLACE: Governor's Office, Sulaimaniya

PARTICIPANTS: Brig. Abd al-Razzaq al-Sayyid Mahmud, Governor of  
Sulaimaniya Province  
Ambassador Strong  
Bryan H. Baas

Brig. Mahmud had seen Mullah Mustafa Barzani earlier in the day. When he received the Ambassador he was in good spirits and self-confident to the point of being "cocky". He was overbearing and evasive and, in general, put on a fine show for the four of his subordinates (including the chief of military intelligence) who were present in the room. The Ambassador opened the conversation with the statement that the purpose of his trip was to assess the extent of damage in the North and to determine how the United States might cooperate with the GOI. In reply to specific questions, the Governor made the following statements:

Number of Families in Need of Assistance: Statistics on the number of families in need of assistance were not available. All the pertinent information had been transmitted to the Government in Baghdad and could be obtained there. The Government was in the process of giving aid to those who were in need.

Plan for Reconstruction of the North: A plan has been prepared and has been sent to Baghdad for approval. Further action is dependent upon the Government in Baghdad. The Governor avoided giving any details on the reconstruction plan. He did add that the plan covers five years and would cost ID 500 million.

Failing to elicit any detailed information on the economic situation, the Ambassador turned to political questions. Again the Governor was anything but candid:

Political Stability in North: The Governor stated that fighting had ceased and that all was rapidly returning to normal. People were returning to their villages.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani: The Governor and Barzani are "good friends." Barzani is cooperating fully with the Government and "will go anywhere he is told to go." The Governor gave the impression that he regards Barzani as his errand boy. According to the Governor, he himself can go anywhere in the north unarmed.

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Page 2 of 2

Encl. No. 4

A- 888 from Baghdad

GOI Control of Mountainous Area vs. Control of Cities: The Governor stated that Barzani is clearly paramount among tribal chiefs and will keep the tribes in hand. The Government will use its power to keep control of the cities. He made it clear that the Government is not worried about the intellectuals in the cities inasmuch as the army and police are there in force and have control over the situation. There was a clear implication that Barzani has no influence over the city Kurds. With regard to the Panjwin area, the Governor said it was under control of a person friendly to the GOI and that the Kurdish leaders in the village itself are "100% with the Government." (We learned from an informed source that the GOI has not been able to establish even a police post in Chuarta and Panjwin, that leftist Kurds are apparently strong in that area, and that the Governor had seen Barzani that day to try to persuade him to clean up the Panjwin - Chuarta area so the GOI can restore administration and authority.)

Split Among the Kurds: The Governor said there is an unbridgeable split between the tribal groups led by Barzani and the Kurdish Democratic Party leaders, particularly city intellectuals. He attributed the split to differences of "interests and principles," but would identify neither.

Communists Among the Kurds: The Governor evaded this question by grandly stating that there are communists everywhere, even in the United States.

Comment: With regard to the question of relief, whether intentionally or not, the Governor created the impression that any relief assistance required is being provided by the GOI. The Governor did say, however, that assistance from abroad is always welcome. This statement in the context of the conversation did not mean that aid is needed. It might further be noted that the Governor's total uncooperativeness when he had full knowledge of the purpose of the Ambassador's visit may be an indication that outside assistance is not needed. If it were, he would have reason to be more helpful. The Governor's bouyant self confidence following his meeting with Barzani may be an indication that he scored some victory in his negotiations (although Kurdish contacts here say Barzani refused the request to clean up Chuarta - Panjwin).

BHbaas:mla

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Page 1 of 1  
Encl. No. 5  
A- 888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 11, 1964  
PLACE: Aqra, Mosul Province  
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Hassoun Khazraji, Qa'imaqam of Aqra  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador  
Bryan H. Baas, Second Secretary

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Mr. Khazraji has been in Aqra for 14 months. He does not speak English, but speaks some French. He was a student in France seven years ago, and he had hoped to obtain a Ph.D. in economics. He said that he failed to complete his studies because of illness. During the visit in Mr. Khazraji's office and a tour through the village the following information was obtained:

Destruction. The village of Aqra (7,000 inhabitants, 95% Kurds) suffered no destruction during the Kurdish war. This was borne out by our own observations that there was no apparent damage to the village.

Stability. According to Mr. Khazraji, there is no trouble in the area. All the villagers have returned with the exception of about ten who were killed during the fighting. We observed that there were a large number of troops garrisoned next to the village, and there were large numbers of soldiers and police in the streets. None of the Kurds was armed.

Agriculture. Mr. Khazraji stated that farming continues as usual. Our observation was that fields in the area are being cultivated.

Relief. No indication was given by Mr. Khazraji that food assistance is needed. A second lieutenant in a separate conversation with Mr. Baas stated that there are plans for food distribution, but no action has been taken. A tour through the market revealed that the shops were reasonably well stocked and no food shortage was apparent.


Education. There are 550 students in Aqra. The principal of one of the schools is a Kurd, but the language of instruction is Arabic. Mr. Khazraji had informed the Ambassador that both Kurdish and Arabic are used, but separate conversations with lesser officials revealed that this is not true.

Comment: Although the officials protested that all is normal, Mr. Baas was not permitted to take any photographs other than a general view of the village from a distance that would insure that few details would be recorded.

Bryan H. Baas:ems:4/27/64

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Page 1 of 1  
Encl. No. 6  
A-888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 12, 1964  
PLACE: Zakho, Mosul Province  
PARTICIPANTS: Ghazi Shaikh al-Jawad, Qa'imaqam of Zakho  
Staff Col. Hatem Atiah Izzi, Commander, 2nd Battalion, 11th Brigade  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador  
Bryan H. Baas, Second Secretary

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We made a brief tour of the town and then went to the officials' club. Several conversations as well as observations produced the following information.

Population. The village of Zakho has a population of about 10,000 while the administrative district (Qadha') as a whole contains about 41,000. A high percentage of the population is Christian, and we noted that there are two churches in the village.

Destruction. No damage was evident in the village with the exception of a few windows out in the secondary school (which may be a result of normal wear and tear in Iraqi schools). There were, however, sand bags on the roof of the school that indicated that there had been a state of preparedness. On the road from Dohuk to Zakho we noted that Mangesh had been destroyed and was unoccupied, that small villages close to the road had suffered considerable damage, but that those a mile or more away were intact. We were unable to ascertain the extent of damage in the Zakho district, but we received the impression that it was minimal.


Agriculture. The principal contacts stated that agriculture has returned to normal, which agrees with our observations of the countryside except in the Mangesh area.

Stability. The Qa'imaqam, who was recently transferred from Diyala, stated that all is normal in the area. Most of the villagers have returned. We also learned that the road into Zakho has only recently been opened to traffic on a 24-hour basis. Previously, no traffic could move after 2 p.m. There was the usual statement that the military intends to withdraw "soon", but we saw no evidence that this was being done.

Projects. The only project that merited the Qa'imaqam's comment was a new officials' club. No other projects were mentioned by either the Qa'imaqam or the Colonel.

Bryan H. Baas:ems:4/27/64

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Page 1 of 2  
Encl. No. 7  
A-888 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: April 13, 1964 - 6:00 p.m.  
PLACE: Officials' Club, Shaqlawa, Arbil Province  
PARTICIPANTS: Abdul Sattar Musa, Qa'imaqam of Shaqlawa  
Various local officials  
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador  
Bryan H. Baas, Second Secretary

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On the return trip from Ruwanduz we stopped at Shaqlawa for dinner. Our escort diverted us to the officials' club where we met the Qa'imaqam. The conversation that ensued covered the following points:

Population. The village itself has a population of about 4,500 while the administrative district (Qadha') contains about 25,000. The population is nearly 100% Kurdish.

Relief. Mr. Musa (who assumed his position six weeks ago after a transfer from Hai, Kut Province) said that there are about 2,000 families in the district that require relief assistance (in a separate conversation the following day the Governor of the province gave the same figure for the number of needy families in the whole province). He stated that these people are being given, or will be given, flour, sugar, tea and cooking fat. As for work relief projects, they will be started as soon as the Committee for the Rehabilitation of the North decides on recommendations submitted by the Qa'imaqam. Mr. Musa says that he hopes to have some projects underway in about one month, and he mentioned schools, hospitals and roads. Mention was made of the people seen living in tents near Harir on the road to Ruwanduz. Mr. Musa said that they had been moved from summer resorts in Salahuddin and were awaiting return to their villages.

Education. Schools never closed in the village of Shaqlawa, although they did in some villages in the district. It was apparent that, although the Shaqlawa schools were open, some students were not in attendance, since Mr. Musa mentioned that schools would remain open through August to permit students to make up for lost time. As usual, Arabic is the medium of instruction in all secondary schools. A concession is made in the case of the primary schools where both Kurdish and Arabic are used. There are some Kurds teaching in the schools, just as there are a few Kurds on the Qa'imaqam's staff (this subject brought rather frozen silences).

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Page 2 of 2  
Encl. No. 7  
A- 888 from Baghdad

Summer Resorts. Summer resorts are to be opened soon. Mr. Musa did not exude the same enthusiasm on this subject as did other Qa'imaqams. In Salahuddin, 30 minutes drive from Shaqlawa, we were lodged in a small house that is part of the summer resorts administration. The house was clean and in good condition, and it rents for ID 30 per month. The Ambassador noted that it might be useful for the Embassy to rent the house or one similar to it for the use of Embassy personnel during the summer. Such an arrangement would serve the dual purpose of giving relief during the oppressive heat of the Baghdad summer and of giving reporting officers access to the northern areas.

Bryan H. Baas:ems:4/27/64

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66/ INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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DE RUHCR 0049 21/0452  
R 010432Z ZTA

NEA

AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD

Info

TO RUHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUH/M4/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SS

STATE GRNC

G

RT

SP

SECRET FRONT OF THE ACTION DEPT 1871 INFO TEHRAN 140

SAL

AMMAN ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA

EUR

KUWAIT LONDON MOSCOW DHAKHAN UNN APRIL 21-0000 AM

IGA

I PROMISED FOREIGN MINISTER THAT REPORT ON MY TRIP TO NORTH WOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THIS SUMMARY BE CLOSELY HELD AND LIKEWISE SERIES OF MORE DETAILED AIRGRAMS WHICH FOLLOW.

ATD

NSC

INR

RMR

TRIP WITH SECOND SECRETARY BAAS APRIL 9-17 INCLUDED TALKS WITH "STRONG MEN" GOVERNORS OF THE FOUR PROVINCES. FROM MOSUL WE VISITED AMADIYA, ZAKHO, TEL KAIF, AIN SIFNI, AQRA, AIN ZALA, SINJAR AND POINTS ALONG ROUTES. FROM ARBIL WE DROVE CFN 871 140 9-17

PAGE TWO RUHCR 0049 SECRET  
TO RUHCR. FROM KIRKUK WE VISITED DIBIS DAM (COMPLETION IN A FEW MONTHS). FROM SULAIMANIYA WE DROVE TO DIKAN DAM AND HALARCHA. PANJWIN WAS ONLY PLANNED POINT WE COULD NOT GO. RETURNED BAGHDAD VIA DERBENDI KHAN DAM. ACCOMPANIED EVERYWHERE BY ARMY OFFICER AND ESCORTED BY ONE OR TWO PICKUP TRUCKS FULL OF LOCAL POLICE. OUR MOVEMENTS AND CONTACTS CAREFULLY CONTROLLED BOTH FOR LEGITIMATE SECURITY REASONS AND TO PREVENT CONTACTS WITH ANY SIGNIFICANT KURDS. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION.

A. SECURITY SITUATION. DESPITE EARLIER TROOP WITHDRAWALS, HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF TROOPS AND MOBILE POLICE REMAIN, WITH ARMY IN BATTALION STRENGTH INCLUDING THREE OR FOUR TANKS AND SOME ARTILLERY AT MAIN OUTLYING CENTERS AND AT LEAST BRIGADE STRENGTH IN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS. REEFED UP SECOND DIVISION AT KIRKUK PROVIDES STRATEGIC FORUM TALK IS OF WITHDRAWING BULK OF ARMY IN TWO WEEKS, LEAVING MOBILE POLICE, BUT THIS SEEMS UNLIKELY NEW MOUNTAIN BRIGADE FORMED AND IN TRAINING, USING MULES AND 75 MM PACK MORTARS AS HEAVIEST WEAPONS. ALL ARMY AND POLICE PERSONNEL GIVEN LEAVE OF WEEK OR TEN DAYS EACH MONTH, THUS EARLY RENEWAL CFN 75

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-2- 871, APRIL 21, 8 A.M. (SECTION I OF III), FROM BAGHDAD.

PAGE THREE RUQVRD 2949 S E C R E T  
OF HOSTILITIES NOT YET NOT EXPECTED.

SECURITY MEASURES HEAVY EVERYWHERE. PATROLS IN TOWNS AND ON ROADS. SOME TENSION APPARENT IN CITIES, LESS IN MOUNTAINS. INCIDENTS OCCURRING, SOME BETWEEN KURDS, BUT ON SMALL SCALE AND WITHOUT APPARENT ORGANIZATION. SALAHADDIN CAVALRY STILL UNDER ARMS AND PAID, BUT EXPECTED BE PHASED OUT IN NEXT MONTH. SLOGAN "KURDISTAN OR DIE" PAINTED ALL OVER SULAIMANIYA IN KURDISH.

COMMUNIST KURDS AND ARABS EVIDENTLY CONTROL PANJWIN-CHUARTA AREA. MEASURES APPARENTLY BEING CONSIDERED TO CLEAN UP. BELIEVE GOI COUNTING ON BARZANI AND OTHER TRIBAL LEADERS TO DO JOB, BUT ALSO PARATROOPERS AT SAYID SADEQ WHERE SOME OF BARZANI'S MEN ALSO OBSERVED. GOI PRESUMABLY WOULD WISH AVOID APPEARING REVENUE A SETTLED WAR BY USING ARMY. PRIME HAS ORDERED IMMEDIATE REPAIR OF RANIA-DOKAN ROAD, PERHAPS WITH MOVEMENT OF BARZANI FORCES IN MIND. TASK MAY BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF TERRAIN AND POSSIBILITY DEFENDERS USE IRANIAN TERRITORY.

FOUND UNANIMOUS VIEW THAT BARZANI AND OTHER TRIBAL LEADERS HAVE IRREVOCABLY SPLIT WITH KOP "BECAUSE THEIR

PAGE FOUR RUQVRD 2949 S E C R E T  
INTERESTS ARE DIFFERENT". BARZANI DESCRIBED AS UNCHALLENGED LEADER OF TRIBES AND COOPERATING FULLY WITH GOI, BUT WE UNABLE OBTAIN EXPLANATION OF CAUSE OF SPLIT. OUR GUESS IS THAT OTHER KOP LEADERS WANT TO CONTINUE GUERRILLA WAR IN LEAGUE WITH COMMUNISTS AND USING SOVIET HELP, WITH SEPARATIST OBJECTIVE AND WITH COORDINATED UPRISING IN IRAN, WHILE TRIBAL LEADERS HAVE MUCH MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVES WITHIN IRAQI STATE. ONLY UNPUBLISHED COMMITMENT TO BARZANI WE COULD UNCOVER WAS PLEDGE TO DEVELOP NORTH RAPIDLY INCLUDING MODERN ROADS INTO MOST REMOTE AREAS BRINGING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL UPLIFT, AND OF COURSE ENABLING GOI MORE EASILY INSTALL POLICE POWER. WE SUSPECT GOI ALSO COMMITTED TO PROLONGED DELAY OF LAND REFORM IN TRIBAL AREAS. APPLICATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT ANYWAY BUT PLEDGE OF NON-APPLICATION WOULD MEET TRIBAL LEADER DESIRES, WHO MUST LOOK ASKANCE AT LEFTIST DOCTRINE OF MANY KOP LEADERS.

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-3- 871, APRIL 21, 8 A.M. (SECTION I OF III), FROM BAGHDAD.

TO SUM UP IN TERMS OF CONVERSATION WITH THE LIAISON OF  
SULAIMANIYA WHO IS STILL GOI LIAISON WITH BARZANI: GOI CAN  
COUNT ON BARZANI AND OTHER TRIBAL LEADERS TO CONTROL TRIBAL  
AREAS ("BARZANI WILL GO WHEREVER HE IS TOLD") AND WILL USE

PAGE FIVE RUMORD 0949 S E C R E T  
ITS POLICE POWER TO CONTROL CITIES AND LOWLAND AREAS.

IF THIS IS TRUE, AND IT SEEMS QUITE POSSIBLY TRUE, WE  
CAN COUNT ON CONTINUED KURDISH TROUBLES. IT WILL BE NECESS-  
ARY IN ANY EVENT FOR GOI CARRY OUT MEASURES WHICH WILL BENEF-  
FIT TRIBAL AREAS, JUSTIFY POLICY OF TRIBAL LEADERS, IMPROVE  
ECONOMIC STATUS OF KURDS IN LOWLANDS TO REDUCE ARREARS OF  
KOP, AND CREATE MEANS OF EXTENDING GOI POLICE POWER THROUGH-  
OUT KURDISTAN.

B. KURDISH NATIONAL RIGHTS. WE NOWHERE FOUND ANY AREAS  
RECOGNITION OF KURDISH CULTURAL RIGHTS. INSTRUCTION IN ALL  
SCHOOLS IS IN ARABIC. THE FEW SCHOOLS WE WERE SHOWN WERE  
CAREFULLY SELECTED. IN SOME OF THEM IT IS CLAIMED THAT  
KURDISH IS TAUGHT AS A SECOND LANGUAGE (PRIMARY SCHOOL), BUT  
KURDISH TEACHERS ARE LIMITED IN NUMBERS. SOME QUINAGAMS  
SAID THEY HAD SOME KURDS ON THEIR STAFFS, BUT THIS WAS NOT  
A POPULAR SUBJECT. DOMINANT THEME WAS THAT IRAQ IS ARAB  
STATE AND KURDS MUST ADJUST. NO SIGN OF POLICE OR ARMY PER-  
SONNEL OF KURDISH ORIGIN. ONLY CONCILIATORY APPROACH WE  
FOUND WAS THAT OF GOVERNOR OF KIRKUK WHO SAYS HE ARGUING WITH  
GOI ABOUT HANDLING OF KURDS, BUT HE OBVIOUSLY EXPECTS NO  
RESULTS.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

37

Action

SECRET

Control: 16865  
Rec'd: APRIL 21, 1964  
7:18 AM

NEA FROM: BAGHDAD  
Info  
ACTION: SECSTATE 871  
SS INFO: TEHRAN 140  
G AMMAN UNNUMBERED  
SP ANKARA UNNUMBERED  
SAL BASRA UNNUMBERED  
EUR BEIRUT UNNUMBERED  
IGA CAIRO UNNUMBERED  
AID DAMASCUS UNNUMBERED  
NSC JIDDA UNNUMBERED  
INR KUWAIT UNNUMBERED  
LONDON UNNUMBERED  
MOSCOW UNNUMBERED  
DHAHRAN UNNUMBERED

RMR

849

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POL 2 IRAQ

DATE: APRIL 21, 9 AM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

BELIEVE THAT LIMITED EXTENT TO WHICH ARABS SETTLED ON FORMERLY KURDISH LANDS PRESENTS ONLY MINOR ISSUE. SOME OF ARABS ACTUALLY ABANDONED LANDS TO RETURN TO DESERT.

A-110 (US) 15-91 RAQ

C. RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. DAMAGE IN NORTH WAS CONSIDERABLE BUT LESS THAN WE EXPECTED AND FAR LESS THAN DETAILED IN A-857. THOUGHT MANY VILLAGES TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY DESTROYED AND ANIMAL LOSSES PROBABLY RATHER HEAVY IN SOME AREAS. FRUIT TREES UNDAMAGED. MANY PEOPLE HAVE MOVED BACK IN. SOME HOUSES REPAIRED. MANY FAMILIES LIVING IN TENTS LOANED BY GOI. WE WERE TOLD MOST MEN HAVE RETURNED AND MOST FAMILIES HAVE MONEY, BUT FOOD AND MONEY BEING ISSUED TO NEEDY AND ENCOURAGEMENT GIVEN TO THEM TO REBUILD, WHICH IS RATHER SIMPLE MATTER IN MOST CASES. IN ARBIL WE RECEIVED AN ESTIMATE OF 2000 FAMILIES "ON RELIEF" IN PROVINCE, BUT OTHERS LACKED STATISTICS. FOOD IN SUFFICIENT SUPPLY AS FAR AS WE COULD TELL. BELIEVE PROBLEM OF RELIEF AND RESTORING STATUS QUO ANTE IS ONE GOI CAN HANDLE FOR GREATER PART. WE SHALL SEEK CLOSER LOOK BEFORE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS.

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-2- 871 FROM BAGHDAD APRIL 21, 9 AM (SECTION 2 OF 3)

BUT PROBLEM OF COURSE GOES FAR BEYOND THIS BECAUSE THERE IS A TREMENDOUS JOB OF MODERNIZATION. MUCH ROAD REPAIR AND MANY NEW ROADS NEEDED ALONG WITH SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND CLINICS, SOCIAL CENTERS, POLICE STATIONS, WATER AND SEWAGE SYSTEMS, PAVING OF VILLAGE STREETS, ETC. COMMITTEE OF GOVERNORS HEADED BY GOVERNOR OF KURKUK HAS PRESENTED GOI WITH COLLECTIONS OF PROJECTS TO BE EXECUTED OVER FIVE YEARS AT COST OF ID 500 MILLION. IT IS IN THIS SECTOR PRINCIPALLY THAT USG SHOULD TRY FIND MEANS BE HELPFUL.

D. AGRICULTURE. POSSIBLE COMPLICATION FOR USG ASSISTANCE ON MEANINGFUL SCALE IS CURRENT STATUS OF AGRICULTURE IN NORTHERN PROVINCES. WHILE SOME PARTS OF KURDISH AREAS UNCULTIVATED, A SURPRISING AMOUNT HAS BEEN PLANTED. IN ADDITION MOST OF PLAINS AREA OF NORTH HEAVILY PLANTED IN WHEAT AND BARLEY, AND WEATHER CONDITIONS VERY FAVORABLE. IF CONDITIONS PERSIST AND PLANT DISEASES FAIL APPEAR, IRAQ SHOULD HAVE RELATIVELY LARGE GRAIN CROP, THOUGH RICE MAY CONTINUE IN SHORT SUPPLY BECAUSE OF SOUTHERN DEFICIENCY. LARGE IMPORTATION LIVE SHEEP APPARENTLY MEETING BULK OF MEAT SHORTAGE.

WE WERE UNABLE OBTAIN CLEAR EXPLANATION OF BASIS ON WHICH LANDS PLANTED. APPARENTLY ON GOVERNMENT LANDS AND ON EXPROPRIATED BUT STILL UNDIVIDED LANDS GOI HAS CONTRACTED WITH FARMERS HAVING MODERN EQUIPMENT FOR LARGE SCALE FARMING. SALT IS PROBLEM IN NORTH ONLY IN ONE LIMITED AREA OF KIRKUK PROVINCE AS FAR AS WE COULD DETERMINE. PLANS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF LANDS STILL EXIST APPARENTLY. OLD SYSTEM OF LEAVING LANDS FALLOW ALTERNATE YEARS PREVAILS AND FERTILIZERS UNUSED, BUT FACT SO MANY LAND UNCULTIVATED OR UNREAPE LAST YEARS MAY ACCOUNT FOR UNUSUALLY LARGE PLANTED AREA.

WE SHALL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH SITUATION.

E. SUMMER RESORTS. DG OF TOURISM VIGOROUSLY PREPARING NUMEROUS RESORTS FOR OCCUPANCY. ALL SHOULD BE READY

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-3- 871 FROM BAGHDAD APRIL 21, 9 AM (SECTION 2 OF 3)

IN NEXT TWO MONTHS AND SEVERAL SOONER. GOI PROBABLY HOPING REDUCE FOREIGN EXCHANGE DRAIN EXPERIENCED LAST SUMMER AND ALSO BRING FINANCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO NORTH. WE CONSIDERING RENTING HOUSE AT SALAHADDIN TO PROVIDE CHEAP PERIODS OF RELIEF FOR STAFF FROM SUMMER HEAT HERE AND TO FACILITATE OSTENSIBLY INCIDENTAL TRAVEL THROUGHOUT NORTH BY EMBASSY OFFICERS.

INCLUDED IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR NORTH ARE OTHER SUMMER RESORTS FOR WHICH THERE IS ALMOST UNLIMITED POTENTIAL.

F. COURSES OF ACTION.

1. USE OF SURPLUS FOOD. I PLAN TELL GOI SHORTLY THAT IMPRECISION OF GOVERNORS IN NORTH LEAVES ME UNABLE BE PRECISE IN RECOMMENDATIONS TO USG. THUS GOI SHOULD ARRANGE EARLY TRAVEL IN NORTH BY EMBASSY ECONOMIC OFFICER AND CARE OFFICIAL (WILL COORDINATE FIRST WITH CARE HERE), SPECIFICALLY SHOWING THEM RELIEF OPERATIONS IN BEING AND DESIRED; IN MEANTIME WE WILL DISCUSS WITH GOI OFFICIALS HERE SPECIFIC PROJECTS TO WHICH USG COULD LEND SURPLUS FOOD SUPPORT. WILL REMIND GOI OF ITS COMMITMENT SPEND ON DEVELOPMENT DINAR PROCEEDS FROM INTERNAL SALE OF TITLE IV COMMODITIES UNDER EXISTING AGREEMENT AND I SUGGEST WE WOULD BE HAPPY IF AT LEAST PART WERE EARMARKED FOR NORTH.

CONTINUE BELIEVE US POLITICAL PURPOSES SERVED BY USE OF SURPLUS FOOD TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH. IN MAKING PROMT DECISIONS WE SHOULD LEAN TO SIDE OF GENEROSITY OR "FLEXIBILITY" IN ORDER OBTAIN DESIRED POLITICAL IMPACT.

WILL BE MORE SPECIFIC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING FOR MOBILE POLICE (SEE EMBTEL 866 RE SECRETARY'S TALK WITH AL-HANI.) MOBILE POLICE OBVIOUSLY TO PLAY BIG ROLE IN NORTH AND LIKELY TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH SUBVERSION AND EVEN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS INDEFINITELY, WITH ARMY STEPPING IN ONLY WHEN ESSENTIAL. THUS BELIEVE IT NOW TIMELY OFFER COUNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING SLOTS IN US FOR POLICE AND OFFICIALS OF DG OF SECURITY. COULD LATER OFFER SUCH TRAINING AND CIVIC ACTION TRAINING TO ARMY OFFICERS,

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-4- 871 FROM BAGHDAD APRIL 21, 9 AM (SECTION 2 OF 3)

AFTER SITUATION FURTHER STABILIZED (INSHALLAH).

QUESTION IS WHO PAYS? WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S  
EARLY RESPONSE AND INSTRUCTIONS IF REPLY FAVORABLE, IN-  
CLUDING MATTER OF FUNDING.

GP-3

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By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

37  
Action

SECRET

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004 APR 21 AM 156

NEA RR RUEHCR  
Info DE RUQVWD 0049 21/0615Z  
R 010614Z ZEA  
SS FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC  
SP INFO RUQVVA/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
SAL STATE GRNC  
BT  
EUR SE C R E T SECRET OF TRE ACTION DEPT 871 INFO TEHRAN 140  
IGA AMMAN ANKARA BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA  
AID KUWAIT LONDON MOSCOW DHAKHAN UNW APRIL 21-0930 AM  
NSC  
INR 3. IRANIAN COOPERATION OPPOSITE PANJWIN-CHUARTA AREA

RMR OUR MILITARY ESCORT, BELIEVED INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, GAVE WHAT PROBABLY WERE ACCURATE HINTS ON SITUATION THIS AREA AND GOI DESIRE HAVE IT "CLEANED UP". INDEED GOVERNOR OF SULAIMANIYA

WENT TO SEE BARZANI APRIL 16 AND WE SAW HIM THAT EVENING. WHILE GOVERNOR WOULD NOT GIVE US TIME OF DAY, WE ACTED LIKE CAT WHO HAS JUST DINED ON JUICY RAT. OUR ESCORT WAS AMAZED AT HIS "EVASIVENESS".

WE LACK INFORMATION WHETHER GOI TALKING OR WILL TALK WITH IRANIANS ABOUT COLLABORATION TO SEAL IRANIAN BORDER, ASSUMING CEN 3 15

PAGE TWO RUQVWD 0049 S E C R E T  
OPERATION TO OCCUR, AND ARREST OF THOSE SEEKING USE IRAN AS HAVEN OR BASE OF OPERATION. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE MUTUAL INTEREST IN PREVENTING CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF ENCLAVE OR SPREAD OF POISON. IT SHALL ENDEAVOR OBTAIN OFFICIAL INDICATION OF GOI OPERATIONAL PLANS FROM FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD NOT BE AMISS PROBE IRANIANS FOR THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF SITUATION AND WHETHER THEY TALKING WITH IRAQIS. OBVIOUSLY THIS IS DELICATE SUBJECT TO GOI WHICH HAS BEEN LESS THAN FRANK WITH US, AND THUS IN ANY PROBING BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK RATHER THAN GIVE INFORMATION. LATER WE MAY BE IN POSITION DETERMINE WHETHER SUGGEST ONE OR BOTH PARTIES THEY CONSULT AND COOPERATE.

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ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POW 2 IRAQ		
NEA-5			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-859			CONFIDENTIAL		
1			NO.			100A AND 200 100 2 100		
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The enclosed memorandum is an initial "think piece" in general terms of the political dynamics of Iraq. Its preparation was designed to utilize the experience and observations of the Chief of the Political Section, William C. Lakeland, prior to his transfer after nearly four years in Baghdad, preceded in turn by several years in the Department dealing with Iraqi affairs.

Over a period of time we hope to be able to conduct sufficient research to permit production of a number of more detailed studies of some of the groups in the power structure and of some of the issues with which they are concerned. Thereafter we would hope to be able to present a more complete and detailed summary of the political dynamics of Iraq based on a more intimate knowledge of the components involved. Given the complexity of the socio-political structure in Iraq and the normal secretiveness of important Iraqis regarding the political process here, our project is necessarily rather long term.

For the Ambassador:

*Wesley Adams*  
Wesley Adams  
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure: Study (LOU)

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Enclosure 1, Page 1  
A-859 from Baghdad

THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF IRAQ

The political dynamics of Iraq are, in the final analysis, a function of its particular geography and history. The primary historico-geographical factor which is encountered is the ethnic and sectarian diversity of the population. Any effort to understand what makes present-day Iraq tick must begin, therefore, with at least a brief review of the historical background and a consideration of the facts of geography.

Arabs and Kurds

The inclusion (for essentially British imperial reasons) of substantial areas of Kurdish-inhabited mountain terrain within the boundaries of the modern state of Iraq, which was created after World War I primarily out of geographical Mesopotamia and adjoining desert areas, had far-reaching consequences for the new country. The most obvious of these has been the persistent internal security problem created by repeated revolts led by Kurdish tribal and nationalist leaders. Other, more subtle, effects of this bi-nationalism on Iraq's internal and external politics are referred to elsewhere in this paper. (The presence in Iraq of Turcoman, Christian and other minorities is a further complication, but these groups are too small to have much real significance.)

Sunna and Shi'a

Thirteen centuries after the Muslim conquest of Iraq by desert Arabs from the Arabian peninsula--centuries filled with tribal turbulence, violent successions, foreign invasions and alien rule--the basic schism in Islam, which had its origins in the (essentially political) dispute over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad and in ethnic and cultural resistance to Arab domination, remains an ever-present fact of political life for Iraqis. Despite deliberate discrimination against the shi'a during the four centuries of Ottoman rule and the British inclination (almost of necessity) to make use of the existing sunni administrative and military hierarchy, shi'a proselytizing, with moral and material support from Iran, has succeeded in winning and holding virtually the whole of southern Iraq. Although no really accurate statistics exist, the shi'a are now believed to exceed the sunni population (including Kurds) and almost certainly outnumber the sunni Arabs by a significant margin. Moreover, the shi'a, largely debarred from military and government careers, have concentrated on trade and banking with the result that they wield a good deal of economic power which is at least potentially translatable into political influence. The shi'a continue to suffer, however, from a lack of effective religious leadership or political solidarity and even the former land-owning shaikhs have been stripped of their power by land reform.

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Enclosure 1, Page 2  
A- 859 from Baghdad

Thus, rivalry between the dominant sunni Arab minority and the shi'a majority is an elemental factor in Iraqi politics; although personal relationships between individual members of the two sects are generally good, the sense of division is pervasive and its effects far-reaching.

Iraq's Neighbors

The fact of being the Eastern outpost of Arabism, with powerful non-Arab (although Islamic) neighbors to the north and east, has inevitably colored political outlooks in Iraq. Iraq has historical ties as well as historical problems with both Turkey and Iran. Although blamed for neglect of Iraq during four centuries of Ottoman rule, the Turks are nostalgically remembered by some Iraqis--particularly upper-class sunnis, many of whom have family ties with Turkey. There is also, of course, a small but fairly concentrated Turkish community in the Kirkuk area. The presence of the large population of Kurds in the mountainous area where Iraq, Turkey and Iran meet creates another shared interest (for the governments, a shared danger) between Iraq, Turkey and Iran.

In the case of Iran, shi'a religious connections, particularly with Najaf and Karbala, create an important tie with Iraq. On the negative side, relations are affected by Iran's cooperation with Israel and intermittent Iranian pressure for modification of the status quo in Shatt al-Arab. The existence of an Arab minority in the oil-rich province of Khuzistan (referred to by Arab irredentists as "Arabistan") is a source of nervousness to the Iranian government and could possibly become a real danger at some future date.

Somewhat paradoxically, the net effect of these geo-political factors seems to have been twofold. On the one hand, they have tended to heighten Iraq's sense of its Arabism; on the other, they have tended to mitigate against Iraq's involvement in sunni-dominated Arab unity projects.

Failure of an Experiment

By the early 1950's, with an assured and expanding income from oil, an experienced and determined leader in the person of Nuri Sa'id, political and military backing from the British and a growing professional and middle class, Iraq seemed to most observers to be reasonably well launched on the road to modern statehood. The concept of Iraqi nationality in which sunni and shi'i, Kurd and Arab, Muslim and Christian alike would share seemed to be slowly taking root. The hope that Iraq's diverse and factious population might gradually develop a sense of national unity, superseding to some degree individual, tribal, sectarian and regional loyalties, did not appear entirely fatuous.

The experiment, however, did not succeed; the mold was broken before the bond had time to set. Combined internal and external pressures produced an explosion which shattered the precarious balance that had been achieved and unleashed violence of a scarcely-anticipated scope and intensity. Although no

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Enclosure 1, Page 3  
A- 859 from Baghdad

attempt will be made to go into detail, at least a brief review of internal and external developments leading up to July 1958 is necessary to an understanding of what followed.

The Prelude to July 14

The ruling oligarchy up until July 1958 was made up basically of three elements: (a) the sunni political and military elite, (b) southern shi'a tribal leaders (who as a result of land settlement procedures had become wealthy "feudal" landlords), and (c) Kurdish tribal aghas. The Hashimite royal family with its impeccable Muhammadan lineage was acceptable to all factions and served as a unifying symbol--although the political role played by Prince Abdulilah was bitterly resented by the educated elite and finally brought about the family's destruction.

For some thirty years, in and out of office, the principal architect of the new Iraq and manager of the ruling coalition was Nuri Sa'id. It is a truism to note that the increasing rigidity of old age left him without the imaginative flexibility to cope with the internal and external pressures that built up against the regime, particularly after the successful revolution in Egypt in 1952. Nuri's failure to ward off disaster should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact, eloquently attested by subsequent events, that his basic design for Iraq was sound--that the best hope for progress and stability in a country with Iraq's peculiar complexities lay in the concept of the modern secular nation-state, bending its energies toward economic development and social and political modernization while eschewing extremisms of every sort.

Mounting Pressures

a. Arab Nationalism - Iraq had a heritage of "anti-imperialism" nourished on accumulated resentment of British tutelage and replete with its martyrs from the 1920 and 1941 uprisings. These feelings were intensified (and broadened to include the US) as a result of the Palestine War of 1948-49. The Egyptian success in negotiating the British out of the Suez base in 1954 and Nasser's growing pretensions to speak for Arab nationalism increased the pressure for modification of Iraq's outmoded treaty arrangements with Britain. Nuri's effort by taking Iraq into the Baghdad Pact to placate nationalist sentiment without really severing his military ties with the West served to make him personally and the Iraqi regime itself prime targets for the pan-Arab propaganda barrage emanating from Cairo.

When Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956, Nuri forfeited the sympathy of a crucial segment of public opinion (civilian and military) by inaction which could only be interpreted as tacit support of the aggression. Nuri's "treachery" to the Arab cause during Suez--damaging as it was--probably was less significant, however, in the cynical arena of Iraqi politics than the

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Enclosure 1, Page 4  
A- 859 from Baghdad

impression of his growing weakness relative to Nasser as the latter turned defeat into victory and swept Syria into his arms in February 1958. Nuri's riposte, the short-lived Arab Union of Hashimite Jordan and Hashimite Iraq, was widely viewed as an adding of weakness to weakness and, as events proved, probably hastened the catastrophe.

b. Military Plotting - Another stream of Iraq's political heritage which ran currently with the developments sketched above and finally converged with the flood tide of Arab nationalism on the fateful day of July 14 was the pattern of periodic military intervention in government beginning with the Bakr Sidqi coup in 1936.


Although the principle of civilian direction of government had on the whole been maintained in Iraq, and direct military interference had been the exception rather than the rule, Iraqi army officers had before them the examples not only of Bakr Sidqi and the Four Colonels of the Golden Square (1941) but also of Nasser's successful military coup in Egypt.

It is questionable what percentage of Iraqi officers were active Nasserists but the great majority were sunni Arabs and clearly a significant percentage were influenced by the Arab nationalist doctrines propounded by the Cairo propaganda machine. Others, particularly among the junior and field-grade ranks, had obviously been organized by the Communist or Baath parties. Still others who were not party adherents were affected by the "socialist" ideas put out by the National Democratic Party and other opposition groups. Nuri and the senior officers of the army were unaware of the true extent of the resultant plotting and fatally over-confident of their ability to detect and defeat any coup attempt.

c. Malaise of the Elite - The third ingredient of the explosive mixture which blew the lid off in July 1958 was the disaffection of the growing intellectual and bourgeois elite whose ranks were being constantly swelled by the development and educational policies of the regime but who were with few exceptions denied access to the inner circles of the ruling oligarchy. This group (and to some extent the upper proletariat) could no longer be satisfied by the promise--or even the reality--of greater material abundance. Imbued with a mixture of reformist ideals and ambition to share the powers and prerogatives of rule, they were both envious and contemptuous of the privileged few. It was these people (including their military counterparts--the younger officers) that the aging politicians most seriously failed to understand. Nuri's increasing resort to suppression of political activity and expressions of dissent simply built up the pressure while ignoring the need to find channels for non-destructive release of the energies being generated in the society.

It is interesting to note the ironical fact that in the case of all three of the principal factors cited above, it was the sunna who were the dominant element. Thus, while pan-Arabism has an appeal for some of the educated, secularized shi'a and Nasser's magnetism as an Arab leader is not felt by the

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Enclosure 1, Page 5  
A-859 from Baghdad

sunna alone, it is the latter who as a group are the principal advocates of Arab nationalism and unity. Again, although the officer corps increasingly had opened its ranks to shi'a Arabs, Kurds and even Christians, it had always been predominantly sunni Arab in make-up. Even the ranks of the disaffected elite, while including many educated shi'a, Kurds and other minority elements, were probably predominantly composed of middle-class sunnis in 1958. It may thus be argued that in a very real sense it was the sunna who took the lead in bringing about the downfall of the old order and (as events were to prove) opened the door to a violent upsurge of anti-sunna forces.

The Shu'ubi Interregnum

An authoritative study of the Qasim era has yet to be written but it can be argued that the period, broadly speaking, was characterized by protracted and bitter conflict between opposing factions roughly describable as the Arab nationalist sunna versus a loose shi'a-Christian-Kurd coalition bent on throwing off traditional sunni Arab domination. The situation was, of course, immensely complicated by the injection of ideological and foreign-policy issues and by Qasim's manipulations aimed at maintaining his personal position. Sycophancy played its ugly part, but conviction also was operative. It was not uncommon, for example, to find communist members of sunni families or individual (educated) shi'a with Arab nationalist--even pro-Nasser--attitudes. On the whole, however, and particularly following the collapse of the Mosul-based Shawwaf revolt of March 1959, the period was one in which anti-sunni-Arab ("shu'ubi"\*) forces were dominant.

The Role of Qasim

Without trying to assign relative weights to the various motives operating in Qasim's complex personality, one can nevertheless detect shu'ubi attitudes behind much of his behavior. Although a professional army officer, he came from humble origins and was not really a member of the "in" group which he rebelled against. Despite his anti-western and pro-communist sympathies, he seems to have been motivated more by personal ambition and resentment of the status quo than by ideological commitment. Thus, from the outset Qasim set himself against the pro-UAR sunni element led by Arif and encouraged or rode with the communist-led forces, but he moved to check the communists when he felt his own position beginning to be threatened. He welcomed back the Barzani exiles and then prepared the ground for a new Kurdish revolt by his clumsy efforts to manipulate Kurdish nationalism for his own ends.

\* Although shu'ubism historically connoted only opposition to Arab domination, its principal propagators were Persian shi'a and in modern Iraqi usage the term has taken on anti-sunni (as well as anti-Arab) overtones.

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Enclosure 1, Page 6  
A- 859 from Baghdad

In the end, Qasim's evil genius for dominating other men and playing diverse elements off against each other not only led to his own destruction but paved the way for the reestablishment of sunni political control. Before turning to the post-Qasim era, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at the phenomenon of Iraqi communism and its relationship to shu'ubism.

Iraqi Communism

Although it played no major part in the execution of the 1958 coup, the Communist Party of Iraq (CPI), with its hard core of professionals seasoned by years of prison or exile, moved quickly to exploit the opportunity offered by the destruction of the anti-communist, pro-Western regime. Pre-1958 the CPI had gained some sympathy by its sacrifices in defiance of Nuri and had even been accepted in a National Union Front with non-communist parties in 1957. It was not accorded participation as a party in the post-revolution cabinet, but managed to exert considerable influence through Qasim himself, several ministers and a number of key officers.

While its ideological appeal, discipline and organization exercised an attraction that cut across sectarian, tribal and even family lines, the CPI naturally found its greatest strength among the groups dissatisfied with their status--i.e., shi'a, Christians and Kurds. Since the communists are basically opposed to Arab nationalism and Arab unity, a natural parallel between communist doctrine and shu'ubi attitudes developed. The abortive Mosul revolt in March 1959 by Arab nationalist officers with Shammur tribal backing and clandestine support from the UAR precipitated a clear drawing of the lines with the communists springing to Qasim's assistance. The atrocities committed on that occasion against the Arab population of Mosul by communist-led Popular Resistance Forces from Baghdad and local Christians and Kurds, and in July 1959 against the sunni Turkish-speaking community of Kirkuk by Kurdish/communist elements, completed the identification of communism with shu'ubism in the eyes of most Iraqis.

In retrospect it is increasingly clear that this identification cost the CPI dearly. The savagery and wanton brutality displayed in Mosul and Kirkuk undoubtedly were as much an eruption of sectarian hatreds as calculated communist tactics but the party was nevertheless branded in the public mind with both brutality and anti-Arabism. Even Qasim recoiled in horror and the nightmare of a quick communist take-over receded, although Qasim's perpetual balancing act left the communists with considerable room for action until he was finally toppled and they faced their day of reckoning at the hands of the Baath Party.

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Enclosure 1, Page 7  
A- 859 from Baghdad

The Baathi Interlude

When a loose coalition of Arab nationalist\* and Baathist officers, assisted by Baath Party of Iraq (BPI) civilian cadres, finally collapsed Qasim's house of cards in February 1963, there was for a while widespread hope that Iraq might at last be entering on a period of internal healing and economic development, accompanied by reconciliation with the main stream of Arab-nationalism centered in Cairo. Without attempting any exhaustive critique of the rise and fall of Baathi power in Iraq, we may make some observations in line with the preceding analysis in the hope of shedding some light on the longer-term significance of this period.

Purge of the Communists

While the Baathist-nationalist coalition which overthrew Qasim was predominantly sunni-based (although the Baath doctrine stressed secularism) and the sweeping purge of communists which followed had many of the aspects of blood-feud revenge for Mosul and Kirkuk, it is important to note the ways in which ideological considerations interacted with traditional attitudes and allegiances during the Baathi period.

The Baath and Communist Parties in Iraq have for nearly a decade been rivals (and, in fact, the only serious contenders) for the allegiance of those Iraqis who have begun to feel the need for a coherent, modern approach to the country's problems and an organized, disciplined, ideologically motivated political instrument to spearhead reform. Apart from the sectarian pitfalls into which the CPI fell in 1959, the party has suffered in Iraq as elsewhere in the Arab world from its espousal of an "alien" ideology and its overriding allegiance to the Soviet leadership.

The Baath, of course, copied the highly effective communist organization and many of the communist political tactics but sought to reconcile modern concepts of nationalism and socialism, including the more appealing tenets of Marxism-Leninism, with abiding Arab attitudes and beliefs. To create, in other words, a synthesis of certain modern Western and prevailing Arab values which would offer the people of the area an acceptable doctrinal framework for the transition to modernity. (Although Nasser has traded on the broad and powerful appeal of the general notion of Arab unity, and exercises great influence through

\* This word is written in lower case because it does not refer to any one particular political group but it is intended to denote those individuals and groups who favor Arab unity in some form and look to Nasser as the natural leader of the unity movement.

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Enclosure 1, Page 8  
A- from Baghdad

his personal qualities of leadership and the leading position of Egypt in the Arab world, he has never been a very effective competitor in the field of ideology and doctrine--for reasons which cannot be analyzed here.)

Baathist-Nationalist Rivalry

To return to February 1963, it was apparent that both traditional attitudes and party considerations dictated liquidation of the communist apparatus and that the Baathists and their nationalist allies of the movement were united on that. What also quickly became apparent was that there was little else that the Baathists and nationalists could really agree upon. Among the factors contributing to the tension we may note the following:

1. The well-organized Baathists, despite the smallness of their total numbers, naturally thought in terms of Party rule. Notwithstanding the considerable strength of nationalist sentiment in the sunni heart of Iraq, the Baathists were contemptuous of the lack of organization or even cohesiveness of the other nationalist groups and were disinclined to share effective power with them.
2. The background of Baath Party-Nasser rivalry over Syria beclouded BPI-nationalist relations in Iraq, particularly after the return of a Baathist-dominated regime in Syria. This situation was intensified rather than relieved by the patently unrealistic unity agreement signed in Cairo in April.
3. The National Guard, as the para-military arm of the Baath Party, having dealt efficiently but brutally with the communist threat began to be used against non-communist opposition. The sadistic behavior of some of its members gave the organization a bad name which rubbed off on the Party as a whole and particularly on Ali Salih al-Saadi who increasingly appeared as a proponent of Baathist unilateralism in the political arena and doctrinaire extremism in the economic and social fields.
4. A further factor, which not only caused tension with the nationalists but stirred deep resentments among almost all non-Baathist Iraqis, was the Baath's attempt to subordinate Iraq's interest as an existing sovereign state to those of the "Arab nation". This doctrine was interpreted to justify the corollary that the authority of the Baath National (i.e., international) Leadership overrode that of the Government of Iraq, since the Party was the chosen instrument for the attainment of Arab unity. The interference in Iraqi affairs of Syrian and Lebanese Baathist leaders--particularly of Party secretary Michel Aflaq--was deeply offensive to Iraqi sensibilities.

Collapse of the Baath

The cumulative effect of these and other factors was the progressive isolation of the Baath with a concomitant over-taxing of the Party's limited

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By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Enclosure 1, Page 9  
A- 859 from Baghdad

capabilities for governing. As the regime's predicament became increasingly clear the pressures were reflected within the Party's "collective leadership", with one school of thought insisting on the need for moderation and compromise with the nationalists and another pressing for thoroughgoing socialist reform under an uncompromising Party dictatorship. When the Talib Shabib-Hazim Jawad "moderate" faction succumbed to traditional Iraqi political instincts and broke Party unity by organizing a coup de force against Ali Salih al-Saadi and his "extremist" supporters, the end of Iraq's first experiment in ideologically-motivated party government came quickly. Challenged by National Guard effrontery and backed by an aroused populace, the Army leadership put aside its political differences long enough for Baathist and nationalist officers to unite on November 18, 1963 in crushing the Guard and destroying the Baathi militants' base of power.

The Sunni Restoration

The nearer the object one tries to focus on with his political telescope, the more difficult it becomes to distinguish the main outlines from the mass of detail. So it is with the situation which has emerged in Iraq since November 18, 1963. Protected by this caveat, however, we may venture on some broad-brush observations.

In the first place, the events of November demonstrated (if there had ever been any serious doubt of it) that the Army remains the final arbiter in Iraqi politics and can be expected to intervene in critical situations, at least. When it came to the test, the Baath proved to have failed in its effort to forestall military intervention by the dual means of building a Party-controlled counter force and trying to gain internal control of the armed forces themselves. Traditional values and attitudes proved to be stronger, even in the cases of many avowedly Baathist officers, than ideological commitments and Party ties. In the heat of the crisis, Baathist and nationalist officers alike tended to behave as professional military men.

Secondly, in the evolution of the situation since November we have seen, with the removal even of military Baathists who turned against the National Guard, a rejection of party dogma and the re-emergence of traditional sunni domination of the government. Unfortunately, sunni monopolization of political and military power appears to have become so undisguised and pervasive as to be provoking an intensification of the long-standing dissatisfaction of the shi'a with their status in the country. The issue of "sectarianism" is being discussed more widely and openly at present than at any time in recent Iraqi history.

Thirdly, the conclusion of a truce with the Kurds may also be at least partially explained in terms of a reversion to traditional alignments. Viewed in that light, the apparent contradictions in the spectacle of sunni-controlled, military-based, nationalist-oriented regime making peace and trying to win the

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Enclosure 1, Page 10  
A-859 from Baghdad

Kurds back to brotherly cooperation tend to disappear. Many Kurds also seem to have sensed that while their dreams of far-reaching political gains are not now obtainable, there is a better prospect of a tolerable relationship with this regime than was possible either under Qasim's erratic dictatorship or in the Baath's pan-Arab scheme of things.

A fourth point worth noting is that while there is quite clearly a limit as to how far any but a minority of extreme pan-Arabists are prepared to go on the issue of early unity with the UAR, there is wide support for Iraq's active participation in Arab affairs generally and for its taking a strong stand on the Palestine question in particular. Israel remains perhaps the only issue which can automatically produce a large measure of unity among the Arabs--and among the Iraqis as well. No Iraqi government (and an Arab-nationalist-oriented regime least of all) can pursue domestic policies unmindful of larger Arab considerations--and particularly of the perennial Arab preoccupation with Israel.

Finally, it should explicitly be recognized that, notwithstanding the relative social and economic conservatism of the post-November regime ("socialism" has almost become an epithet), there is on the part of both government and people a great urge for modernization and progress. The government's effort is to show itself diligent in fostering economic development, expanding education and promoting social welfare. Particularly significant is the fact that, despite widespread recognition of the adverse economic effects of agrarian reform to date and even some suggestions (not accepted by the government) for re-enlisting the former landowners' services as an interim measure, there has been general acceptance of the political and social necessity for land reform as a precondition to raising the whole level of rural existence. Thus, while the public has reacted adversely to its experience of recent years with both "communism" and Baathi "socialism" and is currently in a fairly sober frame of mind, there is almost no serious questioning of the idea that the government should pursue a public welfare policy and play the leading role in all fields requiring major capital investment.

Thoughts for the Future

In summary, then, it might be said that the pendulum of Iraqi politics, which was given a sharp push to the left in 1958-59, started to swing back in 1960 and has probably about reached the limit of its opposite arc. The metaphor is too simple, however, to have more than limited applicability. For while it is true that the leftist and anti-sunni forces unleashed in July 1958 have spent themselves for the present, and the sunna have come back to power on a wave of traditionalism and conservatism, there can be no mere return to old formulas. The strength of deep-rooted attitudes, relationships and values has been demonstrated but many subtle changes have been introduced, many new terms inserted in the equation of Iraqi politics.

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Enclosure 1, Page 11  
A-859 from Baghdad

The country is clearly tired of strife and wary of extremisms. The imbalance in the sunna-shi'a relationship is potentially dangerous but the frank recognition of the perils of sectarianism could, hopefully, contribute to a peaceful adjustment of the situation. There seems to be a rather general conviction of the need for an early return to some form of parliamentary government which would provide a privileged forum for debate and dissent. Legal and economic security for the individual citizen has acquired new meaning and value against the background of individual and party tyranny of the last five years. Notwithstanding the rejection of communism and the failure of the Baathi experiment, however, many of the younger generation particularly have grasped the importance of bringing modern political, economic and social concepts to bear on Iraq's problems. The current rulers' inclination either to dismiss ideology or to be content with selective borrowings from Nasser is not shared by many of the younger intelligentsia who feel the need for a new vehicle capable of cutting across the old dividing lines and releasing energies for a genuine national endeavor of reform and development.

Perhaps all that can be said with any assurance at this time is that the search for a modern political creed and instrument will continue in contrapuntal interplay with the traditional themes of Iraqi political life. Only the future can tell to what extent the result will be harmonious or to what degree discord will prevail.

In a recent address he delivered in Venezuela, Professor Walt W. Rostow listed three basic conditions necessary to the attainment of that degree of political stability without which democracy cannot flourish or development proceed apace. Briefly summarized these are:

1. A popular consensus on the main lines of foreign and welfare policy to be pursued by the nation.
2. Confidence on the part of the minority that its basic rights will be protected.
3. A widespread loyalty to the democratic process.

At first glance it is apparent that Iraq has a long way to go by this definition. And yet there is room for cautious optimism. The first condition, in fact, seems well on the way to being met. The situation with regard to Professor Rostow's second condition is, of course, extremely complex. There is a clear majority-minority relationship only between Arabs and Kurds (plus Christians, Jews, etc.), while within the Arab community the minority is dominant. Whether these racial and sectarian divisions can be softened by the supervision of modern political loyalties remains to be seen. Finally, loyalty to the democratic process is still largely confined to the Western-educated elite but, as noted above, appears to be increasingly recognized

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Enclosure 1, Page 12  
A- 859 from Baghdad

(in theory, at least) as a political necessity for Iraq. The key question at present is whether it will be so recognized by those who hold the actual power in their hands.

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E	P	IO	FROM : Amconsul BASRA		DATE: March 5, 1964	
4			SUBJECT: Ambassador Strong's Visit to Basra Consular District		REF :	
L	FBO	AID	<p>Submission of this report was delayed by the Ambassador's illness following return to Baghdad.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Summary</u></p> <p><u>Begin Unclassified.</u> Ambassador Strong visited Basra September 23 through September 26, as well as Amara on the last day of his tour. The Ambassador called upon the principal officials of this area, visited the BPC installations at Fao and Khor-al-Amaya and toured the date industry. Local officials in Basra and Amara were markedly courteous and hospitable and they seemed to appreciate having someone come from Baghdad to see them. <u>End Unclassified</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">Decontrolled following March 5, 1967.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">LIMITED OFFICIAL USE</p>			
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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Amb RCSstrong/CWHenebry:two 3-4-64

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by: CWHenebry

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Page 2, A-94 from Basra

Begin Unclassified

September 23

Called on the Mutasarrif Mohammed AL-HAYANI who explained the problems besetting his administration---mostly lack of funds---and who suggested that American aid would be most welcome. The Ambassador in turn spelled out the nature of the assistance the United States could extend to Iraq and the resources available to Iraq from elsewhere.

In the absence of the Acting Director General, called upon Talib AL-QAILANI, Chief of Administration of the Iraqi Ports Administration, Dr. Taariq AL-KAATIB, the Chief Engineer of the Port, who explained the operations and responsibilities of the Ports Administration and conducted a tour of the port area.

Called upon the Acting Garrison Commander, Colonel Sabih RAOUF, who discussed the problems of the Iraqi Army and the River Force stationed in Basra.

Toured the facilities of the American Liquorice Company, MacAndrews-Forbes, and were guests at a luncheon given by the manager of the company.

Reception by the Consul for 150 guests including leading political figures and businessmen.

September 24

Trip by car to Fao and by launch to the deep water terminal at Khor-al-Amaya.

Official dinner by the Consul attended by 28 guests.

September 25

Inspection of the dates industry, including the Iraqi Date Trading Company's packing plant, three private packing stations, and the Nabisco fumigation plant.

Lunch by the Acting Director of the IDTC.

Reception by the Director General of the Iraqi Dates Administration attended by 150 guests.

Supper for 20 by the manager of Nabisco.

Dinner by the Consul's wife in honor of the Ambassador's wife for 20 Iraqi women.

September 26

Visit to Amara calling on the Acting Mutasarrif Abdul-Jalil AL-WAKIL, the local Garrison Commander, the Lord Mayor, the President of the Law Courts, and sundry justices. Visited the Republican Hospital, the agricultural station, and the Amara silver souq.

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Page 3, A-94 from Basra

Luncheon by the Mutasarrif and his staff.

Departed by train, seen off by the Mutasarrif, the Acting Garrison Commander and the Commandant of Police. End Unclassified

Comments

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1. Atmosphere. Friendly, relatively open. Practically all those invited to social functions showed up.

2. Mutasarrif of Basra. Handsome, personable, very friendly and courteous. Limited command of English. Went out of his way to show honor to his visitor. Obviously highly regarded by the leading residents.

3. Amara. The Mutasarrif was young, personable, initially chilly but warmed up rapidly, obviously a strong Baathi, apparently liked by his staff, full of plans for making Amara a better place to live through the self-help organization of NOPA. He claimed that several hundred former residents of the Amara area had recently returned to Amara from Baghdad as a result of GOI urgings and that land was being distributed to them.

4. Dates. The industry was obviously a shambles. The packing stations were filthy, there was no supply of chemicals at them for fumigation, the dates awaiting attention were inadequately protected, etc. Friendly advice was given to the packers and to the Iraqi officials concerned that if the dates trade with the US was to be kept alive it was essential that there be vast improvements promptly, and the belief was expressed to them that the USG would be obliged to commence reducing the infestation tolerance level in 1964. It was made clear that the American Embassy and Consulate wanted to help keep the trade alive and that our attention to the dates industry was for this purpose.

5. Port Administration. Large sums obviously have been spent in recent years to improve handling and storage of cargo. Great progress has been made in building on Port lands, brick houses for the staff and permanent labor, the latter giving up sarrafa living. Housing for port labor is far superior to that being built outside Baghdad by former sarrafa dwellers there and is twice as expensive. End Limited Official Use

*Charles W. Henebry*  
Charles W. Henebry  
American Consul

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ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 2 IRAQ	
EUR-6			<b>AIRGRAM</b>		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	A-1990		UNCLASSIFIED	
1			NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR	
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : Department		1964 FEB 20 AM 8 55 <i>Jm</i>	
NEA	CU	INR	Info : Baghdad, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Ankara, Teheran, Amman, Cairo, London		ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH	
4	P	5	FROM : American Embassy Paris		DATE: February 19, 1964	
E		2	SUBJECT : Iraqi Communique			
L	FBO	AIO	REF :			
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<i>RM/R file</i> <i>inter</i> <i>2/27/64</i> <i>RK</i> <i>1</i>			<p>COMBAT, on February 15-16, 1964, carries a communique from the Embassy of Iraq in Paris, purporting to contain the verbatim text of the communique issued by the President of Iraq on February 11; highlights:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Government of Iraq recognizes the "national rights" of the Kurds "within the framework of fraternal national unity."</li> <li>2. All Kurdish prisoners detained during the "events" in northern Iraq to be released and pardoned. The blockade of Kurdish territory to be ended.</li> <li>3. The Local Government Administration to be reinstituted in northern Iraq.</li> <li>4. Kurdish employees and civil servants to be returned to work.</li> <li>5. The economic blockade (of the North) to be raised.</li> <li>6. The resumption of economic life in northern Iraq to be encouraged with emphasis on construction, and indemnities to be paid to those entitled to press claims.</li> <li>7. Indemnities also to be paid to those whose interests were infringed by the construction of dams at DOKAN and DARBANDIKHAN.</li> </ol>			
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Drafted by: POL:PSebastian;aa-2-17-64			Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JABovey, Jr. <i>Jm</i>			
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8. Requisite measures to be taken to reestablish security and stability in northern Iraq, to guarantee legitimate rights of the Kurds and to afford them the advantages of full citizenship.

9. The responsible Ministries to begin the implementation of these measures forthwith.

According to the Iraqi Embassy here (writes COMBAT) Molla Mustapha BARZANI declared in one of his communiques that he was prepared "to base himself on the good faith of the President of the Iraqi Republic" so that the means to guarantee the national rights of the Kurds within the framework of Iraq's national unity might be found.

Barzani is also quoted as having said that the "primacy of security, law and order in North Iraq are the requisite guarantees for the resolution of all problems."

COMBAT, after noting the arrival in Baghdad of a Kurdish Delegation headed by Col. Jalal TALABANI for further talks, adds the following editorial comment:

1. The communique is important because it reveals the concessions made by the Iraqi Government to the Kurds.

2. The communique is drafted in prudent terms; it says nothing about a key Kurdish condition -- the recall of Iraqi troops to their barracks.

Other French press comment on the end of the conflict in Iraq centers on the implications for Israel of the disengagement of Iraqi (and perhaps some Egyptian) troops from peripheral conflicts such as the war on the Kurds and the guerilla in Yemen.

For the Ambassador

Norbert L. Anschuetz  
Counselor of Embassy

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By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1964 JAN 20 AM 7 33

INFO : BAGHDAD, KUWAIT

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION  
BRANCH

FROM : Amconsul BASRA

DATE: January 20, 1964

SUBJECT: DCM J. Wesley Adams Visits Basra Consular District

REF :

DCM J. Wesley Adams toured the Consular district and Kuwait from January 9 through January 13, 1964. Having transited Basra to Kuwait on January 9, he returned the following evening to Basra. On January 11, accompanied by the reporting officer, he called upon the Mutasarrif, the Garrison Commander and the Port Director. He visited all of the port facilities (with the exception of the restricted military area where Soviet arms are offloaded) and later in the afternoon the American licquorice plant, MacAndrews and Forbes. That evening a representational dinner was given at the Consul's residence which was attended by prominent Basra officials and businessmen.

On January 12, the DCM and the reporting officer flew to the tank farm in Fao and inspected BPC's facilities. Then by helicopter they visited the deep water terminal at Khor-al-Amaya. That evening the British Consul General gave an official dinner in honor of Mr. Adams.

On January 13, Mr. Adams and the reporting officer toured Amara city and Amara Liwa, calling upon the Acting Mutasarrif, the Director of Security, the Director of Education, the Chief of Police, and the Mayor. During the visit, Mr. Adams concentrated his attention on the Amara educational system. He visited a boys elementary school and a girls elementary school, as well as a model coeducational elementary school. He and the reporting officer also visited a teachers normal school (actually a secondary school for training male teachers). The visit to Amara was concluded by a tour of Amara's famous silver souq. On the return to Basra DCM Adams visited the Garden of Eden in Qurna "where our Father Abraham once lived" and lunched in the afternoon at the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Mr. Adams

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4-62 DS-323

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, A-76 from Basra

departed Basra by train for Baghdad late in the afternoon of January 13, 1964.

Comment

For senior Embassy officers a tour of the south of Iraq is an absolute necessity. Not only are the geographical conditions and climate at considerable variance with Baghdad, but the mode of thought and the very Weltanschauung of the people of the south are hardly the same as those of central and northern Iraq. For example, while Mr. Adams and this reporter toured BPC facilities, their wives visited within an hour's drive from Basra the people of the marsh lands who except for a few pieces of imported metal implements and jewelry live an almost neolithic life.

*Charles W. Henebry*  
Charles W. Henebry  
American Consul

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGINAL ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BASRA

1964 JAN 15 AM 9 28

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ARMY  
NAVY'S DISTRIBUTION  
SEARCH

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: January 14, 1964

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Kamil Chaderchi to Government.

REF :

On December 18, 1963, Kamil Chaderchi, former president of the National Democratic Party, acting "on behalf of the National Democrats", sent a long memorandum to President Arif listing his views on the means of restoring stability and democracy to Iraq. Copies of the memorandum was sent by Chaderchi to many prominent government officials. Although many of the proposals were sound, it is not believed that Chaderchi has any significant current capacity to influence developments in Iraq. His cooperation with the communists during the Red Tide in Iraq in 1959-1960 is remembered and still makes him distasteful to many Iraqis.

A summary of Chaderchi's statement follows:

The first 40 percent of the memorandum was a review of the Iraqi people's determination to overthrow the Nuri Said regime, of how the 1958 revolution was betrayed, of how the February 8, 1963 revolution was carried out to restore the principles of July 14, but how it too degenerated into a dictatorship.

"It is clear that our intention from this speedy review of incidents is to arrive at the undoubted reality that the Iraqi people is disgusted with a restless life and wishes to live in a stable atmosphere where the individual enjoys his right to live and ensures his basic rights, and gains his daily bread in a way consistent with human dignity. He also wants to see that his destinies are not entrusted to people who are afflicted with 'Sadism', - the malady of taking pleasure in torturing and

Decontrol following January 1, 1967.

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Drafted by:

POL:SEAkins:mlh:01/11/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

AMB:RCStrong *mb*

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Authority *NNO 938522*  
By *SE* NARA Date *11/18/05*



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Page 2, Airgram No. A-566  
Baghdad, Iraq.

killing people with all brutal means."

Chaderchi continued by saying that the Iraqi people would resort to force when this was the only way of achieving its rights but that military coups d'etat, can never really solve the country's problems.

"All of the past setbacks", he wrote, "were caused by the loss of democratic life". He went on to defend political parties, as the sine qua non of democracy and said that those who condemn party activity base their cases on false premises.

"In our opinion, the parties were unable to exercise their activities according to proper party understanding since July 14 and even before that date, as they were in constant conflict with the ruling authority when they failed to keep pace with the wish of that authority. Even when the authority provided certain organizations with an opportunity, as it happened after July 14, some of them exercised activities in a manner contrary to democracy insofar as using violent domination, and individual action, inconsistent with democracy, was their end. In fact, any party that attempted to combine its acts with the usual democratic methods was confronted with opposition on the part of the authority, in various manners contradictory to law, in letter and in spirit. Thus, real party activity was not, at any time, given free scope, to enable us to say that it failed in Iraq. During various epochs the popular parties were molested, and were not considered as parties in the true sense, able to practice their constitutional rights. There was, therefore, often resort to secret societies rather than to parties, despite the fact that such societies are of a peculiar nature, different from that of parties in the real sense".

Chaderchi concluded his memorandum with eleven specific proposals:

"1-Limitation of this abnormal situation - the transitional period - to the shortest possible duration; meanwhile, to endeavor, in a serious manner, to prepare the country for a sound democratic life, when the people will exercise their constitutional rights.

2-The necessity of excluding partisanship from the armed forces, in view of the great damages resulting from repeated military coups d'etat, rendering the army and the public opinion conscious of the situation.

3-Institute serious investigations, under the supervision of trusted judges, into crimes committed in detention camps prisons and other places, and mark out those responsible for such crimes and punish them judicially. To publish an official note on the outcome for the information of public opinion.

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 3, Airgram No. A-566  
Baghdad, Iraq.

4-Purge the state machinery of extraneous elements who assumed office on a narrow partisan basis. Apply the principle of efficiency and integrity, in the first place, in the selection of elements.

5-Reinstate the dismissed honest officials and those who are efficient in their posts.

6-Clear the detention camps and liberate any person who has not been charged with a real crime, specifically mentioned by law.

7-Take an interest in the Kurdish issue, and consider the military operations in the North of Iraq not as punitive operations to suppress an insurrection or tribal disobedience, but consider the Kurdish issue in the light of its ancient and modern chronology, and its relation to other similar nationalist issues, with a view to arriving at a reasonable solution. At the same time preserving the unity of Iraq, in the same way as done by other states who have multiple nationalities.

8-Render Iraq's Arab policy a stable policy not to be influenced by passions or whims, as Arab unity should always be our principal goal. But this should be made on democratic bases to be approved by the Arab peoples in all regions, quite remote from being made a toy in the hands of adventurers, who use it as a medium to grasp power when they are vagabonds but become its greatest enemies once they are in power through deceit.

9-Apply the provisions of the agrarian reform law in a sound way, which will do away with feudalism and raise the level of production.

10-Achieve industrialization on a large scale by executing the important industrial projects, particularly by establishing an independent national oil sector which will aim at developing the oil wealth and the natural gas, independently of the foreign oil companies. Eliminate all obstacles that stand in its way, and ensure and protect the private national capital to enable it to play its role in the economic development.

11-Plan the economy of the country scientifically and comprehensively and take measures ensuring the solution of urgent economic problems, particularly the problem of unemployment which is widespread, and the problem of excessive high cost of living."

For the Ambassador:

*William C. Lakeland*  
William C. Lakeland  
First Secretary of Embassy

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